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THE SEPARATION OF PLATFORMS AND COMMERCE
Lina M. Khan*
A handful of digital platforms mediate a growing share of online
commerce and communications. By structuring access to markets, these
firms function as gatekeepers for billions of dollars in economic activity.
One feature dominant digital platforms share is that they have inte-
grated across business lines such that they both operate a platform and
market their own goods and services on it. This structure places domi-
nant platforms in direct competition with some of the businesses that de-
pend on them, creating a conflict of interest that platforms can exploit
to further entrench their dominance, thwart competition, and stifle
innovation.
This Article argues that the potential hazards of integration by
dominant tech platforms invite recovering structural separations.
Separations regimes limit the lines of business in which a firm can
engage, either by proscribing entry in certain markets or by requiring
that distinct lines of business be operated through separate affiliates.
Previously implemented both as a standard regulatory intervention and
key antitrust remedy in network industries, structural separations have
been largely abandoned. At the same time that lawmakers have weak-
ened or eliminated sector-specific regulatory regimes, judicial interpre-
tation of antitrust law has drastically narrowed the forms of vertical
conduct and structures that register as anticompetitive. And when
antitrust enforcers have targeted these forms of conduct and structures,
they have applied remedies that generally (1) fail to target the under-
lying source of the problem and (2) overwhelm the institutional
capacities of the actors assigned to oversee them. Neglecting struc-
tural remedies results in both substantive harms and institutional
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misalignments—effects that are especially pronounced in digital
platform markets.
This Article seeks to give structural separations a seat back at the
table. Tracing the history of separations reveals that they have been
motivated by a host of functional goals, ranging from fair competition
and system resiliency to media diversity and administrability. Recalling
this broader set of concerns brings into focus the range of factors at stake
when dealing with dominant intermediaries and invites consideration
of the degree to which separations in platform markets would also
respond to a diverse set of problems.
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INTRODUCTION
“No competition can exist between two producers of a commodity when one
of them has the power to prescribe both the price and output of the other.”
—U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on
Interstate & Foreign Commerce1
“In short, the choice is between a Bell System restrained by neither
regulation nor true competition and a Bell System reorganized in such a
way as to diminish greatly the possibility of future anticompetitive behavior.”
—U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia2
A handful of digital platforms exert increasing control over key
arteries of American commerce and communications. Structuring access
to markets, these firms function as gatekeepers for billions of dollars in
economic activity. By virtue of setting marketplace rules for the millions
of merchants, producers, and developers dependent on their infra-
structure, dominant platforms today “function as regulators.”3
As these platforms further concentrate market power, there are
rising concerns about their size—usually in reference to the large share
that each firm captures of its primary markets.4 Yet an equally important
question concerns not the scale of these companies but their structure.
One feature dominant digital platforms share is that they have integrated
1. H.R. Rep. No. 52-2278, at vii–viii (1893).
2. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 170 (D.D.C. 1982).
3. See Jacques Crémer et al., European Comm’n, Competition Policy for the Digital
Era 6 (2019), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LHH7-9UEK].
4. See, e.g., Franklin Foer, World Without Mind: The Existential Threat of Big Tech
103 (2017) (“Amazon doesn’t necessarily want to own whole industries, but it likes to control
them. With publishing, Amazon has become the indispensable store. It sells 65 percent of
all e-books and over 40 percent of all books.”); Jonathan Taplin, Move Fast and Break
Things: How Facebook, Google, and Amazon Cornered Culture and Undermined
Democracy 21 (2017) (“Google has an 88 percent market share in online searches and
search advertising. Google’s Android mobile operating system has an 80 percent global
market share in its category. Amazon has a 70 percent market share in ebook sales.
Facebook has a 77 percent market share in mobile social media.”); David Dayen, Big Tech:
The New Predatory Capitalism, Am. Prospect (Dec. 26, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/
big-tech-new-predatory-capitalism [https://perma.cc/H2AA-JEXD] (arguing that tech
firms, due to their market-share dominance, have “crippled entrepreneurship,” “concen-
trated economic gains in a few small enclaves,” “religiously avoid[ed] taxes,” developed
extensive surveillance capabilities, and created addictive products that “have undermined
social relationships, expanded divisiveness, and transformed what it means to be human”);
Ben Smith, Opinion, There’s Blood in the Water in Silicon Valley, BuzzFeed News (Sept.
12, 2017), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/bensmith/theres-blood-in-the-water-in-
silicon-valley [https://perma.cc/3FQA-B3TC] (describing an increasingly prevalent critique
of the major American tech firms—Facebook, Amazon, Google, and Apple—as “sinister
new centers of unaccountable power”).
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across business lines such that they both operate a platform and market
their own goods and services on it. This structure places dominant
platforms in direct competition with some of the businesses that depend
on them, creating a conflict of interest that platforms can exploit to further
entrench their dominance, thwart competition, and stifle innovation.5
Consider Spotify’s effort to reach users through Apple’s iPhone
while Apple sought to promote Apple Music. In 2016, Spotify revealed
that Apple had blocked the streaming application from the App Store,
“continu[ing] a troubling pattern of behavior by Apple to exclude and
diminish the competitiveness of Spotify on iOS and as a rival to Apple
Music.”6 Or take the challenge faced by Yelp, Foundem, and scores of
online services to reach internet users while Google sought to build out
its own competitor offerings.7 In Europe and India, competition author-
ities have found that Google ranks its own services higher than those
offered by rivals, a “search bias” that means anyone competing with
Google properties may effectively disappear from Google search results.8
Merchants that rely on Amazon to reach consumers are in a similar bind:
Not only must they jostle for placement against Amazon’s own goods, but
they also face the constant risk that Amazon will spot their bestselling
items and produce them itself.9 Facebook, equipped with technology that
5. See infra sections I.A–.D.
6. Peter Kafka, Spotify Says Apple Won’t Approve a New Version of Its App Because It
Doesn’t Want Competition for Apple Music, Recode (June 30, 2016), https://www.recode.net/
2016/6/30/12067578/spotify-apple-app-store-rejection [https://perma.cc/T4XF-JCEJ]
(quoting Horacio Gutierrez, General Counsel, Spotify).
7. See Charles Duhigg, The Case Against Google, N.Y. Times (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/magazine/the-case-against-google.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
8. Findings of search bias prompted antitrust authorities in Europe and India to
fine Google for violating competition laws. Natasha Lomas, Google Fined $2.7BN for
EU Antitrust Violations over Shopping Searches, TechCrunch (June 27, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/27/google-fined-e2-42bn-for-eu-antitrust-violations-over-
shopping-searches/ [https://perma.cc/5J57-2KNW]; Natasha Lomas, Google Fined $21.1M
for Search Bias in India, TechCrunch (Feb. 9, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/09/
google-fined-21-1m-for-search-bias-in-india/ [https://perma.cc/RU8L-FZML].
9. See Greg Bensinger, Competing with Amazon on Amazon, Wall St. J. (June 27,
2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304441404577482902055882264 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (“According to some small retailers, the Seattle-based
giant appears to be increasingly using its Marketplace—where third-party retailers sell
their wares on the Amazon.com site—as a vast laboratory to spot new products to sell,
test sales of potential new goods, and exert more control over pricing.”); Julie Creswell,
How Amazon Steers Shoppers to Its Own Products, N.Y. Times (June 23, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/business/amazon-the-brand-buster.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review); Robinson Meyer, When Does Amazon Become a
Monopoly?, Atlantic (June 16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2017/06/when-exactly-does-amazon-become-a-monopoly/530616/ [https://perma.cc/3T2B-
7DC8] (“[Amazon] is, in short, an Everything Store: not only selling goods but also
producing them, not only distributing media from its servers but also renting them out to
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lets it detect which rival apps are succeeding, would often give companies
a choice: Be acquired by Facebook, or watch it roll out a direct replica.10
Competing with one of these giants on the giant’s own turf is rife with
hazards.
Venture capitalists now factor this risk into their investment decisions.11
Indeed, the power of these gatekeeper platforms to steer the fate of
countless other firms is described by entrepreneurs and investors as
“having a profound impact on innovation in Silicon Valley”12 and “choking
off the start-up world.”13 Venture capitalists now discuss a “kill-zone”
around digital giants—“areas not worth operating or investing in, since
others.”); Eugene Kim, Amazon Is Doubling Down on Its Private Label Business, Stoking
‘Huge Fear’ in Some Sellers, CNBC (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/06/
amazon-doubling-down-on-private-label-sellers-see-huge-fear.html [https://perma.cc/NZC8-
XEVA] [hereinafter Kim, Amazon Is Doubling Down].
10. See Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook’s Willingness to Copy Rivals’ Apps Seen as
Hurting Innovation, Wash. Post (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/facebooks-willingness-to-copy-rivals-apps-seen-as-hurting-innovation/2017/08/10/
ea7188ea-7df6-11e7-a669-b400c5c7e1cc_story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing Facebook’s “aggressive strategy” for attempting to break into fields beyond
social networking by “mimic[king] the most successful features of rival companies’ apps”);
Betsy Morris & Deepa Seetharaman, The New Copycats: How Facebook Squashes
Competition from Startups, Wall St. J. (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-
new-copycats-how-facebook-squashes-competition-from-startups-1502293444 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Morris & Seetharaman, New Copycats]; Deepa
Seetharaman & Betsy Morris, Facebook’s Onavo Gives Social-Media Firm Inside Peek at
Rivals’ Users, Wall St. J. (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebooks-onavo-
gives-social-media-firm-inside-peek-at-rivals-users-1502622003 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). Faced with criticism that it was using Onavo in potentially anticompetitive
ways, Facebook announced in 2019 that it was no longer using the technology to collect
data on rivals. See Josh Constine, Facebook Will Shut Down Its Spyware VPN App Onavo,
TechCrunch (Feb. 21, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/21/facebook-removes-
onavo/ [https://perma.cc/5UMD-E5E4].
11. See Dwoskin, supra note 10 (“At Sequoia’s annual off-site retreat, held in March,
skirting Google and Facebook were main topics of conversation, said Sequoia partner
Alfred Lin. . . . ‘We don’t touch anything that comes too close to Facebook, Google or
Amazon,’ he said.”); Olivia Solon, As Tech Companies Get Richer, Is It ‘Game Over’ for
Startups?, Guardian (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/
20/tech-startups-facebook-amazon-google-apple [https://perma.cc/BT2G-34G4] (“‘People are
not getting funded because Amazon might one day compete with them,’ said one founder,
who wished to remain anonymous. ‘If it was startup versus startup, it would have been a
fair fight, but startup versus Amazon and it’s game over.’”); Asher Schechter, Google and
Facebook’s “Kill Zone”: “We’ve Taken the Focus Off of Rewarding Genius and Innovation
to Rewarding Capital and Scale,” ProMarket (May 25, 2018), https://promarket.org/google-
facebooks-kill-zone-weve-taken-focus-off-rewarding-genius-innovation-rewarding-capital-scale/
[https://perma.cc/TZ98-LBX6] (“The scale of these companies and their impact on what
can be funded, and what can succeed, is massive.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Albert Wenger, Managing Partner, Union Square Ventures)).
12. Dwoskin, supra note 10.
13. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roger McNamee, Founder,
Elevation Partners).
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defeat is guaranteed.”14 Discussing how tech platform giants today use
their integrated structure to undermine rivals, a product manager who
worked for Microsoft leading up to its antitrust suit observed, “It’s what
we did at Microsoft.”15
Indeed, the way in which dominant online platforms threaten to
undermine competition and distort markets today is not entirely new. At
its core, the problem traces to a basic challenge posed by firms that
capture control over a critical network or channel of distribution.
Regulators and competition authorities have traditionally harnessed a set
of tools to ensure that bottleneck facilities do not distort competition.
These tools include common carriage, which requires firms to offer
customers equal access on equal terms,16 as well as interoperability, which
14. Schechter, supra note 11; see also American Tech Giants Are Making Life Tough
for Startups, Economist (June 2, 2018), https://www.economist.com/business/2018/06/
02/american-tech-giants-are-making-life-tough-for-startups [https://perma.cc/J56F-PML6]
(describing venture capitalists’ hesitance to support startups in industries dominated by
tech giants such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook).
15. Dwoskin, supra note 10 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Scott
Sandell, Managing Partner, New Enterprise Associates).
16. See Eli M Noam, Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of Common
Carriage, 18 Telecomm. Pol’y 435, 436–38 (1994) (explaining the origins of common
carriage and the underlying principle that no customer willing and able to pay for a
service should be denied its use). Recognizing the gatekeeper power of internet service
providers (ISPs), academics and policymakers in the 2000s re-embraced common carriage
in the form of “network neutrality.” Under the Obama Administration, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) codified net neutrality rules requiring that ISPs treat
all internet traffic equally. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd.
5601, 5603, para. 4 (2015) (adopting “carefully-tailored rules that would prevent specific
practices we know are harmful to Internet openness—blocking, throttling, and paid
prioritization—as well as a strong standard of conduct designed to prevent the deploy-
ment of new practices that would harm Internet openness”); Preserving the Open
Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17906, para. 1 (2010)
(ordering that “[f]ixed broadband providers may not unreasonably discriminate in
transmitting lawful network traffic”). In December 2017, the Trump Administration’s FCC
voted to undo this order. See Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 318, para. 20
(2018). Numerous lawsuits—including one on behalf of twenty-three state attorneys
general—are now challenging the legitimacy of the FCC’s repeal. See, e.g., Petition for
Review at 1–2, New York v. FCC, No. 18-1055 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 22, 2018). A wealth of
scholarship has discussed and debated the revival of common carriage in the form of
network neutrality. See, e.g., Mark Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 925,
928–30 (2001) (advocating against government policies that reduce competition among
internet service providers); Barbara van Schewick, Toward an Economic Framework for
Network Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 329, 331–36 (2007)
(analyzing the “potential for discriminatory behavior by network providers”); Kevin
Werbach, Only Connect, 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1233, 1270–72 (2007) (noting that, while
network neutrality “followed a classic non-discrimination script” when it was first
promoted, both sides of the contemporary network neutrality debate “fail to recognize the
significance of interconnection”); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination,
2 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 141, 150 (2003) [hereinafter Wu, Network Neutrality]
(explaining “how a common carriage or anti-discrimination model might be better developed
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requires networks to maintain an open interface, enabling users to switch
between platforms with ease.17 These policies respond, respectively, to
problems of discrimination and lock-in.
In digital markets, however, third parties that depend on a platform
risk not just discrimination and lock-in but also appropriation. Because
dominant platforms monitor with unrivaled precision the business
activity of third parties while also competing with them, a platform can
harvest insights gleaned from a producer at the producer’s expense.
This Article argues that these combined problems of discrimination
and information appropriation invite recovering common carriage’s
forgotten cousin: structural separations. Structural separations place
clear limits on the lines of business in which a firm can engage. Rather
than prohibit particular business practices, separations proscribe certain
organizational structures. In antitrust, structural remedies are contrasted
with behavioral ones: Whereas behavioral remedies seek to prevent firms
from engaging in specific types of conduct, structural remedies seek to
eliminate the incentives that would make that conduct possible or likely
in the first place.18
Structural prohibitions have been a traditional element of American
economic regulation. They have been applied as a standard regulatory
tool and key antitrust remedy in network industries, often to prohibit a
dominant intermediary from competing with the businesses that depend
on it to get to market. While common carriage regimes prevent a firm
from discriminating—requiring equal service on equal terms—structural
prohibitions eliminate one source of the incentive to discriminate. In this
way, common carriage and structural separations often functioned as
complements in the service of nondiscrimination.
to address the current Internet environment”); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network
Neutrality, 19 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 13–18 (2005) (arguing that proponents of network
neutrality mistakenly focus on promoting competition among internet content providers,
which are already competing vigorously, instead of among internet service providers,
which are not currently very competitive).
17. See Philip J. Weiser, Regulating Interoperability: Lessons from AT&T, Microsoft,
and Beyond, 76 Antitrust L.J. 271, 272–74 (2009) (using the AT&T and Microsoft cases to
illuminate why interoperability in an important antitrust tool, and noting that “in network
industries, cooperation is essential for rivals of dominant firms to have any chance of
success in the marketplace”).
18. See Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network
Industries, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 15 (2001) (discussing the distinction between behavioral
and structural remedies). It’s worth noting that the structural–behavioral divide is not so
clear-cut. See Eric Emch et al., What Past U.S. Agency Actions Say About Complexity in
Merger Remedies, with an Application to Generic Drug Divestitures 1 (Dusseldorf Inst. for
Competition Econ., DICE Discussion Paper No. 270, 2017), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/
10419/169412/1/898962412.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[T]he simple dichot-
omy of structural versus behavioral does not illuminate the greyer area into which most
remedies containing both structural and behavioral elements, fall.”).
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Today, structural separations have largely been abandoned.19 At the
same time that lawmakers have significantly weakened or outright elimi-
nated sector-specific regulatory regimes, judicial interpretation of
antitrust law has drastically narrowed the forms of vertical conduct and
structures that register as anticompetitive. And when antitrust enforcers
have targeted these forms of conduct and structures in recent years,
they’ve applied remedies that generally (1) fail to target the underlying
source of the problem and (2) overwhelm the institutional capacities of
the government actors assigned to oversee them.20 Neglecting structural
separations results in both substantive harms and institutional misalign-
ments—effects that are especially pronounced in digital markets.
This Article seeks to give structural separations a seat back at the
table. Its contribution is twofold. First, it demonstrates that both the risk
and cost of information appropriation are heightened in digital markets,
rendering conduct remedies especially ineffective and structural
remedies critical.21 Dominant digital platforms passively capture highly
precise and nuanced data on their business customers, information that
they can exploit when competing against those same customers. These data
are more valuable by virtue of being more sophisticated—and more
likely to be exploited given their value. This risk of appropriation
coupled with discrimination, moreover, is especially harmful in digital
platform markets, given the important role platforms play as innovation
catalysts. Even within a framework where only welfare-based harms justify
regulatory interventions, the likely innovation harms stemming from
platform appropriation and discrimination invite serious consideration of
structural limits.
Second, this Article identifies the host of functional goals that
motivated previous separations regimes, ranging from fair competition
and system resiliency to media diversity and administrability.22 These
concerns register in a normatively pluralistic framework: While some are
cognizable in terms of welfare economics, others appeal to a broader set
of democratic and institutionalist values. In the context of business and
market structure, these distinct values sometimes align—such that a
separation that promotes a robust marketplace of ideas also promotes
dynamic efficiency—while in other instances they are in tension.
After identifying the tradition of structural separations and the
diverse set of concerns that motivated them,23 this Article explores
whether integration by dominant tech platforms poses risks and challenges
19. See infra Part II.
20. See Spencer Weber Waller, Access and Information Remedies in High-Tech
Antitrust, 8 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 575, 575–77 (2012) (“Finally, the more complex the
remedy, the greater the need for sophisticated oversight and dispute resolution mecha-
nisms that typically exceed the resources and strengths of the enforcement agencies.”).
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Parts III–IV.
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analogous to those previously addressed through separations.24 It closes
by briefly sketching out relevant considerations for separating platforms
and commerce and identifying likely challenges.25
This Article is a project in diagnosis and intellectual recovery. It
seeks to provide a general analytical framework for thinking through
problems stemming from integration by dominant digital platforms and
to identify principles through which Congress and agencies can issue
policy prescriptions to remedy them. Its goal is to enrich our under-
standing of the tools and remedies through which lawmakers and regulators
have previously addressed integration by dominant intermediaries—an
effort in recovery necessitated by the abandonment of traditional regula-
tory interventions and partial collapse of antitrust. Several questions that
this Article only partially engages—such as how to scope and design
specific separations in digital markets—invite deeper study.
Several factors render this project especially timely. First, the central
role dominant platforms play in structuring access to online commerce
and communications is prompting both scholarly and policy discussions
about whether these firms should be designated as forms of infra-
structure or essential services, meriting regulatory interventions coupled
with reinvigorated antitrust.26 Second, after years of retreating from
structural remedies in favor of behavioral ones, antitrust enforcers are
confronting the difficulty of enforcing pure conduct remedies and
asking whether greater reliance on structural interventions would better
24. See infra Part V.
25. See infra Part V. Although the question of how antitrust enforcers should assess
vertical mergers is receiving renewed attention today, the focus of this Article is much
narrower: namely, vertical expansion by digital platforms operating in markets
characterized by network externalities. Because these markets can favor the emergence of
a single dominant player, integration is more likely to raise concerns in network markets
than in highly competitive ones. See, e.g., FTC, Commission File No. 181-0180, Statement
of Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter: In the Matter of Sycamore Partners, Staples,
and Essendant 2 (2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
1448321/181_0180_staples_essendant_slaughter_statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/98Y4-
V5EA] (“Vertical tie-ups are occurring across the economy, and they present an enforce-
ment challenge that we must meet.”).
26. See, e.g, Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Virtual Competition: The Promise
and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy 203 (2016) (noting that, while online
markets create a “competitive veneer,” “complex webs of algorithms” give tech firms new
anticompetitive strategies to “maximize the firms’ profits, while harming our welfare”);
Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy 215–16 (2016)
(arguing that antitrust authorities should account for “data-driven network effects,” which
can “increase entry barriers”); K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social
Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 Cardozo L. Rev. 1621,
1626 (2018) [hereinafter Rahman, New Utilities] (identifying “principles for twenty-first
century public utility regulation” and applying those principles “to the emergent debates
over private power and infrastructure in the context of internet platforms”).
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promote competition.27 And third, a neo-Brandeisian movement is refo-
cusing attention on the structural underpinnings of the competitive
process, critiquing the current welfare-based approach for both betraying
the founding values of antitrust and failing on its own terms.28
Part I of this Article documents how dominant digital platforms use
their integrated structure to engage in both discrimination and infor-
mation appropriation and reviews why this conduct likely undermines
innovation. Part II traces the institutional and doctrinal shifts that
account for the retreat from structural separations. Part III reviews five
instances in which separations were implemented. Part IV identifies the
set of harms that lawmakers, regulators, and enforcers sought to address
through structural separations and the functional goals they aspired to
promote. Part V examines whether integration by dominant platforms
gives rise to analogous harms, briefly explores what a separations
framework for digital intermediaries might look like, and identifies likely
challenges and questions that remain unresolved. The Appendix engages
the relevant economic literature to examine why platforms would act in
ways that risk undermining their ecosystems.
I. INTEGRATION BY DOMINANT DIGITAL PLATFORMS
Dominant digital platforms serve as critical intermediaries of online
commerce and communications. Reflecting on the vital role these firms
now play, the Supreme Court has described Facebook, Google, and other
27. See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice,
Keynote Address at American Bar Association’s Antitrust Fall Forum (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-
keynote-address-american-bar [https://perma.cc/X4H3-Q6KA]; see also John E. Kwoka &
Diana L. Moss, Behavioral Merger Remedies: Evaluation and Implications for Antitrust
Enforcement, 57 Antitrust Bull. 979, 1008 (2012) (“Structural remedies have advantages
in terms of clarity, cost, and certainty, and have withstood the test of experience.”).
28. See, e.g., K. Sabeel Rahman, Democracy Against Domination 2–3 (2017)
(“Corporations, economic elites, and even market forces themselves all exercise a kind
of unchecked power over others in the economy. The purpose of governance in this view
is to curtail such forms of economic power, subjecting these seemingly powerful and
diffuse economic forces to democratic oversight and control.”); Tim Wu, The Curse of
Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age 9–11 (2018) (arguing that “[w]e have managed to
recreate both the economics and politics of a century ago—the first Gilded Age—and
remain in grave danger of repeating more of the signature errors of the twentieth
century”); Lina Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J.
Eur. Competition L. & Prac. 131, 131–32 (2018) (discussing the historical roots and
modern goals of the neo-Brandeisian movement); David McLaughlin, Forget Consumer
Welfare. This Antitrust Movement Targets Power, Bloomberg Businessweek (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-17/forget-consumer-welfare-this-antitrust-
movement-targets-power-instead (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing the
movement’s goal as “not just to toughen enforcement by the federal government, but to
return antitrust policy to its early 20th century roots to take on new corporate giants,
particularly in the tech sector”).
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online providers as serving as the “modern public square,”29 while law-
makers have analogized Amazon to a nineteenth-century railroad.30 Govern-
ments around the world have initiated studies and investigations examining
the market power these firms enjoy.31 The dominant digital platforms
differ in important ways: They have different business models, different
value chains, and different primary markets. But one critical feature they
share is the dual role they play in select markets: as both an operator of a
dominant platform that hosts third-party merchants, content creators, or
app developers, and as a market participant that competes with those
same producers. This Part reviews some of the markets in which online
platforms are integrated and the practices this integrated structure enables.
29. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
30. See Ramon Ramirez, Elizabeth Warren Champions Michelob Ultra, Breaking Up
Amazon at SXSW, Daily Dot (Mar. 9, 2019), https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/elizabeth-
warren-john-kasich-sxsw/ [https://perma.cc/LK66-MVZJ] (describing Senator Elizabeth
Warren’s speech at SXSW in which she likened Amazon and Facebook “to the railroads
under Roosevelt: ‘The railroads were the place you had to be. . . . You had to get your wheat or
your corn onto the railroads.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Sen. Elizabeth Warren)).
31. See, e.g., Australian Competition & Consumer Comm’n, Digital Platform
Inquiry: Preliminary Report 4–5 (2018), https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/ACCC%20
Digital%20Platforms%20Inquiry%20-%20Preliminary%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/F57Z-
HG5S] (providing an overview of the “substantial market power” that Facebook and
Google have in the Australian social media and online search markets, respectively);
Autorité de la Concurrence & Bundeskartellamt, Competition Law and Data 11–16
(2016), http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/reportcompetitionlawanddatafinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KJG-RFTG] (“[T]he greater information resulting from expanded data
collection, especially about competitors’ pricing, may also be used by undertakings in
ways that could limit competition.”); Autorité de la Concurrence, Opinion No. 18-A-03
of 6 March 2018 on Data Processing in the Online Advertising Sector 2–10 (2018),
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/avis18a03_en_.pdf [https://perma.cc/DVA5-
FZ32] [hereinafter Data Processing in Online Advertising] (concluding that profits from
growth in online advertising have mainly gone to just a handful of large firms and “those
that are reaping the most rewards are companies that have access to vast sets of high-
quality personal data”); Digital Competition Expert Panel, Unlocking Digital Competition
8–16 (2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S8PP-H5TY] (providing twenty policy recommendations for how digi-
tal markets can be made more competitive); Digital, Culture, Media & Sport Comm.,
House of Commons, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’: Final Report 36 (2019),
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9K7H-CZMB] (discussing how Facebook acquired immense amount of
app-usage data from its customers and utilized this information to acquire companies
that appeared profitable “or shut down those they judged to be a threat”); Select
Comm. on Commc’ns, House of Lords, Regulating in a Digital World 45 (2019),
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldcomuni/299/299.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YZP5-NP9W] (“Online communications platforms act as gatekeepers
for the internet, controlling what users can access and how they behave. They can be
compared to utilities in the sense that users feel they cannot do without them and so have
limited choice but to accept their terms of service.”).
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A. Amazon
Amazon provides a host of different services. It is the dominant
online marketplace, the world’s largest cloud computing service, a
massive shipping and logistics network, a media producer and distrib-
utor, a grocer, a small-business lender, a live video-gaming streaming
platform, a digital home assistant, a designer of apparel, and an online
pharmacy.32 Two areas where it both serves as a bottleneck facility and
competes with those reliant on its bottleneck include online retail and
digital home-assistant systems.
1. Marketplace/AmazonBasics. — In Amazon’s early days, it operated
primarily as an online retailer: It would procure goods at wholesale
prices from suppliers and then sell them at retail prices to consumers. In
1999 it introduced Auctions, an online auctions service, and zShops, a
fixed-price marketplace business—services that would evolve into the
Amazon Marketplace, an open platform on which other merchants could
list their products to sell directly to consumers.33 Unlike selling wholesale
to Amazon, selling through the Marketplace permitted suppliers to
maintain control over retail pricing and shipping.34 Inviting producers to
sell through Amazon Marketplace significantly expanded the catalogue
of goods available on Amazon’s platform, while freeing Amazon of the
risk of purchasing inventory.35
This dramatic expansion in product selection has helped Amazon
become the dominant online marketplace in the United States. The
platform is estimated to capture 52.4% of all U.S. online retail spending36
32. For a full list of the lines of business in which Amazon operates, see Paris Martineau &
Louise Matsakis, Why It’s Hard to Escape Amazon’s Long Reach, Wired (Dec. 23, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/why-hard-escape-amazons-long-reach/ [https://perma.cc/
HBH7-ZBCY].
33. Feng Zhu & Qihong Liu, Competing with Complementors: An Empirical Look
at Amazon.com, 39 Strategic Mgmt. J. 2618, 2623–24 (2018); see also Lydia DePillis &
Ivory Sherman, Amazon’s Extraordinary Evolution: A Timeline, CNN (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2018/10/business/amazon-history-timeline/index.html
[https://perma.cc/63P8-QBW8].
34. For a rundown of the tradeoffs between selling to Amazon as a vendor and selling
on Amazon as a merchant, see Mary Weinstein, How to Sell on Amazon in 2019: A
Complete Guide, CPC Strategy (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.cpcstrategy.com/blog/2018/08/
sell-on-amazon/ [https://perma.cc/2GKP-GNCX] (observing that the benefits of selling on
Amazon include maintaining control over one’s brand and pricing and receiving payments
more quickly).
35. See Amazon, 2000 Amazon.com Annual Report 2 (2000), https://ir.aboutamazon.com/
static-files/49b9a96d-f5ce-4695-a9a1-70eb8ffd3b87 [https://perma.cc/S6HV-BVW6].
36. Spencer Soper, Amazon Suppliers Panic Amid Purge Aimed at Boosting Profits,
Bloomberg (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-07/amazon-
purges-suppliers-in-push-to-boost-e-commerce-profits? (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Soper, Amazon Suppliers Panic].
986 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:973
and 56.1% of the segment’s traffic,37 while 54% of all product searches
originate on Amazon.38 Amazon’s share of ecommerce is more than double
the market share of its next nine competitors combined,39 and even
merchants who list products on other sites can come to rely upon
Amazon for up to 90% of their sales.40 For many merchants, “Not being
on Amazon doesn’t feel like an option.”41
37. Leading Online Marketplace Websites in the United States as of 4th Quarter
2018, Based on Share of Visits, Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/270884/most-
visited-websites-in-the-retail-sector-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/GR62-2U2P] (last visited
Mar. 11, 2019); Ingrid Lunden, Amazon’s Share of the US E-Commerce Market Is Now
49%, or 5% of All Retail Spend, TechCrunch (July 13, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/
2018/07/13/amazons-share-of-the-us-e-commerce-market-is-now-49-or-5-of-all-retail-spend/
[https://perma.cc/AAZ7-A97Q] [hereinafter Lunden, Amazon’s Share of the US E-
Commerce Market].
38. Krista Garcia, More Product Searches Start on Amazon, eMarketer (Sept. 7, 2018),
https://www.emarketer.com/content/more-product-searches-start-on-amazon [https://perma.cc/
C5DP-U8LJ].
39. Its closest competitor, eBay, enjoys 6.6% of the ecommerce market, followed by
Apple (3.9%) and Walmart (3.7%). Lunden, Amazon’s Share of the US E-Commerce Market,
supra note 37; see also Jeff Desjardins, Chart: Amazon’s Dominance in Ecommerce, Visual
Capitalist (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/chart-shows-amazons-dominance-
ecommerce/ [https://perma.cc/6B3S-4SMK]. For the purposes of antitrust analysis, the
relevant product market is likely to be much narrower than “online retail.”
40. Spencer Soper, Bezos Disputes Amazon’s Market Power. But His Merchants Feel
the Pinch, Bloomberg (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-
04-17/is-amazon-too-powerful-its-merchants-are-starting-to-wonder (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Soper, Bezos Disputes].
41. Josh Dzieza, Prime and Punishment: Dirty Dealing in the $175 Billion Amazon
Marketplace, Verge (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/19/18140799/
amazon-marketplace-scams-seller-court-appeal-reinstatement [https://perma.cc/SW7Q-LGD2]
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Zac Plansky, an Amazon merchant); see also
Bensinger, supra note 9; Angus Loten & Adam Janofsky, Sellers Need Amazon, but at What
Cost?, Wall St. J. (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sellers-need-amazon-but-at-
what-cost-1421278220 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“‘If you say no to Amazon,
you’re closing the door on tons of sales[.]’ . . . ‘You can’t really be a high-volume seller online
without being on Amazon, but sellers are very aware of the fact that Amazon is also their
primary competitor.’” (quoting two Amazon merchants)); Stacy Mitchell, Amazon Doesn’t
Just Want to Dominate the Market—It Wants to Become the Market, Nation (Feb. 15,
2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/amazon-doesnt-just-want-to-dominate-the-market-
it-wants-to-become-the-market/ [https://perma.cc/GV4R-475U] (“‘If the customer is on
Amazon, as a small business you have to say, “That is where I have to go[.]” . . . Otherwise,
we are going to close our doors.’” (quoting an Amazon merchant)); Lara O’Reilly & Laura
Stevens, Amazon, With Little Fanfare, Emerges as an Advertising Giant, Wall St. J. (Nov. 27,
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-with-little-fanfare-emerges-as-an-advertising-giant-
1543248561 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“‘They get all the prime real estate. It’s
unfair,’ Mr. Boyce says, but ‘we have to be on Amazon.’”). It is worth noting that, with
Amazon’s expansion into government procurement, even those merchants that
traditionally sold directly to government agencies are being compelled onto Amazon’s
platform. See Olivia LaVecchia & Stacy Mitchell, Inst. for Local Self-Reliance, Amazon’s
Next Frontier: Your City’s Purchasing 5 (2018), https://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/
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Marketplace sales are a lucrative and booming part of Amazon’s
overall business. Amazon charges merchants either a $39.99 monthly
subscription fee or a 99¢ per-item flat fee, depending on the plan, as well
as a percentage of each transaction.42 Analysts estimate that 52% of unit-
goods43 and 68% of total Amazon sales derived from Marketplace
merchants in 2018.44 The service fees Amazon charges third-party sellers
generated $42.75 billion in 2018,45 comprising around 18% of the
company’s net sales and its second-largest revenue segment.46 Revenue
from seller commissions is outpacing Amazon’s overall online sales.47
In addition to serving as a major marketplace for third-party sellers,
Amazon now also sells Amazon-branded goods on its platform. It first
began offering private labels in 2009, primarily selling commodity goods
such as batteries and HDMI cables.48 In the decade since, its private-label
business has expanded to include toys, shoes, apparel, jewelry, coffee,
baby wipes, furniture, mattresses, vitamins, towels, and pet food, among
other products.49 Amazon has around 137 private-label brands—with just
one of these brands accounting for over 1,500 distinct products.50
07/ILSR_AmazonsNextFrontier_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9H9-36WA] (“As Amazon sells
the contract, it’s told public officials that they can still shop with their local businesses but
just do so through Amazon’s platform.”).
42. These sale percentage fees range from 3% to 45%, depending on the product category.
See Selling on Amazon Fee Schedule, Amazon Seller Cent., https://sellercentral.amazon.com/
gp/help/external/200336920/ref=asus_soa_p_fees?ld=NSGoogle [https://perma.cc/NU92-
SJBQ] (last visited Mar. 25, 2019).
43. Eugene Kim, Amazon Added a First-Ever Warning About Counterfeit Products to Its
Earnings Report, CNBC (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/04/amazon-10k-
warns-investors-about-counterfeit-problem-for-first-time.html [https://perma.cc/942C-V5G8];
Percentage of Paid Units Sold by Third-Party Sellers on Amazon Platform as of 4th Quarter
2018, Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/259782/third-party-seller-share-of-amazon-
platform/ [https://perma.cc/SV74-6EY4] [hereinafter Statista, Third-Party Sellers] (last visited
Mar. 11, 2019).
44. Juozas Kaziukenas, Amazon Marketplace Is the Largest Online Retailer,
Marketplace Pulse (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.marketplacepulse.com/articles/amazon-
marketplace-is-the-largest-online-retailer [https://perma.cc/Y6W5-38BT].
45. Statista, Third-Party Sellers, supra note 43.
46. Id.; see also Amazon.com, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 17 (Jan. 31, 2019)
[hereinafter 2018 Amazon 10-K], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/
000101872419000004/amzn-20181231x10k.htm [https://perma.cc/6UU4-WZMQ] (reporting
that Amazon earned $232.89 billion in net sales in 2018).
47. Dzieza, supra note 41.
48. Kim, Amazon Is Doubling Down, supra note 9.
49. To see a continually updated database of Amazon’s private labels, see TJI
Amazon Brand Database, TJI Amazon Research, https://this.just.in/amazon-brand-database/
[https://perma.cc/SD2Y-8EKA] (last updated Mar. 11, 2019).
50. Id. As the database authors note, Amazon does not clearly delineate its private
label brands or Amazon exclusive brands, leaving researchers to identify Amazon brands
through trademark filings. Id. On its website, Amazon describes both private label and
exclusive brands as “Our Brands.” To give a sense of how many products may be sold
under Amazon’s own brand, in 2017 just one of these brands—AmazonBasics—covered
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Analysts estimate that Amazon’s private-label sales amounted to $7.5
billion in 2018 and will reach $25 billion by 2022.51
Amazon exploits this dual role—marketplace operator and
marketplace merchant—in two ways: first, by implementing Marketplace
policies that privilege Amazon as a seller and give it greater control over
brands and pricing, and, second, by appropriating the business infor-
mation of third-party merchants. One way that Amazon has favored
Amazon goods and services is by presenting itself as the default seller
even when Marketplace vendors have offered lower prices. A ProPublica
investigation discovered that Amazon engineers its ranking algorithm to
favor its own products as well as those sold by merchants that buy
Amazon’s fulfillment services.52 Since an estimated 82% of Amazon sales
go to the top listing—namely, whoever wins the Amazon “Buy Box”—this
self-preferential treatment is an “oft-decisive advantage.”53 Amazon also
appears to have privileged Amazon goods in promotional placements.
According to The Capitol Forum, Amazon prioritizes its own clothing
brands in its space for sponsored placements and appears to restrict
competitors’ access to this placement, directing consumers toward its
1,506 distinct products for sale. Mike Murphy, AmazonBasics Is Moving Well Beyond the
Basics, Quartz (Dec. 14, 2017), https://qz.com/1155843/amazonbasics-is-moving-well-beyond-
the-basics/ [https://perma.cc/VWW6-YRP7]. Amazon-exclusive brands—which are owned by
third parties but sold exclusively on Amazon—number over 400. TJI Amazon Brand
Database, supra note 49. Through its “Accelerator Program,” Amazon recruits manufacturers
to produce made-for-Amazon products. Eugene Kim, Amazon Quietly Launched a New
‘Accelerator’ Program to Create More Exclusive Brands for Its Website, CNBC (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/04/amazon-quietly-launched-a-new-accelerator-program-
to-create-more-brands-exclusively-sold-on-its-website.html [https://perma.cc/6RQM-QJJH].
Companies that join are granted access to marketing support and superior performance
information. Id. Analysts say the program enables Amazon to “generate better profit
margins,” “control the supply chain for sourcing inventory,” and “put more pressure on
bigger brands to reduce their prices on Amazon to stay competitive.” Id.
51. Eugene Kim, Amazon Has Been Promoting Its Own Products at the Bottom of
Competitors’ Listings, CNBC (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/02/amazon-is-
testing-a-new-feature-that-promotes-its-private-label-brands-inside-a-competitors-product-
listing.html [https://perma.cc/S53B-YEAM] (citing investment research by Robinson
Humphrey, which noted that “[p]rivate label is one of the highly under-appreciated
trends within Amazon, in our view, which over time should give the company a strong
‘unfair’ competitive advantage”).
52. See Julia Angwin & Surya Mattu, Amazon Says It Puts Customers First. But Its
Pricing Algorithm Doesn’t, ProPublica (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/
amazon-says-it-puts-customers-first-but-its-pricing-algorithm-doesnt [https://perma.cc/8DVN-
CTDT] (“[Amazon] appears to be using its market power and proprietary algorithm to
advantage itself at the expense of sellers and many customers.”); see also Zhu & Liu, supra
note 33, at 2637 (“We observe across many instances of entry that Amazon may present
itself as the default seller even when the same product is offered at lower cost (i.e.,
product price plus shipping cost), with a comparable shipping speed by third-party sellers
with high ratings.”). By omitting shipping costs for these Amazon-affiliated products,
Amazon gives these items top placement in search results. Angwin & Mattu, supra.
53. Id.
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own products over those sold by rivals.54 Even when a customer goes on a
Marketplace merchant’s product page, Amazon will show prominent ads
and pop-ups directing customers to Amazon’s own products instead.55
A second way Amazon has favored itself as a seller is through
implementing Marketplace policies that enable it to become the
exclusive merchant of certain products. According to news reports,
Amazon encourages brands to sell directly to Amazon in exchange for
Amazon’s commitment to enforce the brand’s minimum advertised
prices (MAP) on Amazon.56 Enforcing this policy, Amazon expels any
third parties selling lower than the MAP, sometimes leaving Amazon as
the only remaining seller.57 Last November, Amazon also signed a deal to
become an authorized reseller of Apple’s devices—an agreement that
prompted Amazon to delist any Apple products sold by Marketplace
merchants who are not authorized Apple resellers.58 Since one of the
requirements for becoming an authorized Apple reseller includes
purchasing a certain minimum amount of product directly from Apple,
54. Amazon: By Prioritizing Its Own Fashion Label Brands in Product Placement on
Its Increasingly Dominant Platform, Amazon Risks Antitrust Enforcement by a Trump
Administration, The Capitol Forum (Dec. 13, 2016), https://thecapitolforum.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Amazon-2016.12.13.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter The Capitol Forum, Amazon Prioritizing]; see also Creswell, supra note 9
(discussing how Amazon uses its data advantage “to steer shoppers toward its in-house
brands and away from its competitors”). More recent analysis by L2 found that, while
Amazon is investing significantly in advertising its brands on Amazon, it owns approx-
imately 15% of the sponsored placement for certain clothing-related keywords. See Cooper
Smith, Amazon’s Private Label Fever, L2 Inc (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.l2inc.com/daily-
insights/amazons-private-label-fever [https://perma.cc/WGK2-GXL8] (noting that Amazon
Essentials owns 16% of the sponsored placements for keywords related to dress shirts and
13% for polo shirts).
55. O’Reilly & Stevens, supra note 41.
56. Amazon Ousted Marketplace Sellers in Order to Be Only Seller of Certain
Products; A Closer Look at Monopolization Enforcement, The Capitol Forum (Jan. 23,
2018) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter The Capitol Forum, Ousted
Marketplace Sellers].
57. Id. While Amazon enforces MAP agreements that it has entered into with brands,
it also overrides pricing decisions by third-party merchants in ways that could place them
in violation of merchant’s MAP agreements. Laura Stevens, Amazon Snips Prices on Other
Sellers’ Items Ahead of Holiday Onslaught, Wall St. J. (Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/amazon-snips-prices-on-other-sellers-items-ahead-of-holiday-onslaught-1509883201 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that Amazon lowers prices on products offered by
independent merchants, which “could inadvertently violate a merchant’s agreement with a
brand to keep its products at or above a set minimum advertised price”). In one instance,
Amazon used this strategy to become the only merchant on Amazon to sell a particular type of
replacement water filter. Prior to Amazon’s initiation of the MAP, up to thirty sellers com-
peted in the market for this replacement water filter. Since becoming the sole merchant of
these filters on Amazon, the company has steadily raised prices. The Capitol Forum,
Ousted Marketplace Sellers, supra note 56.
58. Ben Fox Rubin, How Amazon’s Deal with Apple Puts the Hurt on Small Sellers,
CNET (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/how-amazons-deal-with-apple-puts-the-
hurt-on-small-sellers/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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most independent merchants will no longer be able to sell Apple products
on Amazon.59
Another policy change Amazon has instituted is requiring certain
brands on Marketplace to instead sell wholesale to Amazon—granting
Amazon the ability to set the retail price and maintain exclusive access to
certain sales and customer data.60
In theory, efforts by Amazon to enter exclusive or semiexclusive
agreements with brands could be understood as an effort by Amazon to
combat counterfeits, which proliferate on Amazon.61 But in practice,
Amazon also seems to use its ability to decide whether or not to police
counterfeits as leverage against brands who might otherwise refrain from
selling on Amazon.62 Nike, for example, for years refused to list its
59. Sam Medley, Amazon Will Prevent Unauthorized Third-Parties from Selling
Apple Products Through Its Online Store, Notebook Check (Nov. 11, 2018),
https://www.notebookcheck.net/Amazon-will-prevent-unauthorized-third-parties-from-
selling-Apple-products-through-its-online-store.359521.0.html [https://perma.cc/2PTQ-LPRQ].
60. See Jason Del Rey, An Amazon Revolt Could Be Brewing as the Tech Giant Exerts
More Control over Brands, Recode (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.recode.net/2018/11/29/
18023132/amazon-brand-policy-changes-marketplace-control-one-vendor [https://perma.cc/
9EJ8-ZW9A] (“Over the past few months, Amazon has applied intense pressure to
consumer brands across different product categories—seizing more control over what,
where and how they can sell their goods on the so-called everything store, these people
say.”). By assuming control over pricing, Amazon can use brands’ products to experiment
and determine the optimal price—information it can use when rolling out its own private
label version.
For some sellers, however, Amazon’s policy change has gone in the other direction. In
March, Amazon abruptly informed thousands of vendors that it would no longer place
orders for their items. Some were explicitly told that in order to keep selling on
Amazon, they would need to establish merchant accounts and sell on the Marketplace
instead. Id. Jason Del Rey, Amazon Ousted Thousands of Merchants with No Notice—
Showing the Danger of Relying on the Shopping Platform, Recode (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.recode.net/2019/3/8/18252606/amazon-vendors-no-orders-marketplace-
counterfeits [https://perma.cc/664D-G4DW]; see also Soper, Amazon Suppliers Panic,
supra note 36 (“‘If you’re heavily reliant on Amazon, which a lot of these vendors are,
you’re in a lot of trouble,’ said Dan Brownsher, Chief Executive Officer of Channel Key, a Las
Vegas e-commerce consulting business . . . . ‘If this goes on, it can put people out of business.’”).
61. One advocacy group that identifies fake goods has identified around 58,000
counterfeits on Amazon. Edgar Alvarez, Amazon Needs to Get a Handle on Its Counterfeit
Problem, EndGadget (May 31, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018/05/31/fulfilled-
by-amazon-counterfeit-fake/ [https://perma.cc/2EN6-JE7H]. Apple is among the
companies that have sued third-party Amazon sellers for selling counterfeit products,
and Apple has also criticized Amazon for hosting those products. See Gregg Keizer,
Apple Sues Amazon Supplier over Fake iPhone Chargers, Computerworld (Oct. 20, 2016),
https://www.computerworld.com/article/3133627/apple-sues-amazon-supplier-over-fake-
iphone-chargers.html [https://perma.cc/PD6N-V5G5].
62. See Laura Stevens & Sara Germano, Nike Thought It Didn’t Need Amazon. Then
the Ground Shifted, Wall St. J. (June 28, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-nike-
resisted-amazons-dominance-for-years-and-finally-capitulated-1498662435 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (“Nike agreed to start selling some products directly to Amazon in
exchange for stricter policing of counterfeits and restrictions on unsanctioned
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products on Amazon. Faced with a situation where merchants were
selling both authentic and fake Nike goods on Marketplace anyway, Nike
ultimately signed an agreement to sell wholesale to Amazon in exchange
for stricter policing of counterfeits.63 An executive from Birkenstock—
which stopped supplying products to Amazon in 2017—stated that the
only way a brand or supplier can get Amazon to fully commit to policing
counterfeits is to sell its entire catalogue to Amazon.64 Even as Amazon
professes a “zero tolerance” policy for counterfeit products,65 reports
suggest that not only has the company “resisted calls to do more to police
its site,” but that it has “thrived” from this practice, given the additional
leverage that counterfeiters give Amazon over brands and merchants.66
Indeed, sellers confronting any host of difficulties on Amazon’s site—
ranging from abrupt account suspensions to sabotage campaigns by
rivals—soon learn that “the solution is often to more fully meld with
Amazon” in ways that provide Amazon with more revenue, more control,
or greater access to a merchant’s sensitive business information.67 Earlier
sales . . . .”); see also David Pierson, Extra Inventory. More Sales. Lower Prices. How
Counterfeits Benefit Amazon, L.A. Times (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/business/
technology/la-fi-tn-amazon-counterfeits-20180928-story.html [https://perma.cc/5ETX-UNFJ]
(“Not only has the platform avoided any serious backlash for allowing the sale of fake
goods, it’s actually thrived from it, say more than two dozen brand owners, e-commerce
consultants, attorneys, investigators and public policy experts.”).
63. Stevens & Germano, supra note 62.
64. Ari Levy, Birkenstock Quits Amazon in US After Counterfeits Surge, CNBC
(July 20, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/20/birkenstock-quits-amazon-in-us-after-
counterfeit-surge.html [https://perma.cc/TZ7H-QBFA] (“The only way to get Amazon’s
support in creating a clean environment, according to [Birkenstock CEO David] Kahan, is
by selling the entire catalog to Amazon. . . . Plenty of brands have opted to team up with
Amazon and hand over full collections instead of engaging in a never-ending fight.”).
65. Amazon’s Anti-Counterfeiting Policy states: “Products offered for sale on Amazon
must be authentic. The sale of counterfeit products is strictly prohibited. Failure to abide
by this policy may result in loss of selling privileges, funds being withheld, and destruction
of inventory in our possession.” Amazon Anti-Counterfeiting Policy, Amazon Seller Cent.,
https://sellercentral.amazon.com/gp/help/external/201165970 [https://perma.cc/F36B-
X4SV] (last visited Mar. 13, 2019). In 2018, Amazon listed counterfeits as a “risk factor” in
its 10-K. See 2018 Amazon 10-K, supra note 46, at 14.
66. Pierson, supra note 62. Sellers note that Amazon’s decision to “openly court
Chinese manufacturers, weaving them intimately into the company’s expansive logistics
operation” has made the counterfeiting problem worse. Sales by China-based merchants
on Amazon more than doubled in 2015. Ari Levy, Amazon’s Chinese Counterfeit Problem
Is Getting Worse, CNBC (July 8, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/08/amazons-
chinese-counterfeit-problem-is-getting-worse.html [https://perma.cc/2V2Q-JNRK]. Lawsuits by
Daimler and Williams-Sonoma have alleged that even products sold directly by Amazon
are infringing upon intellectual property. Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief at
6–16, Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 18-cv-07548 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 14,
2018) (accusing Amazon of improperly displaying the “Williams-Sonoma” trademark on its
website and of violating a patent owned by Williams-Sonoma); Complaint for Trademark
Infringement at 11–16, Daimler AG vs. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-cv-7674 (C.D. Cal. filed
Oct. 20, 2017) (alleging that Amazon had infringed on Daimler trademarks by selling
wheel center caps with the Mercedes-Benz logo).
67. Dzieza, supra note 41.
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this year, Amazon announced that sellers looking to fight counterfeiters
and manage other problems on its platform could purchase a new service
from Amazon for $30,000 to $60,000 a year.68 The rapid growth of
Amazon’s digital ad business suggests brands may increasingly need to
buy advertising in order to attract more customer clicks.69
Separate from policies that explicitly or implicitly require merchants
and vendors to buy additional Amazon services, sellers worry about
subtler forms of discrimination. There are numerous means by which
Amazon can disfavor any particular merchant: It can suspend or shut
down accounts overnight, withhold merchant funds, change page displays,
and throttle or block favorable reviews.70
In addition to implementing Marketplace policies that favor
Amazon’s direct sales, Amazon appropriates Marketplace merchants’
data to shape its own retail strategy. By virtue of hosting a digital
marketplace, Amazon’s ability to collect and analyze ecommerce data is
unrivaled. While even large brick-and-mortar stores can track consumer
purchase histories and brand sales, the information Amazon harvests is
far more sophisticated and precise.71 In addition to tracking overall
trends, it captures which goods a customer clicked on but did not buy,
the exact price change that induced a customer to peruse an item or
purchase it, how long a user hovers her mouse over a particular good,
how customers are reacting to product images and videos, and a wealth
of other microdetails that add up to a formidable—and constantly
68. Eugene Kim, Amazon Is Inviting Sellers to Private Meetings at CES to Promote a
Premium Support Service that Costs Up to $60,000 a Year, CNBC (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/09/amazon-holds-ces-meetings-with-marketplace-sellers-
promoting-support.html [https://perma.cc/S78N-X27R].
69. See O’Reilly & Stevens, supra note 41 (“Amazon’s ad business now contributes to
gross profit and is expected to generate more income than its cloud business—which
currently provides the bulk of its profits—as soon as 2021 . . . .”). Some Marketplace
merchants respond to direct competition with Amazon on Amazon by purchasing
hundreds of thousands of dollars of advertisements every year. See Soper, Bezos Disputes,
supra note 40 (“Jason Boyce, having navigated Planet Amazon for 15 years, is selling his
business and has started a consulting firm helping other merchants. . . . [H]e says the
money he was forced to spend to advertise his products reduced his profits by several
hundred thousand dollars a year.”).
70. See Andrew Buck, Is Amazon Deleting or Blocking Your Reviews?, LandingCube
(Jan. 4, 2019), https://landingcube.com/amazon-deleting-reviews/ [https://perma.cc/
Y4SJ-WN4V]; Dzieza, supra note 41 (“For sellers, Amazon is a quasi-state. They rely on its
infrastructure—its warehouses, shipping network, financial systems, and portal to millions
of customers—and pay taxes in the form of fees. They also live in terror of its rules, which
often change and are harshly enforced.”).
71. See Allie Gray Freeland, Inside Amazon’s Approach to Data and People-Based
Marketing, LiveIntent (Apr. 24, 2018), https://blog.liveintent.com/amazon-data-people-
based-marketing/ [https://perma.cc/2BAU-XDF2] (describing “Amazon’s peerless data bank
of search and online purchasing behavior, mined from its hundreds of millions of
customers”).
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evolving—arsenal of market intelligence.72 It is as if a shopping mall
tracked not only all the foot traffic into a store, but also which items
caught a customer’s glance, which products made it into the shopping
cart but were never purchased, as well as complete transaction and
revenue data and all customer reviews. All of this information is gathered
not just on products Amazon sells but also on third-party merchants,73
giving Amazon an unprecedented vantage point over 50% of ecommerce
in the United States.74
Reports suggest Amazon uses this trove of Marketplace data to
inform both its retail business and its private labels. In some cases,
Amazon has responded to popular items introduced by third-party
merchants by sourcing those same products directly from the manufac-
turer and demoting the third-party merchants in search results.75 One
study found that in the case of women’s clothing, Amazon “began selling
25 percent of the top items first sold through marketplace vendors.”76 Its
private label, meanwhile, has also closely tracked successful Marketplace
items. While AmazonBasics—Amazon’s private-label brand—initially
focused on generic goods like batteries and blank DVDs, it has since
expanded into a much broader array of products.77 For a few years “the
house brand ‘slept quietly as it retained data about other sellers’
successes.’”78 As Amazon now rolls out more AmazonBasics products, it is
clear that the company has used “insights gleaned from its vast Web store
to build a private-label juggernaut that now includes more than 3,000
products.”79
72. See id. It can identify whether a customer lands on Amazon after visiting a rival
website and can track customer behavior through email—whether a customer viewed,
clicked, forwarded, or bought an item in a marketing email, or whether she preferred a
similar product within that email. Id.
73. See George Anderson, Is Amazon Undercutting Third-Party Sellers Using Their Own
Data?, Forbes (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/retailwire/2014/10/30/is-
amazon-undercutting-third-party-sellers-using-their-own-data [https://perma.cc/KK5Q-V78R].
74. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text.
75. See Bensinger, supra note 9 (“[S]ome sellers say they suspect Amazon uses sales
data from outside merchants to make purchasing decisions in order to undercut them on
price and give items featured placement under a given search . . . .”). For a specific
example, take the case of Pillow Pets, “stuffed-animal pillows modeled after NFL mascots”
that a third-party merchant sold through Amazon’s site. Id. For several months, the
merchant sold up to one hundred pillows per day. Id. According to one account, “just
ahead of the holiday season . . . , [the merchant] noticed Amazon had itself begun offering the
same Pillow Pets for the same price while giving [its own] products featured placement on
the site.” Id. The merchant’s own sales dropped to twenty per day. Id.
76. Anderson, supra note 73.
77. Spencer Soper, Got a Hot Seller on Amazon? Prepare for E-Tailer to Make One
Too, Bloomberg (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-
20/got-a-hot-seller-on-amazon-prepare-for-e-tailer-to-make-one-too (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
78. Id. (quoting a report provided exclusively to Bloomberg News).
79. Id.
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Initial empirical work suggests that Amazon’s entry into competition
with third-party merchants does not affect product price or customer
satisfaction but does dissuade third-party sellers from continuing to offer
the product.80 Merchants, especially small ones, “are discouraged from
growing their business on the platform.”81
2. Alexa/Alexa Devices/Alexa Skills. — Another area in which Amazon
both serves as a primary platform and competes with platform services is
the voice computing market. Amazon jump-started the voice assistant
market in 2015 when it publicly rolled out the Echo, its smart speaker,
embedded with Alexa, the artificial intelligence software that serves as
a voice assistant.82 An early mover in this market, Amazon remains
dominant.83
The applications that power Alexa—that enable it to perform
particular tasks—are called “skills.”84 Skills execute various requests: They
can dim your kitchen lights, offer recipe ideas, and provide allergy
forecasts with precise pollen counts.85 Skills are created by third-party
developers, who have built over 80,000 skills for Alexa.86 Meanwhile, a
host of manufacturers have produced Alexa-compatible devices or
appliances.87
80. Zhu & Liu, supra note 33, at 2634.
81. Id.
82. See Farhad Manjoo, The Echo from Amazon Brims with Groundbreaking
Promise, N.Y. Times (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/10/technology/
the-echo-from-amazon-brims-with-groundbreaking-promise.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
83. The Echo captured close to 67% of the smart speaker market in 2018, Ingrid
Lunden, eMarketer: Amazon Took 2/3 of Smart Speaker Sales in 2018, but Echo Will Face
the Squeeze in 2019, TechCrunch (Dec. 20, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/12/20/
fading-echo/ [https://perma.cc/MA5P-8VDW], and as of 2017, Alexa powered 68% of
smart speakers in the United States. Rayna Hollander, Amazon’s Alexa Is Dominating the
Smart Speaker Landscape, Bus. Insider (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/
amazon-alexa-smart-speaker-landscape-2017-10 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). As
of January 2019, Amazon has sold more than 100 million devices with Alexa, more than
150 products have Alexa built in, and more than 28,000 smart-home devices are now
compatible with Alexa. Dieter Bohn, Amazon Says 100 Million Alexa Devices Have Been
Sold—What’s Next?, Verge (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/4/18168565/
amazon-alexa-devices-how-many-sold-number-100-million-dave-limp [https://perma.cc/
972N-EE3J].
84. See James Stables, The Best Amazon Alexa Skills for Your Echo Smart Speakers,
Ambient (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.the-ambient.com/guides/best-amazon-alexa-skills-187
[https://perma.cc/6SEM-WHU3]. To analogize with the smart phone market, imagine Echo
as the hardware (iPhone), Alexa as the operating system (iOS), Alexa first domains as
built-in apps (Apple Music), and skills as independent apps (Spotify).
85. See id.
86. Matt Day, Amazon’s Alexa Has 80,000 Apps—and No Runaway Hit, Bloomberg
(Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-11/amazon-s-alexa-
has-80-000-apps-and-no-runaway-hit (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
87. See Bohn, supra note 83 (estimating that 4,500 different manufacturers have
produced Alexa-compatible devices).
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While third-party skills developers and manufacturers are critical to
expanding the Alexa ecosystem, Amazon also actively competes with
both.88 Amazon has recently introduced dozens of new features and
devices, including an Alexa-enabled microwave, security camera,
subwoofer, and smart plug—smart devices that existing Amazon partners
had already been providing.89 Given how Amazon uses Marketplace
data,90 it seems reasonable to assume that Amazon uses its retail platform
for insight into sales of current smart devices, which then informs its
production strategy. In 2015, Amazon launched the $100 million Alexa
Fund, which supports voice-technology startups and was designed to help
cultivate a “developer ecosystem” around Alexa.91 Some observers, however,
say that Amazon is using the fund to mine product ideas that it then
produces itself.92 Nucleus, for example—a startup that had received
backing from the Alexa Fund to create a voice-controlled video device—
went on to watch Amazon release an almost identical product.93 While
startups backed by the Alexa Fund sometimes get unique access to
Amazon, some investors advise businesses “to be wary of accepting
Amazon’s investment, because of the risk of Amazon copying ideas.”94
Following allegations that Amazon appropriates from its portfolio
companies, Amazon has privately reached out to startups to mitigate
those concerns, saying that a “clear ‘firewall’ exists between the Alexa
Fund and Amazon’s product development teams.”95
Amazon also competes with Alexa-skills developers. From its rollout,
Alexa has had some built-in features, such as weather and timers.96 It
88. See Ben Fox Rubin, Amazon’s Gadget Battle with Google Could Upend Its Alexa
Allies, CNET (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/amazons-gadget-battle-with-
google-could-upend-its-alexa-allies/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“These new
Amazon devices serve as more examples of Amazon simultaneously cooperating with and
competing against its partners as it creates more devices for its Alexa voice assistant.”).
89. Id.; Nick Statt, Amazon Wants Alexa to Be the Operating System for Your Life,
Verge (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/27/17911300/amazon-alexa-
echo-smart-home-eco-system-competition [https://perma.cc/U3RJ-CD9R].
90. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
91. Patience Haggin, Startups Weigh Pros, Cons of Alexa Fund, Wall St. J. (Aug. 28,
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/startups-weigh-pros-cons-of-alexa-fund-1503919800 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
92. See, e.g., id. (expressing a concern held by some venture capitalists that Amazon
might copy ideas generated by Alexa Fund startups).
93. Jason Del Rey, Amazon Invested Millions in the Startup Nucleus—Then Cloned
Its Product for the New Echo, Recode (May 10, 2017), https://www.recode.net/2017/5/10/
15602814/amazon-invested-startup-nucleus-cloned-alexa-echo-show-voice-control-touchscreen-
video [https://perma.cc/PUE6-QYKK] (quoting Alexa Fund representatives).
94. Haggin, supra note 91.
95. Eugene Kim, Amazon Wants to Invest in Start-Ups, but Some Are Nervous About
Taking the Money, CNBC (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/13/amazon-
reassured-alexa-fund-start-ups-about-competition.html [https://perma.cc/6FK8-RY2T].
96. See, e.g., Dave Smith, I’ve Owned an Amazon Echo for Nearly a Year Now—Here
Are My 19 Favorite Features, Bus. Insider (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/
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regularly introduces new features, which sometimes offer the same
service as an existing skill or tool provided by third parties.97 Three areas
in which Alexa has entered into direct competition with third-party skill
providers are analytics, testing tools, and Blueprints.98
The primary advantage that Alexa domains enjoy over third-party
skills is that they are set as the default. If a user asks a question that both
an Alexa-native and a third-party skill can answer, the default skill
activated will be the one native to the Alexa engine.99 This default setting
can be justified as way to offer users a smoother experience and to solve
the technical problem of knowing where to send a request. But the effect
is to create a built-in bias to steer users toward Alexa domains over third-
party skills. Recent announcements suggest that Amazon is looking to
enable the surfacing of skills into the first domain, which would mean
Alexa would be able to sort through its abilities to activate the one that
best addressed a user’s request.100 While, in theory, this could place a
third-party skill on equal footing with an Alexa domain, the transition
could also strengthen Alexa’s role as a gatekeeper, rendering skills more
captive to Amazon’s discretion.
Amazon closely tracks usage patterns on Alexa.101 It also enjoys
exclusive access to the voice data that Alexa collects—data that capture
amazon-echo-features-2016-10 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
97. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
98. See John Koetsier, Analytics for AI Assistants: VoiceLabs Reveals Vital Stats for
Alexa Skills and Google Actions, VentureBeat (Dec. 8, 2016), https://venturebeat.com/2016/
12/08/analytics-for-ai-assistants-voicelabs-reveals-vital-stats-for-alexa-skills-and-google-actions/
[https://perma.cc/8QDG-QGYW]; see also About Us, Bespoken, https://bespoken.io/
about/ [https://perma.cc/7M27-2U4A] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (describing Bespoken’s
work providing “testing and monitoring for voice apps”); Kaiyin Hu, Unit Testing:
Creating Functional Alexa Skills, Amazon Alexa: Alexa Blogs (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://developer.amazon.com/blogs/alexa/post/35bdad3d-57c8-4623-88c6-815540697af5/
unit-testing-create-functional-alexa-skills [https://perma.cc/EC4G-HQFN] (reporting Amazon’s
announcement that it is building its own monitoring tools); Sarah Perez, Amazon’s ‘Alexa
Blueprints’ Can Now Be Published Publicly on the US Alexa Skills Store, TechCrunch
(Feb. 13, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/13/amazon-opens-its-us-alexa-skill-store-
to-non-developers/ [https://perma.cc/T62E-Y9KG].
99. For example, if a user says, “Alexa, tell me the weather,” Alexa will summon its
built-in weather feature. In order to access, say, Big Sky, a third-party weather skill, a user
would need to say, “Alexa, ask Big Sky for the weather.” See Taylor Martin, How to Get
Better Weather Forecasts on Your Alexa Speaker, CNET (July 17, 2017), https://www.cnet.com/
how-to/how-to-get-better-weather-forecasts-on-your-alexa-speaker/ (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
100. See Monica Chin, Amazon Is Killing the Skill (as We Know It), Tom’s Guide
(Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.tomsguide.com/us/amazon-alexa-kills-skills,news-28072.html
[https://perma.cc/J2HG-4G42] (“[Y]ou won’t need to say ‘Get me an Uber,’ you’ll say,
‘Get me a car to the airport.’ Amazon’s assistant will use context clues, such as your
location, your subscriptions and services you’ve used in the past, to determine whether to call
an Uber, Lyft, or other ride-sharing service.”).
101. Amazon is seeking to dramatically expand the data it collects from third-party
gadgets, asking them to report, for example, not just when a television is on but what
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the questions consumers ask voice platforms.102 Alexa maintains access to
this data even when the information is collected through third-party
skills, and Amazon can use the information to both steer its future moves
in the voice-assistant market and enrich other parts of its business, such
as advertising.103 This unique dataset will also give Amazon a huge advan-
tage in continuing to develop its machine learning.
No empirical work has closely examined what guides Alexa’s entry
into certain skills or devices or how the threat of direct competition with
Alexa affects third-party developers.
B. Alphabet
Alphabet, the parent company of Google, is a conglomerate
comprised of subsidiaries in digital advertising, internet services, artificial
intelligence, biotech, broadband, and venture capital.104 Google—which
encompasses digital advertising, Android, Chrome, Google Cloud, Google
Maps, Google Play, Google Search, hardware, search, and YouTube105—
remains the entity’s profit center. In 2018, Google pulled in $36.5 billion
in operating income, while the combined total of Alphabet’s other segments
posted a loss.106
There are several markets in which Google both serves as a major
platform and competes with platform participants. These include gener-
alized search, Android operating system/apps, and its online ad exchange.
Although Google’s integrations in the smartphone and online adver-
tising markets have also attracted antitrust attention, this section focuses
on Google’s integration in search.
1. Google Search/Google Verticals. — Google is a dominant internet
search company, capturing around 88% of the U.S. search engine market107
channel it is set to. Matt Day, Your Smart Light Can Tell Amazon and Google When You
Go to Bed, Bloomberg (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-
02-12/your-smart-light-can-tell-amazon-and-google-when-you-go-to-bed (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
102. Drew Firment, Alexa Data Analytics Are a Gold Mine, A Cloud Guru (Feb. 12,
2017), https://read.acloud.guru/alexa-data-analytics-are-a-gold-mine-b4ceb02526d2 [https://
perma.cc/D9K3-9WFW].
103. See id. (“For example, if someone asks ‘Alexa, what are the signs of pregnancy’—
the customer should also expect to see diapers as an item on their suggested wish-list the
next time they go shopping on Amazon.”).
104. See Avery Hartmans, All the Companies and Divisions Under Google’s Parent
Company, Alphabet, Bus. Insider (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/alphabet-
google-company-list-2017-4 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
105. See id.
106. Alphabet Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 81 (Feb. 4, 2019) [hereinafter 2018
Alphabet 10-K], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/000165204419000004/
goog10-kq42018.htm [https://perma.cc/C2YS-QXCE].
107. Search Engine Market Share in United States of America, StatCounter,
http://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share/all/united-states-of-america
[https://perma.cc/WQ2M-ZUAY] (last updated Mar. 2019). The remaining share of the
998 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:973
and 95% of mobile searches.108 It began as a general search provider,
indexing the web and developing algorithms to identify which web
content may provide a relevant response to a user’s search query. Search
users do not pay money for their searches; instead, Google collects and
analyzes data about users to sell targeted advertisements. In 2018, ad
sales constituted 85% of all Alphabet revenue.109
The search engine market is comprised of “horizontal” search—a
general search engine that offers results regardless of subject area—and
“vertical” search, which limits query results to a specific category of
content.110 Even as Google became the dominant website for horizontal
search, a stable of independent entities launched their own specialized
search engines, focused on areas like comparison shopping, local search,
flight search, and financial data.111 Because Google is the dominant pro-
vider of online search, this ecosystem of vertical sites relies on Google to
be seen and discovered by users.112
Although Google introduced its first vertical product around
2002,113 only in 2005 did it begin strategically investing in and promoting
additional vertical properties, including in local search, finance, and
market is split between Bing (6%), Yahoo! (4%), and DuckDuckGo (1%). Id. Globally,
Google captures 92%, with Bing (2%), Yahoo! (2%), and Baidu (1%) following. Search
Engine Market Share Worldwide, StatCounter, http://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-
market-share [https://perma.cc/VHA3-HBH7] (last updated Mar. 2019).
108. Mobile Search Engine Market Share in United States of America, StatCounter,
http://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share/mobile/united-states-of-america
[https://perma.cc/9JT8-DN8J] (last updated Mar. 2019). Google products also capture
59% of the web browser market. Google Embraces Ad-Blocking via Chrome, Economist
(Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.economist.com/business/2018/02/17/google-embraces-ad-
blocking-via-chrome (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Google captures 81% of the
U.S. online maps market. Google Maps API, Datanyze, https://www.datanyze.com/market-
share/mapping-and-gis/google-maps-api-market-share (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited Apr. 3, 2019). It captures 77% of the internet video market. Online
Video Platforms, Datanyze, https://www.datanyze.com/market-share/online-video (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Apr. 3, 2019). And it captures 88% of the global
market for mobile operating systems. Global Market Share Held by the Leading
Smartphone Operating Systems in Sales to End Users from 1st Quarter 2009 to 2nd
Quarter 2018, Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/266136/global-market-share-
held-by-smartphone-operating-systems/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited
Apr. 3, 2019).
109. See 2018 Alphabet 10-K, supra note 106, at 7.
110. See Jim Yu, Search Is More than Google: Mastering Vertical Search Optimization,
Search Engine Land (May 15, 2018), https://searchengineland.com/search-is-more-than-
google-mastering-vertical-search-optimization-298123 [https://perma.cc/FPW4-FL98].
111. See, e.g., Adam Vincenzini, 30 Specialized Search Engines Focused on Specific
Content, Next Web (Apr. 29, 2012), https://thenextweb.com/lifehacks/2012/04/29/30-
specialist-and-super-smart-search-engines/ [https://perma.cc/83SF-4LV5].
112. See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text.
113. See Wired Staff, Google Gets Its Groove On, Wired (Mar. 29, 2004),
https://www.wired.com/2004/03/google-gets-its-groove-on/ [https://perma.cc/PL8U-5X5A].
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travel.114 Its foray into these areas rendered standalone vertical properties,
such as Yelp and TripAdvisor, dependent on their biggest rival.115
Google took advantage of this dual role in several ways—conduct
that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigated as part of an
antitrust probe in 2011. As revealed by an FTC staff memorandum that
was partially and inadvertently disclosed to the Wall Street Journal in 2015,
the investigation found that Google used its position in general search
both to give its vertical properties preferential treatment and to appro-
priate content from third-party competitors in vertical search.116
According to FTC staff from the Bureau of Competition (BC),
Google rolled out a new interface—“Universal Search”—to privilege
Google content and demote third-party content.117 It relied on a host of
tactics. For one, Google displayed Universal Search results at or near the
top of its search engine ranking page, which had the effect of demoting
and resulting in “significant loss of traffic” to many vertical rivals.118
Google also “embellished” its vertical results with “eye-catching inter-
faces” that helped steer users to Google’s vertical properties—interfaces
that Google did not make available to competitor vertical websites.119
Commission staff concluded that Google’s self-privileging had been at
least partially motivated by fear that superior vertical competitors would
divert search queries—and, subsequently, advertisement dollars—from
Google.120 The tactic worked: Self-preferential treatment “led to gains in
user share for its own properties.”121
Google also appropriated information from third-party rivals in
order to boost the quality of its own offerings. As of 2012, Google
primarily obtained its vertical content through “scraping” other websites.122
114. See Duhigg, supra note 7 (quoting a 2005 email between members of the Google
management team, in which one executive wrote that “the real threat if we don’t execute
on verticals” is “[l]oss of traffic from Google.com because folks search elsewhere for some
queries” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
115. See id. (“‘We still exist,’ says Luther Lowe, a vice president at Yelp, ‘but Google
did everything it could to ensure that we’d never present a threat to them.’”).
116. FTC, Memorandum on Google Inc., File No. 111-0163, at 18–30 (Aug. 8, 2012)
[hereinafter FTC Memo]. For the version of the memo as it appeared on the Wall Street
Journal’s website, see The FTC Report on Google’s Business Practices, Wall St. J. (Mar. 24,
2015), http://graphics.wsj.com/google-ftc-report/(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
The FTC disclosed only the even pages of the staff memo, which represented the views of
the Bureau of Competition (BC). Id.
117. FTC Memo, supra note 116, at 30; see also Danny Sullivan, Google Launches
“Universal Search” & Blended Results, Search Engine Land (May 16, 2007),
https://searchengineland.com/google-20-google-universal-search-11232 [https://perma.cc/
6YJ2-HQW2].
118. FTC Memo, supra note 115, at 30.
119. Id. at 24.
120. See id. at 20 (summarizing Google’s concern that users would “move[] to vertical
search websites,” which would, “in turn, become more attractive vehicles for advertisers”).
121. Id. at 80.
122. See id. at 32.
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Google did so through pressuring website publishers to accept a license
agreement that gave Google blanket consent to use third parties’ data
feeds.123 When rivals tried to resist Google’s efforts to copy their
information, Google gave them an “all-or-nothing choice”: They could
either allow their content to be appropriated by Google or they wouldn’t
appear within Google web search results at all.124 In short, Google “could
now force local websites—that needed access to Google’s web search to
reach users—to accede to Google’s use of the large storehouse of reviews
that Google’s rivals had built in order to develop its own user base.”125
BC staff concluded that the “natural and probable effect” of
Google’s scraping was “to diminish the incentives of vertical websites to
invest in, and to develop, new and innovative content” and recom-
mended that the FTC condemn this conduct as unlawful.126 BC staff also
concluded that Google’s self-preferential treatment “likely helped to
entrench Google’s monopoly power.” Although the BC recommended
bringing an antitrust action against Google on three grounds,127 the
Commissioners entered a voluntary settlement with the company
instead.128 The European Commission, by contrast, investigated Google
on similar grounds and brought two cases establishing that the
corporation had abused its dominance.129
Given Google’s integration across internet search, services, and
desktop and mobile advertising markets, there are numerous other ways
in which it competes with businesses dependent on its services. In
addition to discriminating against vertical content, Google has been
found to discriminate against rival horizontal search engines and
browsers and to hobble competitors in the search advertising market.130
123. Id.
124. Id. at 36.
125. Id.
126. Id. at iii.
127. Id. at 86.
128. Press Release, FTC, Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve
FTC Competition Concerns in the Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and
Tablets, and in Online Search (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2013/01/google-agrees-change-its-business-practices-resolve-ftc [https://perma.cc/
YPF6-43AV].
129. See Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42
Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own
Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
17-1784_en.htm [https://perma.cc/K8D6-EL7X] (explaining that Google used its
platform to favor its own comparison shopping search engine at the expense of
competitors).
130. See Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €1.49
Billion for Abusive Practices in Online Advertising (Mar. 1, 2019), http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-19-1770_en.htm [https://perma.cc/BGJ6-LGM5] (“Google has abused its
market dominance by imposing a number of restrictive clauses in contracts with third-
party websites which prevented Google’s rivals from placing their search adverts on these
websites.”).
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C. Facebook
Facebook is a dominant social network. Around two-thirds of
Americans use Facebook, three-quarters of them on a daily basis.131 In
the United States, 80% of user time spent across social networks is spent
on Facebook.132 Through having purchased Instagram and WhatsApp,
Facebook now owns the top three, and four of the top eight, social media
apps.133 Like Google, Facebook monetizes its service by selling placement
to digital advertisers.134
There are at least two sets of market participants that both rely on
Facebook’s network and find themselves in competition with Facebook:
app developers and online publishers. In both markets, Facebook has
used its dominant position to appropriate from rivals.
1. Facebook APIs/Facebook Apps. — Facebook’s network of over two
billion users gives app developers an opportunity to reach a large
audience.135 Facebook, meanwhile, has an incentive to cultivate a rich
ecosystem of apps built around Facebook’s network. To incentivize
developers to invest in building this ecosystem, Facebook offers devel-
opers access to its application programming interfaces (APIs), which lets
apps access data from Facebook’s network and grow their number of
users.136 Facebook also delivers certain apps and features directly, placing
it in competition with developers. It has both foreclosed competitors
from its platform and appropriated their business information and
functionality.
Reports describe how Facebook has denied API access to those firms
that it considers direct competitors. In 2013, for example, Facebook cut
off API access to Vine, the Twitter-owned feature that let users create six-
second videos.137 Emails released by the U.K. Parliament revealed that
131. Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Pew Research Ctr., Social Media Use in 2018, at 2
(2018), https://www.pewinternet.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2018/02/PI_2018.03.01_
Social-Media_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9EP-4TVZ].
132. Dina Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook: A Monopolist’s Journey
Towards Pervasive Surveillance in Spite of Consumers’ Preference for Privacy, 16 Berkeley
Bus. L.J. 39, 88 (2019) (“Including time spent on these other platforms, approximately
83% of the consumers’ time goes to Facebook and Instagram.”).
133. Most Popular Mobile Social Networking Apps in the United States as of October
2018, by Reach, Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/579334/most-popular-us-social-
networking-apps-ranked-by-reach/ [https://perma.cc/4YDD-82GQ] (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
134. Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 5 (Jan. 31, 2019) [hereinafter 2018
Facebook 10-K], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680119000009/
fb-12312018x10k.htm [https://perma.cc/E7PJ-NCMT].
135. Id. at 35.
136. The Graph API, for example, lets developers “read and write to the Facebook
social graph.” Graph API, Facebook for Developers, https://developers.facebook.com/docs/
graph-api/ [https://perma.cc/E4XJ-RXEN] (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
137. Josh Constine, Facebook Is Done Giving Its Precious Social Graph to Competitors,
TechCrunch (Jan. 24, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/01/24/my-precious-social-graph/
[https://perma.cc/JQ2J-U3KF].
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the decision to block Vine’s access came directly from CEO Mark
Zuckerberg—presumably because Twitter, which owned Vine, is a
Facebook competitor, and Facebook was building out its own video
offering.138 Facebook similarly shut off API access to MessageMe, a
messaging app (and competitor to Facebook Messenger) that had soared
in popularity, within a week of its release.139 Voxer, another communi-
cations app, was also cut off shortly after Facebook introduced a
competing product.140 Explaining its decision, Facebook cited a provision
of its platform policy that prohibited developers from using Facebook
APIs to promote a product that replicated “a core Facebook product.”141
The firms that saw their API access revoked by Facebook all ended up
either exiting the market or shutting down entirely.142
In addition to blocking apps that it deemed competitive threats,
Facebook has also systematically copied them. Through Onavo, a mobile-
analytics company that Facebook purchased in 2013, Facebook tracked
rival apps, identifying which competitors were diverting attention and
usage from Facebook.143 Reports capture how the tool has helped Facebook
either imitate rivals or seek to buy them out.144 Using information captured
by Onavo, Facebook has copied the functionality of several apps—including
Meerkat, Houseparty, and Snapchat—and bought out WhatsApp and tbh.145
138. See Note by Damian Collins MP, Chair of the DCMS Committee: Summary of Key
Issues from the Six4Three Files and Selected Documents Ordered from Six4Three,
Parliament, https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/culture-media-and-
sport/Note-by-Chair-and-selected-documents-ordered-from-Six4Three.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y5YC-9A44] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). The internal documents also reveal that executives
kept a “whitelist” of companies that would retain API access. Id.
139. Kim-Mai Cutler, Facebook Brings Down the Hammer Again: Cuts Off MessageMe’s
Access to Its Social Graph, TechCrunch (Mar. 15, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/03/
15/facebook-messageme/ [https://perma.cc/A9CS-U35L].
140. Id. (“The move resembles Facebook’s decision last month to shut off Voxer’s
access to the graph, even though Voxer connected to Facebook for well over a year. . . .
Facebook cut the app off around the same time that it launched competing functionality
with free voice calling to other users.”).
141. Id. In December, a day before Parliament released the Six4Three documents,
Facebook ended this policy. Josh Constine, Facebook Ends Platform Policy Banning Apps
that Copy Its Features, TechCrunch (Dec. 4, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/12/04/
facebook-allows-competitors/ [https://perma.cc/2Q2A-R69Y].
142. See Josh Constine, Facebook Shouldn’t Block You from Finding Friends on
Competitors, TechCrunch (Apr. 13, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/13/free-
the-social-graph/facebook-free-the-social-graph/ [https://perma.cc/U8YS-Q839] (observing
that Voxer exited the market, MessageMe disintegrated, Vine was shut down, and Phhhoto—a
competitor to Instagram that Facebook cut off—closed shop).
143. See Morris & Seetharaman, New Copycats, supra note 10 (describing the internal
database that Facebook developed to track rivals through its acquisition of Onavo).
144. See id. (noting that Onavo served as “an internal ‘early bird’ warning system,”
flagging potential threats).
145. See id; Sarah Perez, Facebook Is Pushing Its Data-Tracking Onavo VPN
Within Its Main Mobile App, TechCrunch (Feb. 12, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/
02/12/facebook-starts-pushing-its-data-tracking-onavo-vpn-within-its-main-mobile-app/
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Apps whose functionality Facebook has copied—like Snapchat—went on
to see declines in user growth.146
Like Amazon and Google, Facebook has established a systemic
informational advantage (gleaned from competitors) that it can reap to
thwart rivals and strengthen its own position, either through introducing
replica products or buying out nascent competitors. Strikingly, one of
Facebook’s more recent acquisition—the burgeoning social network
tbh—had achieved limited market penetration by the time Facebook
purchased it.147 Analysts speculate that Facebook spotted tbh’s rapid pace
of growth through Onavo and then bought it out.148
2. Facebook’s Publishing Network/Facebook Ads. — For online publishers,
Facebook is both a massive communications network on which they’ve
come to depend, as well as a major competitor in selling ad placement.
Facebook, meanwhile, has leveraged its dominant position as a communi-
cations network to extract sensitive business information from publishers.
Collecting this information from publishers has enabled Facebook to
significantly enhance the value of its advertising business at publishers’
expense.
For publishers, Facebook’s network offers a highly attractive
distribution channel. Given that most online publishers earn revenue
from user clicks and visits, greater exposure to Facebook’s 1.52 billion
daily users can be a game changer.149 Citing the promise of greater user
visits—and thus greater revenue—Facebook in 2010 started marketing a
set of social plug-ins that publishers could add to their websites.150
Installing the “Like” button, for example, would mean that any user that
visited a publisher’s website could easily share content from the pub-
lisher’s website with the user’s Facebook network, drawing more readers
back to the publisher’s site.151
[https://perma.cc/9GLJ-TF69].
146. See Michelle Castillo, Here Are All the Ways Facebook Has Copied Snapchat,
CNBC (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/09/facebook-copies-snapchat-
examples.html [https://perma.cc/8JLT-VA9X] (“[I]t seems the copycat items may be having
an effect on Snapchat’s slowing user growth rate, even Snap acknowledged Instagram Stories
could be a direct competitor in its S-1 filing.”).
147. See Josh Constine, Facebook Acquires Anonymous Teen Compliment App
tbh, Will Let It Run, TechCrunch (Oct. 16, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/10/16/
facebook-acquires-anonymous-teen-compliment-app-tbh-will-let-it-run/ [https://perma.cc/
U6RW-RPNW].
148. See Perez, supra note 145.
149. See 2018 Facebook 10-K, supra note 134, at 35.
150. See Facebook for Developers, How to Use the New Facebook Social Plugins for
Your Business, Facebook (May 4, 2010), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-for-
developers/how-to-use-the-new-facebook-social-plugins-for-your-business/394310302301/
[https://perma.cc/M3ZJ-KBER].
151. As Facebook described, “When a person clicks Like, it (1) publishes a story to
their friends with a link back to your site, (2) adds the article to the reader’s profile, and
(3) makes the article discoverable through search on Facebook.” See Facebook Media, The
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In order to add Facebook’s plug-ins, publishers had to install
Facebook’s code onto their websites.152 In practice, installing this code
“opened a backdoor communication between users’ devices and
Facebook’s servers,” enabling Facebook to leverage the social plug-ins
installed on third-party websites to track the users of those websites.153 In
other words, Like buttons dramatically expanded the reach of Facebook’s
tracking: Any time a Facebook user visited a site with the social plug-in,
Facebook could use the user’s Facebook login cookies to identify the
user.154 Some publishers were wary. The value that online publishers offer
advertisers is access to their specific readers; it is this audience relation-
ship that ultimately allows ad-based publishers to monetize their content.
If Facebook were able to surveil a publisher’s readers, it could sell access
to those readers at a fraction of the publisher’s price—undercutting the
publisher’s pricing power in the ad market.155 For Facebook, meanwhile,
access to this data would enable it to more precisely target Facebook
users when selling ads, increasing ad revenue.
To assuage publishers’ concerns, Facebook maintained the percep-
tion that it would not use these plug-ins to monitor users for the purpose
of selling advertising.156 Keen to harness Facebook’s expansive network to
increase clicks, publishers flocked to the plug-ins. Within the first week of
the rollout, over 50,000 websites installed Facebook’s social plug-ins,157
helping Facebook embed its code across the internet.158 Contrary to
Facebook’s representations, researchers later exposed that Facebook was
using the Like button code to track what users were reading or buying—
even if a user hadn’t clicked the Like button and even if the user had
logged out of Facebook.159 Despite facing public backlash for both its appar-
ent deception and its pervasive surveillance, Facebook did not change
course—perhaps because it no longer faced serious competition in the
social network market.160 In 2014, it officially codified its policy of using
Facebook code embedded across third-party websites to track users.161
Value of a Liker, Facebook (Sept. 29, 2010), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-
media/value-of-a-liker/150630338305797 [https://perma.cc/D2RR-3LSX].
152. Srinivasan, supra note 132, at 63.
153. Id. at 63–64.
154. Id. at 65.
155. Id. at 64.
156. Id. at 64 (“For many years, Facebook perpetuated the belief it would not leverage
backdoor access, the way it had with Beacon, to conduct surveillance for commercial
purposes.”).
157. Facebook for Developers, supra note 150.
158. Srinivasan, supra note 132, at 64.
159. Id. at 65–66.
160. Id. at 66–69.
161. Id. at 70 (“In June of 2014, Facebook announced it would leverage its code
presence on third-party applications to track consumers, enabling it to surveil the specific
online behavior of this country’s citizens despite widespread preference to the contrary.”).
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The new policy admitted that Facebook would now use this surveillance
data to boost Facebook’s advertising business.162
It is reasonable to consider this policy change a bait and switch.
Facebook induced websites to install Facebook plug-ins by representing
that the company would not use this installed code to channel user data
to its advertising business. Thirty percent of the top million most-visited
websites—including major news publishers—added Facebook’s plug-ins,
becoming dependent on Facebook’s network for greater distribution.163
Facebook’s decision to switch course has meant that online publishers—
and any third-party website that both sells ads and uses Facebook plug-
ins—are now feeding valuable business data to a major competitor at
their own expense.
Unlike the case of Amazon or Google, Facebook’s appropriation of
publishers’ business information is not a feature of Facebook being
vertically integrated. Instead, it derives from the fact that Facebook is
both a major communications network and a major advertiser, and the
price it charges publishers for using its platform as a distribution network
is the right to surveil publishers’ users—information that it uses to enrich
its advertising business. In other words, collecting publishers’ business
information is not a functional necessity of allowing publishers to use
Facebook; it is instead the condition Facebook has set.
There are aspects of Facebook’s business in which it is integrated,
such as in content. Through Facebook Instant Articles, for example,
Facebook has vertically integrated into publishing media content on its
own platform.164 Reports suggest that Facebook has used its integrated
structure to preference its own offerings.165
D. Apple
Apple is a major provider of consumer electronics and digital
services, spanning smartphone and smartwatch devices, desktop and
laptop computers, digital assistants, a music store, and set-top boxes. The
162. Id. at 71 (“But now Facebook changed course and announced that the data
derived from tracking consumers would augment Facebook ad targeting, attribution, and
measurement.”).
163. Steven Englehardt & Arvind Narayanan, Online Tracking: A 1-Million-Site
Measurement and Analysis, 2016 Proc. ACM SIGSAC Conf. on Computer & Comm.
Security 1388, 1395 fig.2.
164. Facebook: By Prioritizing Natively Published Articles in Its News Feed, Facebook
Risks Antitrust Enforcement, Cuts Off Traffic and Data to Publishers, The Capitol Forum
(Nov. 14, 2016), https://thecapitolforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Facebook-
2016.11.04.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
165. See id. (“Facebook pulls a number of levers to keep users on its own platform
rather than going to the websites of publishers who fuel Facebook with free content. Such
tactics mirror conduct that has landed Google in antitrust trouble in Europe.”).
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first publicly traded corporation in history to reach $1 trillion valuation,166
Apple is a major provider of mobile devices and operating systems in the
United States.167
Across its products, Apple has long championed a vertically inte-
grated model that combines hardware, software, services, and retail.168
Unlike the Android operating system—which users operate on non-
Alphabet devices—Apple iOS functions only on Apple devices.169 Like
Android, Apple both operates an app marketplace, offering third-party
app developers the opportunity to reach Apple customers, and directly
markets its own apps in its app marketplace.170 Since it opened in 2008,
the App Store has generated more than $120 billion in total sales for app
developers.171
1. Apple iOS/App Store/Apple Apps. — App developers claim that
Apple uses its integrated model to privilege its own apps by setting
unfavorable terms for third parties.172 A recent complaint filed by Spotify
166. Thomas Heath, Apple Is the First $1 Trillion Company in History, Wash. Post
(Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/apple-is-the-first-1-
trillion-company-in-history/2018/08/02/ea3e7a02-9599-11e8-a679-b09212fb69c2_story.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
167. Mobile Operating System Market Share in United States of America,
StatCounter, http://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/mobile/united-states-of-america
[https://perma.cc/VT92-JE9M] (last updated Mar. 2019) (documenting that, as of March
2019, iOS captured 55% of the mobile operating system market); US Smartphone Market
Share: By Quarter, Counterpoint (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.counterpointresearch.com/
us-market-smartphone-share/ [https://perma.cc/Y7KT-3A2C] (documenting that, at the
end of 2018, Apple captured 47% of the U.S. smartphone market).
168. Apple has been designing more and more of the technologies inside its products,
including chips. Mark Gurman, How Apple Built a Chip Powerhouse to Threaten
Qualcomm and Intel, Bloomberg (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/
2018-apple-custom-chips/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review). In the last couple of
years, however, Apple has broken from its original model by been making Apple
services available on non-Apple devices. See Michael Simon, Apple Will Launch iTunes
Video App on Samsung Smart TVs This Spring—and It’ll Support Bixby, Macworld
(Jan. 6, 2019), https://www.macworld.com/article/3331183/itunes-app-samsung-smart-tv.html
[https://perma.cc/K7XU-4MHS] (noting that Apple is placing a TV app on hardware
produced by Samsung and is placing Apple Music on smart speakers produced by Amazon).
169. See iOS 11 Is Compatible with These Devices, Apple, https://support.apple.com/
en-us/HT209574 [https://perma.cc/P6BR-4TG8] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
170. See Stephen Silver, The Revolution Steve Jobs Resisted: Apple’s App Store Marks
10 Years of Third-Party Innovation, Apple Inside (July 10, 2018), https://appleinsider.com/
articles/18/07/10/the-revolution-steve-jobs-resisted-apples-app-store-marks-10-years-of-
third-party-innovation [https://perma.cc/FG8G-VDMC].
171. Tripp Mickle, With iPhone Sputtering, Apple Bets Future on TV and News, Wall
St. J. (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/with-the-iphone-sputtering-apple-bets-
its-future-on-tv-and-news-11553437018 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
172. Few developers have publicly reported discrimination by Apple, so this section
will necessarily focus on and draw from Spotify, which recently filed a complaint in the
European Commission, claiming that Apple has engaged in anticompetitive conduct by
abusing its control over the App store. For Spotify’s summary of its claims against Apple,
see The Case, Time to Play Fair, https://timetoplayfair.com/the-case/ [https://perma.cc/
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in the European Union summarizes these allegations.173 First, Apple
charges Spotify and certain other apps a 30% fee on in-app purchases—a
fee that, Spotify points out, Apple enforces selectively.174 Apple’s own
apps do not pay the fee, and neither do many apps, like Uber, that are
not in direct competition with a comparable Apple service.175 Second,
Apple prevents Spotify from communicating directly with Apple-based
users or marketing certain services to them—potentially inhibiting
Spotify’s sales.176 And third, Spotify alleges that Apple “routinely reject[ed]”
Spotify’s app enhancements and bug fixes—degrading the product
quality it could market through Apple, as Apple ramped up its compet-
itor service, Apple Music.177
This is not the first time that developers have alleged discrimination
by Apple. Around 2008, Apple explicitly rejected apps on the basis that
they “duplicate[d] the functionality” of built-in iPhone apps.178 More
recently, Apple was reported to have removed a digital wellness app
shortly after releasing its own rival product (Screen Time)179 and to have
rejected a social location planning app that competes with its own “Find
My Friends” app.180
Faced with slowdown of iPhone sales, Apple is expanding its service
offerings, introducing new services in TV, news, payments, and video
games.181 It has also “intensified monitoring of apps that benefit and
444C-BPFV] [hereinafter Spotify Case] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019). For Apple’s response
to Spotify’s claims, see Addressing Spotify’s Claims, Apple (Mar. 14, 2019),
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2019/03/addressing-spotifys-claims/ [https://perma.cc/
85YP-T7LD] [hereinafter Apple Response].
173. See Spotify Case, supra note 172 (claiming that “Apple’s actions violate the law”
by selectively discriminating against competitors on the Apple platform); see also Joan E.
Solsman, Spotify: Apple’s App Store Abuses Its Power to ‘Stifle’ Rivals, CNET (Mar. 14,
2019), https://www.cnet.com/news/spotify-apple-app-store-abuses-power-to-stifle-competition/
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (paraphrasing Spotify CEO David Ek of saying that
“Apple wields its powerful App Store as a cudgel to stifle innovation, weaken competition
and unfairly tax its rivals”).
174. Five Fast Facts, Time to Play Fair, https://timetoplayfair.com/facts/[https://perma.cc/
37VV-JMTW] [hereinafter Spotify Facts] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
175. Id. In its response, Apple noted that in-app fees are the only source of revenue
for the Apple app store. See Apple Response, supra note 172.
176. Spotify Facts, supra note 174.
177. Id.
178. Chris Foresman, Apple Rejects Another App for “Duplicating Functionality,” Ars
Technica (Sept. 22, 2008), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2008/09/apple-rejects-another-
app-for-duplicating-functionality/ [https://perma.cc/2Y8G-UETK] (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Apple).
179. Mark Wolgemuth, RescueTime for iOS Update: Apple Has Removed Us from the
App Store, RescueTime: Blog (Nov. 8, 2018), https://blog.rescuetime.com/rescuetime-
for-ios-removed/ [https://perma.cc/KJQ2-JF78].
180. See Michael McClain, Apple Rejecting “Find My Location” Competitor Apps?,
Medium (Aug. 13, 2018), https://medium.com/@michael.c.mcclain/apple-rejecting-find-
my-location-competitor-apps-68c12b4c4aae [https://perma.cc/9JNK-8MNQ].
181. See Mickle, supra note 171.
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threaten Apple,” in part by creating a “release radar” through which
Apple tracks apps that pose competitive threats to Apple’s own services.182
It is unclear whether Apple’s monitoring efforts are drawing on data on
rivals collected through its platform.
E. Effects of Discrimination and Appropriation on Investment and Innovation
There are several reasons why permitting dominant digital platforms
to discriminate against and appropriate sensitive business information
from producers that depend on them to reach market might be harmful.
Drawing on a Progressive Era framework, one could argue that allowing a
firm that controls an essential service or form of infrastructure to exploit
that control in ways that enrich the firm and harm third-party
dependents amounts to a problematic exercise of private coercion.183
Seen through this lens, this conduct represents the accumulation of
“arbitrary authority unchecked by the ordinary mechanisms of political
accountability,” amounting to a “political problem of domination.”184
As Part II of this Article traces, in recent decades this expansive
framework for understanding and regulating private power has been
abandoned in favor of a paradigm that focuses primarily on welfare costs.
Yet, as this section outlines, platform discrimination and appropriation
also risk undermining innovation, raising dynamic efficiency concerns.
Therefore, even under a framework primarily focused on efficiency
harms, discrimination and appropriation by dominant platforms merits
serious concern.
1. Are Dominant Digital Platforms Stifling Innovation? — One risk
associated with foreclosure and value appropriation by dominant digital
platforms is that this conduct could deter entry and chill innovation. If
independent developers or producers rely on a dominant platform to
reach customers and also face the constant risk that the platform will
foreclose access, appropriate their business value, or both, producers
may be less likely to secure funding and develop their product in the first
place. In Microsoft, the district court found that Microsoft’s exclusionary
conduct not only had hobbled innovation in middleware and
applications software but had discouraged competition throughout the
computer industry as a whole.185 The long-term effect of its conduct was
182. Id.
183. See Rahman, New Utilities, supra note 26, at 1628 (“The challenge for law and
public policy, then, was not just to promote economic efficiency and well-functioning
markets. Rather, the challenge was a broader political one, of ensuring the accountability of
private actors to the public good . . . .”).
184. Id. at 1629.
185. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 103 (D.D.C. 1999) (“Most
harmful of all is the message that Microsoft’s actions have conveyed to every enterprise with the
potential to innovate in the computer industry.”).
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to “deter[] investment in technologies and businesses that exhibit[ed]
the potential to threaten Microsoft.”186
Anecdotal evidence suggests that both actual entry and the threat of
entry by digital platforms into platform-adjacent markets is dampening
investment in complementary segments, now known as a “kill-zone.”187
For example, a survey of more than two dozen Silicon Valley investors
revealed that Facebook’s willingness to appropriate information from
and mimic the functionality of apps has created “a strong disincentive for
investors” to fund services that Facebook might copy.188 One founder
observed, “People are not getting funded because Amazon might one
day compete with them.”189 “We don’t touch anything that comes too
close to Facebook, Google or Amazon,” said a managing partner at New
Enterprise Associates.190 Another venture capital investor noted that the
impact of dominant digital platforms on “what can be funded, and what
can succeed, is massive.”191 This concern raised by venture capitalists
makes sense: A potential innovator (or a potential funder of a potential
innovator) decides whether to invest based on the anticipated risk and
reward of realizing the innovation. Anticipating platform discrimination
or appropriation will lower expected rewards, depressing the incentive to
invest. Even the uncertainty of discrimination can dissuade entry by
heightening risk.
Data on investment trends do not offer a decisive answer but
generally seem consistent with the story told by surveyed investors.
Venture capital funding as a whole appears to be booming: In 2018, the
total annual venture capital invested surpassed $100 billion for the first
time since the dot-com period.192 The number of angel and seed
186. Id.
187. See American Tech Giants Are Making Life Tough for Startups, Economist (June
2, 2018), https://www.economist.com/business/2018/06/02/american-tech-giants-are-making-
life-tough-for-startups (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
188. Dwoskin, supra note 10. For a counterperspective, see Oliver Wyman, Assessing the
Impact of Big Tech on Venture Investment 5 (2018), https://www.oliverwyman.com/content/
dam/oliver-wyman/v2/publications/2018/july/assessing-impact.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9CM8-CC9T] (concluding that there has been “no negative impact of [Facebook, Google,
and Amazon] presence on venture capital deal value”). The report was commissioned by
Facebook. Id. at 1. For a useful critique of the Wyman study, see Ian Hathaway, Platform
Giants and Venture-Backed Startups (Oct. 12, 2018), http://www.ianhathaway.org/blog/2018/
10/12/platform-giants-and-venture-backed-startups [https://perma.cc/SZ8U-QLKS] (arguing
that the category fields used by Wyman are too broad to be meaningful).
189. Solon, supra note 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
190. Dwoskin, supra note 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
191. Schechter, supra note 11. One can imagine investors holding back from funding
services that strive to go head-to-head with a digital platform in its primary market, or from
withholding funding from services that seek to operate in a complementary market. These
quotations are not entirely clear as to which of the two is occurring.
192. PitchBook Data, Inc. et al., Venture Monitor: 4Q 2018, at 4 (2018),
https://files.pitchbook.com/website/files/pdf/4Q_2018_PitchBook_NVCA_Venture_Monitor.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9FE-NYHM] (“The 2018 VC headline is, understandably, that
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investments, meanwhile, has been declining since 2015, signaling that it
has become harder for startups to secure an initial round of financing.193
Indeed, it is late-stage deals with mature companies that account for an
“outsized proportion” of total capital today,194 while startups see fewer
first financings, even as the deal value for startups has increased.195 In
other words, venture capital markets seem to be following a winner-take-
most model: Fewer firms receive funding, but those that do are raising
more capital.196 These trends come against a backdrop of falling entre-
preneurship: Startup formation is at a thirty-year low, contributing to a
loss of business dynamism.197
These overall numbers, however, offer limited insight into whether—
and in what way—dominant platforms are affecting venture capital
funding. Even sector-specific figures compiled by the industry database
are based on industry classifications that are too generalized for a precise
analysis of this question. Establishing high-level causality between platform
conduct and investment decisions would prove extremely challenging;
there are a significant number of variables at play, and demonstrating
but-for causality is tough. Achieving clarity on this question would require
granular case-by-case analysis.198
The theoretical literature examining how third-party producers and
providers (also called “complementors”) manage or respond to head-to-
head competition with platforms is vast.199 Empirical work, by contrast, is
more limited.
One study found that Amazon is more likely to enter product spaces
that have higher sales, better reviews, and that do not require significant
annual capital invested eclipsed $100 billion for the first time since the dot-com era.”).
Investors note that the current abundance of capital at least partly reflects “investor
demand for growth assets during a time of historically low interest rates.” Id. at 14.
193. See id. at 8. Although the total deal value for angel- and seed-stage deals in 2018
approached a decade high, the relatively strong activity helped “stymie a downward trend.” Id.
194. Id. at 5.
195. See id. at 10.
196. Id. (“Startups see fewer, but larger first financings[.]”).
197. See Ryan A. Decker et al., Declining Business Dynamism: What We Know and the
Way Forward, 106 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 203, 203 (2016); see also Germán
Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Declining Competition and Investment in the U.S. 1
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23,583, 2017) (“[T]here has been a broad
decrease in turnover and a broad increase in concentration across most U.S. industries.”).
198. See Hathaway, supra note 188.
199. For literature that identifies this entry strategy as enabling a platform to
strengthen its market power, see, for example, Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman,
The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33
RAND J. Econ. 194, 194 (2002); Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion,
80 Am. Econ. Rev. 837, 850–56 (1990). For literature that focuses on how this strategy can
discourage third parties from innovating, see, for example, Joseph Farrell & Michael L.
Katz, Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets, 48 J. Indus. Econ.
413, 414 (2000) (“[I]ntegration can inefficiently reduce incentives to innovate when
consumers differ in their valuations of the innovation.”). See also infra Appendix.
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effort by sellers to grow.200 The effect of Amazon’s entry, meanwhile, is to
reduce shipping costs for consumers and increase sales—but its self-
preferential treatment can also foreclose consumers’ access to competing
products.201 Overall, Amazon’s entry has not yet affected customer
perceptions of product quality,202 but it does “discourage[] third-party
sellers from continuing to offer the products.”203 The authors of that
study note that existing merchants discouraged by Amazon’s entry “may
bring fewer innovative products to the platform.”204
A study assessing how app developers reacted to perceived or actual
entry by Google, meanwhile, found that developers are “discouraged
from innovating in the affected market.”205 Indeed, even the threat of
direct competition by Google spurs developers to “significantly reduce[]”
updates on affected apps—and to reallocate their efforts to markets unaf-
fected by Google’s entry.206 Notably, the average small firm also responds
by pivoting to a focus on short-term profits, leading to higher prices.207
200. See Zhu & Liu, supra note 33, at 2620.
201. Id. at 2632.
202. Id. (“[W]e do not find differences between the average product ratings of
affected and unaffected products, suggesting that Amazon’s entry does not seem to
increase consumer satisfaction with the products.”).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2638. Although Amazon’s conduct deters entry, Professors Feng Zhu and
Qihong Liu speculate that there could be a countervailing effect. Insofar as Amazon’s
lower prices could expand its consumer base, this could in theory spur new merchants to
join Amazon. Id. (“How Amazon’s direct competition against its complementors affects
platform growth thus remains an open question.”); see also Feng Zhu, Friends or Foes?
Examining Platform Owners’ Entry into Complementors’ Spaces, 28 J. Econ. & Mgmt.
Strategy 23, 26 (2019) (“[I]f Amazon’s entries attract more consumers, the expanded
customer base could incentivize more third-party sellers to join the platform. As a result,
the long-term effects for consumers of Amazon’s entry are not clear.”).
205. Wen Wen & Feng Zhu, Threat of Platform-Owner Entry and Complementor
Responses: Evidence from the Mobile App Market 16 (NET Inst., Working Paper No. 16-
10, 2018). Specifically, the study found that when a developer is faced with the threat of
Google’s entry, the developer “significantly reduces its updates on the affected app by 5
percent relative to an unaffected developer’s app,” while actual entry by Google leads the
developer to reduce updates on the affected app by eight percent. Id. Notably, Google’s
threat of entering a particular app market drives the affected developer to “significantly
increase[]” updates on unaffected apps. Id.
206. Id. Notably, Google’s threat of entering a particular app market drives the
affected developer to “significantly increase” updates on unaffected apps. Id. The authors
conclude that “[o]verall, these figures suggest that after Google becomes a credible threat
in certain markets, developers become less interested in offering new products in those
markets.” Id. at 23.
207. Id. at 5 (“Further, in contrast to other studies that find that entry threat reduces
prices, we show that the average small firm increases prices because, faced with the entry
threat of a powerful firm, it may decide to focus on short-term profits.”). The finding that
platform entry redirects innovation rather than stifles it altogether could be seen as
reducing “product redundancy” and “wasteful effort.” But one cost to this approach is that
it risks replacing the competitive process with Google as the arbiter of what products fail
or survive. Id. at 26.
1012 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:973
Empirical studies assessing how actual or potential entry by a
dominant platform affects complementors are still limited. Investors
acknowledge unequivocally that the dominance of digital platforms
deters investment in certain markets, and data suggest that firms looking
to compete with a core functionality of Google, Facebook, or Amazon
have seen funding dry up.208 The few available case studies confirm that
the risk of appropriation chills or at least diverts certain forms of invest-
ment and innovation. More empirical work on this issue would help
deepen public understanding of how funders assess the risk of platform
foreclosure and appropriation, and what impact platform expansion into
adjacent markets may have on innovation.
At first glance, the idea that dominant digital platforms may be using
their integrated structure to undermine dynamic efficiency appears in
tension with standard economic theory. The Appendix to this Article
reviews leading theories on when integrated firms can be expected to
discriminate against or exclude rivals in adjacent markets, identifies the
set of conditions under which this is likely to happen, and explains why
digital platform markets fit these conditions.
2. Innovation and Platform Design Principles. — While initial evidence
suggests that platform discrimination and appropriation is stifling
innovation, definitively determining the net effects on innovation—
which involves significant uncertainty, lengthy time horizons, and interde-
pendencies209—is complex. Indeed, the debate over what type of market
structure and forms of business organization best promote innovation is
longstanding and extensive.210 While contributing to this debate is
208. See Hathaway, supra note 188 (“[T]he expansion of venture capital first
financings grew more slowly or contracted more rapidly in each detailed FGA industry
than it did for comparable sub-sectors (Software, Retail), sectors (IT, B2C), and for the
rest of venture capital as a whole.”).
209. See Melissa A. Schilling, Towards Dynamic Efficiency: Innovation and Its
Implications for Antitrust, 60 Antitrust Bull. 191, 199 (2015).
210. The rich and complex literature on this topic is often described in shorthand as a
debate between Kenneth Arrow and Joseph Schumpeter. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker,
Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 Antitrust L.J. 575, 575
(2007) (describing the debate over the best way to foster innovation as pitting the view of
Arrow against that of Schumpeter). At the risk of oversimplification, Arrow argued that
competition spurs innovation, while Schumpeter argued that oligopolistic markets do.
Compare Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources to
Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors
609, 620 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962) (“The preinvention monopoly power
acts as a strong disincentive to further innovation.”), with Joseph A. Schumpeter,
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 106 (1942) (“The firm of the type that is compat-
ible with perfect competition is in many cases inferior in internal, especially technological,
efficiency.”). For a high-level review of this debate, see generally Carl Shapiro, Competition
and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull’s Eye?, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive
Activity Revisited (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2012). See also Mark A. Lemley,
Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation, 2011 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 637, 651–52
(arguing that the “relationship between market structure and innovation is industry-
specific” and demanding a more industry-specific innovation policy).
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beyond the scope of this Article, this section will briefly offer that (1)
promoting innovation in platform-adjacent markets should be a key goal
of platform policy, and (2) innovation architecture literature offers
useful principles for thinking through how to create digital platform
ecosystems conducive to innovation.
There is broad consensus that, over the long run, promoting
dynamic efficiency is more important to well-being than static effi-
ciency.211 For this reason, scholars have devoted a wealth of research to
identifying how to cultivate and promote instrumentalities of inno-
vation.212 Commonly recognized innovation catalysts include patents,
standard-setting processes, and platforms.213
Because platforms have the potential to lower the cost of entry for firms
looking to market new products or services, platforms have the potential to
“increase the rate at which product innovation can happen.”214 The
Windows platform had the potential to ease entry for Netscape, which could
access millions of consumers without having to create its own operating
system—just as Android has the potential to ease entry for thousands of
app developers. Given the critical role that platforms can play in spurring
innovation, protecting the integrity of platforms as innovation catalysts
should be a key goal of competition policy in digital markets.215 This would
include preventing platforms from engaging in forms of discrimination,
exclusion, appropriation, and self-privileging, conduct that can lead to
“the corruption of the entire system of platform-based innovation.”216
211. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Innovation: Where We Are and Where We
Should Be Going, 77 Antitrust L.J. 749, 751 (2011) (“[T]here seems to be broad
consensus that the gains to be had from innovation are larger than the gains from simple
production and trading under constant technology.”).
212. See generally Innovation Clusters and Interregional Competition (Johannes
Bröcker, Dirk Dohse & Rüdiger Soltwedel eds., 2003) (collecting essays that discuss how
the spatial clustering of firms impacts regional productivity and innovation levels);
Innovation Networks and Clusters: The Knowledge Backbone (Blandine Laperche, Paul
Sommers & Dimitri Uzunidis eds., 2010) (collecting essays that explain how promoting
collaboration and networks among firms, which can be used to share knowledge about
innovation, can produce new and useful forms of knowledge); Steven Johnson, Where
Good Ideas Come From: The Natural History of Innovation (2010) (discussing and
analyzing the environments and conditions that are most conducive to innovation and
identifying seven factors that are most likely to lead to innovation in any context).
213. Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement if Innovation
Mattered Most, 78 Antitrust L.J. 313, 321 (2012) [hereinafter Wu, Taking Innovation
Seriously] (“[T]here are some instrumentalities that do lie within the domain of competition
enforcement. Here I want to focus on three: Standard Setting, Platforms, and Patents.”).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 322 (“Given the importance of platforms and standard setting to
innovation, an innovation-centered law would make a major goal the protection of the
integrity of these instrumentalities.”).
216. Id. at 323; see also id. at 324 (noting that, were antitrust enforcement purely
innovation-focused, “the treatment of applications by platform owners would be the
subject of continuing oversight.”).
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Separate from policing conduct that risks undermining innovation,
policy can also draw from innovation architecture principles.217 This
approach was central to designing the internet, whose original
architecture was based on the “end-to-end” principle.218 In general, end-
to-end stipulates that “the ‘intelligence’ in a network should be located at
the top of a layered system—at its ‘ends,’ where users put information
and applications onto the network[,]” while the “communications
protocols themselves (the ‘pipes’ through which information flows)
should be as simple and as general as possible.”219 Professors Mark
Lemley and Lawrence Lessig observe that designing the Internet around
end-to-end has had social significance, most notably in “the competition
in innovation the Internet enables.”220 As they explain, because “there is
no single strategic actor who can tilt the competitive environment (the
network) in favor of itself, or no hierarchical entity that can favor some
applications over others, an e2e network creates a maximally competitive
environment for innovation.”221
The end-to-end principle was embedded partly through the Internet
Protocol, an open-standard networking protocol that empowered
“developers at the network’s edge to design and deploy new services and
applications without having to rely on network operators to build any
new functionality into the physical core of the network.”222 This
principle, in turn, traces to the concept of common carriage, which
required common carriers to grant equal treatment to equally situated
parties.223 The key attributes of common carriage are “nondiscriminatory
public access and indifference to the nature of the goods carried.”224
217. Barbara van Schewick, Internet Architecture and Innovation 4 (2010)
[hereinafter van Schewick, Internet Architecture] (“Different architectures may impose
different constraints, which may result in different decisions by economic actors, which in
turn may result in different firm and market structures and different levels of economic
activity.”).
218. Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 931 (describing the end-to-end principle as a
fundamental design feature of the Internet). As Professor Barbara van Schewick notes,
there is a “broad” and “narrow” version of the end-to-end principle. Van Schewick,
Internet Architecture, supra note 217, at 37–38 (“As will become apparent, some of the
confusion can be attributed to the silent coexistence of two different design principles
under the same name: the narrow version and the broad version of the end-to-end
arguments.”); id. at 60–79 (contrasting the two versions).
219. Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 930–31.
220. Id. at 930.
221. Id. at 931.
222. Annemarie Bridy, Remediating Social Media: A Layer-Conscious Approach, 24
B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 193, 200–01 (2018) (“IP is the open-standard networking protocol
that allows heterogeneously configured local area networks from all over the world to
interconnect with one another.”).
223. See id. at 201.
224. Id.
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Digital platforms exist in a different “layer” from the physical
network providers governed by end-to-end.225 As scholars have noted,
regulations at the “application” layer—which includes digital platforms—
have encouraged “content awareness,” in part due to the role some of
these services play in intermediating speech and expression.226 Still, these
architecture design principles offer a fruitful way of thinking through
what set of constraints should apply to dominant digital platforms in
order to best promote innovation.
II. LEGAL SCRUTINY OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION BY DOMINANT NETWORKS
Confronting the risks of integration by dominant intermediaries is
not new. Up until around the 1970s, a basic regulatory principle held
that dominant gatekeepers should not be permitted to compete with
third parties for access to the gatekeeper’s facilities. Limits on business
entry for network monopolies, gatekeeper intermediaries, and other
businesses deemed to have outsized control over key services were a
mainstay of economic regulation.
This Part traces the evolution in both the institutional mechanisms
and the substantive considerations by which government actors have
imposed limits on business entry. It closes by sketching out how current
antitrust law neglects to address harms from vertical integration that
should trigger scrutiny even under the current framework.
Notably, state and federal governments have issued line-of-business
restrictions through a variety of legal tools: corporate charters, regulatory
regimes, and antitrust law.227 In some cases, these limits prohibited firms
from expanding into any distinct market; in others, they prohibited firms
from entering only adjacent markets—namely, those markets that involve
a successive stage of production or distribution. A categorical prohibition
would, for example, ban a movie distributor from entering any nondis-
tributor market, whereas a ban on integration would prohibit it from
entering only the movie-production market or the movie-theater market.
Since this Article examines the dual role that digital platforms play—as
both marketplace operators and merchants in the marketplace—this Part
primarily focuses on limits on entry into adjacent markets.
A. Evolving Approaches to Restricting Business Lines
Early American corporations had their activities restricted by their
charters. States issued corporate charters as a special grant of limited
225. Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. on Telecomm. & High
Tech. L. 37, 59 (2002) (distinguishing between four layers that comprise the Internet:
physical, logical, applications or services, and content).
226. Bridy, supra note 222, at 205; see also Brett M. Frischmann, Infrastructure: The
Social Value of Shared Resources 319–23 (2012) (describing a five-layer model of internet
infrastructure).
227. See infra section II.A.
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liability in exchange for the performance of specific duties and
functions.228 Corporate charters generally limited the size, scope, and
duration of operations and steered business activity toward serving
community purposes.229 This effort to use charters to impose “some
degree of social control” on firms lasted into the late nineteenth century,
by which point most state legislatures had passed general incorporation
laws—with the expectation that companies would now be regulated by
competition.230 With this shift from special to general incorporation, the
corporation largely ceased being viewed as an instrument of state policy
and instead became seen as a “private institution” that had authority “to
carry on virtually any kind of business.”231
Following this shift, restricting the lines of business in which a firm
could engage mostly fell to regulatory regimes that Congress introduced
to govern specific sectors. Typically overseen by an administrative agency,
these regulatory regimes spanned industries including railroads, bank-
ing, airlines, trucks, telecommunications, electricity, and natural gas—
sectors considered both critical to the economy and, in some cases,
susceptible to monopolistic market structures.232 In some instances, the
statute creating the regulatory regime specifically prohibited regulated
firms from entering certain markets.233 In other cases, these limits on
entry (and exit) were instituted by the administrative agency.234
While each regime had its own specific policy goals and regulatory
tools, government oversight of these “regulated industries” shared a
228. This notion of the corporate form stemmed from early English law, where
corporations were
in form, in fact, and in legal cognizance a device by which the political
state got something done. They were far more like the bodies corporate
we call ‘public authorities’ today . . . . Few in the seventeenth or
eighteenth centuries would have disputed that a corporation was an
agency of the state—probably not before the early nineteenth century,
either in England or in the United States.
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of Personal
Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 933, 944 (1952).
229. Id. at 935 (describing “attempts to limit by charter the size or the scope of
operations, or to guide into, or hold operations in, some specific field of activity, . . . or
[to] direct[] corporate action for community purposes,” which carried forward into
nineteenth-century state incorporation statutes but were then abandoned).
230. Id. at 935, 946.
231. Id. at 946. Of course, this view of corporations as private actors did not override
the recognition that the corporate form derived its legal protections from the state.
Indeed, “[c]ourts continued to insist that ultimate control over and responsibility for the
administration and functioning of the corporation remained with the state because the
corporation’s existence and functioning was an exercise of the sovereign political power of
the state itself.” Id.
232. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1323, 1325–27 (1998).
233. See infra sections III.A–.B.
234. See infra sections III.C–.D.
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general aim of ensuring reliability and nondiscrimination.235 Agencies
applied restrictions on market entry and exit to promote both of these
goals.236 In some cases, regulated firms were permitted to enter multiple
markets so that they could cross-subsidize: Long-distance service, for
example, could subsidize local service, enabling the provision of univer-
sal service.237 In other instances, regulated firms were prohibited from
entering certain lines of business in order to further the goal of
nondiscrimination.238 While common carriage regimes would require a
firm to offer equal service on equal terms, prohibiting a firm from
competing with its business customers would eliminate one source of the
incentive to discriminate. In this way, common carriage and structural
separations often functioned as complements in the service of nondis-
crimination. In addition to limiting entry and exit, standard agency
interventions included regulating rates, requiring standard packages of
services at uniform prices, and mandating universal service.239
No precise set of criteria determined the sectors that Congress
decided to oversee through regulatory regimes. Several of the regulated
industries exhibited natural monopoly characteristics—including high
fixed costs and low marginal costs—but these economic characteristics
offer only a partial explanation.240 Direct government oversight tended
to hinge more on the degree to which an industry was, as the Supreme
Court termed it, “affected with a public interest.”241 In some cases, the
“public-ness” of an industry correlated to the degree to which it was a
235. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 232, at 1325.
236. See id. at 1359 (“[T]he regulatory agency would make the initial and central
determination of whether companies would be permitted to enter the industry.”).
237. Id. at 1340.
238. See id. at 1359.
239. See id. at 1334 (arguing that, in the 1930s, it was “generally accepted that an
administrative system based on filed tariffs” was an effective way of regulating public
utilities and common carriers).
240. See id. (noting that some traditionally regulated industries were natural
monopolies, while “others were highly competitive”); see also Thomas B. Nachbar, The
Public Network, 17 CommLaw Conspectus 67, 97 (2008) (“The early history of common
carrier regulation is devoid of any mention of monopoly, nor is market power an element
of modern common carrier regulation of many industries. For instance, inns have
traditionally been subject to the same liability in the presence or absence of competition.”
(footnote omitted)).
241. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 130 (1876) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Sir Matthew Hale, De Portibus Maris, in 1 A Collection of Tracts Relative to the
Law of England 45, 78 (Francis Hargrave ed., 1787)); see also Nachbar, supra note 240, at
106 (“The object of the business, not the number of competitors in the market, renders
one’s work public.”); Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination
Norms in Communications, 5 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 15, 31 (2006) (“[I]t is the
role the carrier plays in the economy that necessitates duties of common carriage, not
necessarily the potential for abuse of market power.”).
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public necessity, as was the case, for example, with electricity.242
Nondiscriminatory access requirements, however, were generally tied to
physical distribution networks, which the government has a long history
of overseeing.243 All regulated industries were related in some way to
transportation and communication networks, even as “different eco-
nomic and social facts seem to carry different weight” depending on the
context.244
As Professors Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill have described,
starting in the 1970s this legal regime gave way to a different regulatory
paradigm.245 Instead of promoting equal treatment and reliable service,
the new framework sought to encourage competition both among
providers and within their forms of service, the idea being that
maximizing consumer choice would minimize the need for regulatory
involvement.246 The specific way lawmakers applied this new framework
varied by industry. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, for example,
ended the public utility approach to regulating airlines, while the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 loosened some restrictions and intro-
duced a new set of requirements oriented around the goal of promoting
competition.247 Across industries, tariffed services, integrated service
packages, and regulatory control were abandoned in favor of individually
negotiated contracts, unbundled services, and an abridged role for
administrative agencies.248
The transition away from the traditional regulatory paradigm took
place against a background assumption that antitrust laws would robustly
police formerly regulated dominant firms. Both Alfred Kahn and then-
Professor Stephen Breyer, strong advocates of the shift in regulatory
paradigm, described the new regime as a distinct form of regulation.249
242. See Nachbar, supra note 240, at 85 (“Society’s willingness to engineer markets in
order to provide access to certain articles of commerce depends in some measure on the
necessity of those items.”).
243. Id. at 102.
244. Id. at 109.
245. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 232, at 1325 (“This legal regime has been
giving way over the last quarter-century to a very different paradigm.”).
246. Id. at 1361.
247. See id. at 1325–26, 1335.
248. Id. at 1326.
249. This view was captured by Alfred Kahn, a primary architect of airline
deregulation. In an interview he reflected on the thinking at the time: “[The Airline
Deregulation Act] provided for eventual total deregulation on route, entry and exit . . .
and total freedom of pricing. It did not eliminate antitrust scrutiny. . . . [O]f course we
continued to regulate with intensified application of the antitrust laws.” Alfred E. Kahn
Interview, PBS: The First Measured Century, http://www.pbs.org/fmc/interviews/kahn.htm
[https://perma.cc/GN6Q-SX5E] (last visited Oct. 19, 2018); see also Stephen Breyer,
Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92
Harv. L. Rev. 547, 578 (1979) [hereinafter Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure] (“[O]ne
should recognize that ‘unregulated’ markets are subject to the antitrust laws—a form of
government intervention designed to maintain a workably competitive marketplace.”).
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And while most tools of the first regulatory paradigm (rate-setting, for
example, or mandated universal service) were largely eliminated in favor
of the new competition-based paradigm, structural restrictions on busi-
ness have remained a feature of both. This is because even as the new
model was less directly interventionist, it still relied on the antitrust laws
to police markets—and structural limits have been a key remedy in
antitrust.250
The antitrust laws broadly prohibit anticompetitive conduct and
anticompetitive mergers. Structural prohibitions can apply in both contexts.
When a company is found to be monopolizing or attempting to monopolize
a market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, breakup of the
company is an available remedy.251 Separately, when a court determines
that the effect of a particular merger or acquisition “may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly” in violation of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, it can enjoin the merger.252 Compared to
separations implemented through regulations, antitrust separations are
less likely to categorically deny market entry, although consent decrees
that govern a significant market segment may achieve that effect.253 In
250. As then-Chief Judge Breyer put it, “[e]conomic regulators seek to achieve [the
goals of low prices, innovation, and efficient production methods] directly by controlling
prices through rules and regulations; antitrust seeks to achieve them indirectly by
promoting and preserving a [competitive] process that tends to bring [these goals]
about.” Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990).
251. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 78 (1911) (“The
court below . . . adjudged that the New Jersey corporation . . . was a combination in violation of
the 1st section of the [Sherman Act], and an attempt to monopolize or a monopolization
contrary to the 2d section of the act. It commanded the dissolution of the combi-
nation . . . .”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 99–100 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (per curiam) (summarizing the district court’s remedy, which mandated a structural
separation between Microsoft’s operating system and browser).
252. See Mergers, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-
antitrust-laws/mergers [https://perma.cc/B4FE-N3Q4] (last visited Mar. 17, 2019) (“Merger
law is generally forward-looking: it bars mergers that may lead to harmful effects.”).
253. For example, in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948),
the Justice Department entered into consent decrees with five major motion picture
companies and three minor ones. See id. at 141 n.3. Each decree mandated a separation
between film distribution and exhibition, requiring those defendants that then owned
theatres to divest either their distribution operations or their movie theatres. Barry J. Brett
& Michael D. Friedman, A Fresh Look at the Paramount Decrees, Ent. & Sports Law., Fall
1991, at 1, 3 (“[S]ome of the majors were required to ‘divorce’ themselves from their
theatre interests and were prohibited from engaging in the exhibition business except
upon . . . permission by the court. Similarly, some of the divorced exhibition companies were
prohibited from engaging in production and distribution activities without court
approval.” (footnote omitted)); see also infra section III.D. Meanwhile, in earlier enforce-
ment eras the FTC would routinely enter consent orders prohibiting subsequent
acquisitions in particular lines of business. As of 1975, the FTC had at least fifty-four orders
with provisions barring acquisitions. See United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S.
223, 250 n.7 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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either case, the separation intervenes at the level of business structure
rather than conduct.254
Unknown at the time of the shift away from regulated industries was
how drastically antitrust law, too, would be transformed. Through the
1960s, antitrust courts and enforcers assessed business expansion into
adjacent markets through “economic structuralism,” an approach that
analyzed competition primarily through examining the structure of
markets.255 Although the government was light on bringing antitrust
actions in vertical merger cases up until the 1930s, scrutiny of vertical
expansion picked up after the Great Depression, which wiped out
thousands of small unintegrated businesses and catalyzed a political
movement against integrated chain stores.256
Skeptics of vertical integration offered two primary theories of harm:
leverage and foreclosure. The concern with leverage was that a dominant
firm would use its market power in one line of business to establish an
outsized advantage in an adjacent market.257 The risk posed by
254. Separate from government-mandated separations, sometimes firms break
themselves up. For example, in recent years General Electric has spun off its
transportation business and its healthcare unit, and—in a breakup partially reflecting the
separations principle—is separating its natural gas unit from its unit producing equipment
and distributing electricity. Thomas Gryta, GE Slashes Dividend, Discloses Criminal Probe;
Shares Sink, Wall St. J. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/general-electric-
slashes-quarterly-dividend-to-1-cent-1540896132 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
Corporate spinoffs became popular in the 1980s, when improvements in available data
and analysis helped investors realize that specialist firms attract higher valuations than
rivals within diversified groups. This “conglomerate discount” gave rise to a strategy
whereby corporate raiders would buy firms with short-term “junk” debt that they would
repay by selling business units off individually. Stephen Wilmot, Break Up And Die: Why
Spinoff Fever Can’t Last Forever, Wall St. J. (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
break-up-and-die-why-spinoff-fever-cant-last-forever-1510580248 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). Indeed, corporate spinoffs can generate significant value; one study found
that companies divested from parents between 2001 and 2012 “generated a return 17.1
percent in excess of the benchmark over the 22 months following the split.” Id. But the
spinoffs fared worse than the benchmark during the financial crisis and the Eurozone debt
crisis, suggesting that “[i]nvesting in spin offs is essentially a high-risk, high-return
strategy.” Id. In 2015, the value of corporate spinoffs totaled over $175 billion. Id.
255. See Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 Yale L.J. 710, 717–22 (2017)
[hereinafter Khan, Antitrust Paradox] (“One of the most significant changes in antitrust
law and interpretation over the last century has been the move away from economic
structuralism.”).
256. Herbert Hovenkamp, Robert Bork and Vertical Integration, 79 Antitrust L.J. 983,
985–88 (2014) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration] (noting that, before the
1930s, “the Supreme Court wholeheartedly approved vertical integration that was not
found to be part of a monopolization scheme”); see also id. at 986 (“[V]ertical integration
leads to production cost savings and, to a lesser extent, savings in transaction costs. The
belief that vertical integration had much to do with economy and little to do with
monopoly dominated the thought of both the classical political economists and early
neoclassical economics.”).
257. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler & Richard H. Stern, Competition, Contract, and
Vertical Integration, 69 Yale L.J. 1, 16 (1959) (explaining that “horizontal power in one
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foreclosure meanwhile was that a vertically integrated firm would compel
its subsidiary to deal exclusively with the parent, depriving unintegrated
rivals of access to the firm’s good or service.258 At a minimum, critics
worried that vertical integration increased barriers to entry by neces-
sitating potential entrants to compete in both lines of business.
In 1950, Congress amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act to make it
expressly applicable to vertical acquisitions.259 Through the 1970s, the
Justice Department successfully challenged vertical deals, resulting in
divestitures.260 Ruling that a merger between a major producer and leading
retailer of shoes would undermine competition, the Supreme Court
explained that
[t]he primary vice of a vertical merger or other arrangement
tying a customer to a supplier is that, by foreclosing the compet-
itors of either party from a segment of the market otherwise
open to them, the arrangement may act as a ‘clog on compe-
tition,’ which deprive(s) rivals of a fair opportunity to compete.261
And in holding that the second largest auto manufacturer’s acquisition
of a leading auto parts dealer would foreclose market access for inde-
pendent dealers, the Court concluded that “only divestiture would
correct the condition caused by the unlawful acquisition.”262 Though
enforcers’ analysis of vertical control—through ownership or contract—
was case-specific, it was integration by dominant firms that was most
commonly held to be anticompetitive, given that exclusionary conduct by
dominant companies could, in practice, entirely close off markets to
unintegrated rivals.263 In United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the
Court held that internal transfers within a vertically integrated firm could
market or stage of production creates ‘leverage’ for the extension of the power to bar
entry at another level,” such that a vertically integrated dominant firm could “impair
competition to a greater extent than could the exercise of horizontal power alone”).
258. See id. at 14 (“Vertical integration, whether by contract or ownership, necessarily
forecloses access to a segment of the market, since competitors of the integrating firm
often can no longer deal with the integrated enterprise.”).
259. Clayton Act, ch. 1184, § 7, 64 Stat. 1125, 1125–26 (1950) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012)).
260. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 578 (1972) (requiring
the dissolution of a vertical acquisition by Ford, a major automobile manufacturer, of
assets from an automotive parts manufacturer).
261. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323–24 (1962) (citation omitted)
(quoting Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949)).
262. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 575 (1972); see also id. at 571
(“Every extended vertical arrangement by its very nature, for at least a time, denies to
competitors of the supplier the opportunity to compete for part or all of the trade of the
customer-party to the vertical arrangement.” (quoting Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323–24)).
263. Reflecting this view, Professors Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner—two influential
antitrust thinkers—criticized vertical integration in concentrated markets, connecting
integration to monopolistic outcomes. See Carl Kaysen & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust
Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis 120–21 (1959).
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be anticompetitive if they denied competitors market access.264 And in
the 1968 Merger Guidelines, the Justice Department stated that integra-
tion achieved through a large vertical merger “will usually raise entry
barriers or disadvantage competitors to an extent not accounted for by,
and wholly disproportionate to, such economies as may result from the
merger.”265
This approach to vertical integration underwent a sea change during
the 1980s. Though some economists had for decades maintained a
benign view of vertical integration, it was work by Robert Bork, Ward
Bowman, and Richard Posner, among others, that helped drive an
overhaul in policy.266 Bork’s scholarship challenged both the leverage and
foreclosure theories of harm as logical fallacies,267 while Bowman argued
264. See 353 U.S. 586, 605–07 (1957) (“The statutory policy of fostering free
competition is obviously furthered when no supplier has an advantage over his
competitors from an acquisition of his customer’s stock likely to have the effects
condemned by [Section 7 of the Clayton Act].”).
265. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 1968 Merger Guidelines 9–10 (1968), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11247.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6HW-4Q8L].
266. Earlier in the century, prominent economists including John Maurice Clark and
Ronald Coase had stressed that vertical integration can produce significant cost savings.
See John Maurice Clark, Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs 81, 136–41 (1923)
(noting that vertical integration yields “important economies to be had, distinct from the
other economies of large-scale production”); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & Econ. 1, 16–19 (1960) (explaining that one of the benefits of vertical integration is
that “individual bargains between the various cooperating factors of production are
eliminated”). Economists who instead emphasized the harmful effects of vertical
integration included Joe Bain, Arthur Burns, Edward Chamberlain, and Henry Simons.
See Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization 514–17 (1959) (“Potentially inherent in almost
any structure of vertically integrated firms are some implicitly exclusionary effects, or some
virtual disadvantages to actual or potential competitors of the integrated firms.”); Arthur
R. Burns, The Decline of Competition: A Study of the Evolution of American Industry
431–45 (1936) (discussing the consequences of vertical integration, chief among them
that vertical integration “diminishes the effectiveness of the market as a stimulus to the
improvement of methods of production”); Edward Chamberlain, The Theory of
Monopolistic Competition 122–23 (1933) (arguing that one firm’s decision to vertically
integrate incentivizes other firms to do the same, resulting in “duplication of distributive
machinery” and “still more waste”); Henry C. Simons, A Positive Program for Laissez Faire
20–21 (Harry D. Gideonse ed., Public Policy Pamphlets No. 15, 1934) (“[V]ertical
combinations (integration) should be permitted only so far as clearly compatible with the
maintenance of real competition. Few of our gigantic corporations can be defended on
the ground that their present size is necessary to reasonably full exploitation of
production economies . . . .”). For a general overview of economic attitudes toward vertical
integration through the Great Depression, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and
American Law, 1836–1937, at 331–48 (1991).
267. See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 231–38
(1978) [hereinafter Bork, Antitrust Paradox] (claiming that the “sole merit” of the
foreclosure theory of harm “is that it establishes a new high in preposterousness”); Robert
H. Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic
Misconception, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 157, 195–201 (1954) (arguing against the leverage
theory of harm because “it is always horizontal market power, and not integration into
other levels” that determines a firm’s ability to earn monopoly profits).
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that the jurisprudence around tying agreements was deeply flawed.268
These scholars, associated with the Chicago School, argued that,
contrary to prevailing economic theory and antitrust policy, vertical
integration was almost always procompetitive. This view was premised
primarily on three arguments. First, they maintained, firms could not
extract additional profits from extending a dominant position into a
distinct market, because—assuming that a firm was already selling a
combination of goods at its profit-maximizing price—increasing the
price of one would result in a corresponding offset in the other.269
Second, the Chicago School held that an integrated firm would be able
to foreclose rivals only to the degree that the firm had generated cost
savings, outdoing less efficient competitors—an outcome that antitrust
should encourage.270 Insofar as a vertically integrated entity did cut off
both upstream sellers and downstream customers, those firms now had
an opportunity to transact with one another. And third, they argued,
vertical mergers would invariably generate significant efficiencies.271
Because the upstream division would transfer its input to the downstream
entity at marginal cost rather than at a sales price, vertical mergers
eliminated double marginalization, leading the downstream partner to
lower prices for consumers.
With the election of President Reagan, these theories were stamped
into policy through both the antitrust agencies and federal judiciary. For
the next decade, antitrust officials did not challenge a single vertical
merger and relaxed scrutiny of vertical restraints more generally.272 The
transformation in how antitrust authorities approached vertical struc-
tures and conduct was part of a broader revolution in antitrust law, which
embraced “consumer welfare” as the lodestar of antitrust and adopted
268. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale
L.J. 19, 19–20 (1957) (“Present legal methods of treating tying contracts are based upon a
false notion of leverage.”).
269. See supra section I.E.2; see also, Bork, Antitrust Paradox, supra note 267, at 229;
Bowman, supra note 268, at 25.
270. See Bork, Antitrust Paradox, supra note 267, at 236–37.
271. See id. at 219; Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J.
Pol. Econ. 347, 347–52 (1950) (“Vertical integration, on the contrary, does not, as such,
serve to reduce competition and may, if the economy is already ridden by deviations from
competition, operate to intensify competition.”).
272. See Steven C. Salop, Reinvigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 Yale
L.J. 1962, 1964 (2018) (noting that the last vertical merger case litigated to
completion by the FTC occurred in 1979). This shift in policy was also reflected in the
1982 Merger Guidelines. Compare U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 1968 Merger Guidelines
(1968), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11247.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XTB6-E92K] (emphasizing market structure), with U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 1982 Merger Guidelines (1982), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/
legacy/2007/07/11/11248.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV94-HPH7] (emphasizing price).
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price theory as the proper methodology for analyzing competition.273 As
courts incorporated this new learning into their analysis, they shifted
from rules to standards, narrowing the range of dominant firm conduct
treated as anticompetitive.274 Although the Chicago School’s influence
drove these changes at the level of policy, the Harvard School—whose
prominent members included Phil Areeda and Stephen Breyer—also
played a critical role in setting the intellectual foundation for narrowing
the zone of liability for dominant firms.275
Since the Chicago School’s “resounding victory,” scholars have
critiqued some of its excesses and moderated its theories, delivering the
“Post-Chicago School.”276 Today’s approach to antitrust law largely follows
in this Post-Chicago tradition, where Chicago’s influence has been
tempered even as it remains indelible.277 The following section reviews
the current antitrust approach to vertical integration and why it risks
neglecting potentially anticompetitive vertical conduct by dominant
platforms.
B. Contemporary Antitrust’s Treatment of Vertical Integration
Most forms of vertical integration today are “viewed as economically
beneficial and competitively benign.”278 Antitrust scrutiny of vertical
integration has two legal hooks: (1) Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which
states that mergers that may “substantially lessen competition” are
unlawful,279 and (2) Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopo-
lization or attempted monopolization.280 An unlawful vertical merger
could be challenged under Section 7, and vertical conduct that consti-
tutes monopolization or attempted monopolization could be targeted
273. See William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law
for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 Colum. Bus. L.
Rev. 1, 8 (describing modern antitrust law as evincing a “wariness of rules that might
discourage dominant firms from pursuing price-cutting, product development, or other
strategies that generally serve to improve consumer welfare”).
274. See, e.g., id. at 64 (noting that recent antitrust jurisprudence has led to “more
permissive substantive liability rules” and has created “non-intervention presumptions of
liability standards that constrain the prosecution of private antitrust cases”).
275. Id. at 14.
276. See Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1911, 1911 (2009) (“Of all of Chicago’s law and economics conquests, antitrust was the
most complete and resounding victory. . . . [N]ever did Chicago trounce its ideological
opponents as plainly and lastingly as it did in the field of its early conquests—antitrust.”).
277. For a high-level review of post-Chicago theory on vertical integration, see infra
Appendix.
278. Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration, supra note 256, at 996.
279. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
280. Id. § 2.
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under Section 2. Given the dearth of cases challenging vertical mergers,
the law governing vertical mergers has remained “undeveloped.”281
Two factors that inform whether a vertical merger or vertical
conduct is held to be anticompetitive are the competitiveness of a market
and the presence of entry barriers. Economic analysis holds that
foreclosure is a viable antitrust strategy in monopolistic and oligopolistic
markets protected by entry barriers.282 Similarly, establishing monopo-
lization generally requires showing both the existence of monopoly
power and the existence of entry barriers.283
In digital platform markets, two potential entry barriers worth
assessing are network effects and unequal access to data. In markets
characterized by network effects, the value of the relevant good or service
increases with greater use of that good or service.284 Whereas supply-side
economies of scale reflect declining average and marginal costs of
production, network effects are a demand-side feature. Depending on the
type and strength of the network effects, these externalities can serve as
barrier to entry—a finding that formed the basis of the Microsoft
decision.285 Scholarship analyzing the conditions under which unequal
access to data serves as an entry barriers is still developing, but initial
work suggests that the self-reinforcing advantages of data may give
incumbents a sufficiently significant lead that potential competitors
struggle to enter.286
281. Salop, supra note 272, at 1964–65; see also United States v. AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d
161, 192 (D.D.C. 2018) (identifying a lack of clear precedent in the application of
antitrust principles to vertical merger cases).
282. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209, 224–38 (1986).
283. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(per curiam). Strikingly, vertical tying by a firm with market power is still per se illegal.
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9–10 (1984).
284. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 424, 424 (1985); see also Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian,
Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy 173–74 (1998) (providing
an example of positive feedback in network effects by describing how the value of
Microsoft and Intel computing systems outpaced the value of Apple computing systems in
the late 1990s, given the large share of the market captured by Microsoft and Intel).
285. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36 (D.D.C. 2000) (“The
plaintiffs proved at trial that Microsoft possesses a dominant, persistent, and increasing
share of the relevant market. . . . This barrier ensures that no Intel-compatible PC operating
system other than Windows can attract significant consumer demand . . . .”); see also
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 83.
286. See, e.g., Stucke & Grunes, supra note 26, at 7 (arguing that, although data-
driven industries do not necessarily have high barriers to entry in every instance, “[d]ata-
driven markets ‘can lead to a “winner takes all” result where concentration is a likely
outcome of market success’” (quoting Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Data-Driven
Innovation for Growth and Well-Being: Interim Synthesis Report 7 (2014) [hereinafter
Data-Driven Innovation], https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/data-driven-innovation-interim-
synthesis.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LW9-3WX6])); Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal,
Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 Ariz. L. Rev. 339, 370 (2017) (“[F]irms enjoying data-based
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Given the turn away from structuralism, contemporary antitrust law
generally requires that the allegedly anticompetitive merger or conduct
have an anticompetitive effect, defined as harm to consumer welfare.287
This welfare-based framework is understood to include not just static
concerns about price and output but also dynamic concerns about
innovation.288
Notably, discrimination and appropriation by dominant tech
platforms seem to generate antitrust harms cognizable even within this
welfare-based framework. Insofar as platform conduct reduces investment
and entrepreneurial activity by independent parties, any subsequent loss in
innovation would—in a dynamic efficiency framework—constitute a
harm to competition.289 These dynamics are an echo of Microsoft, insofar
as it was Microsoft’s conduct against Netscape that prompted the Justice
Department to bring its antitrust suit alleging that Microsoft’s activity
“adversely affect[ed] innovation,” by “impairing the incentive[s]” of
rivals to “undertake research and development” and “impairing the
ability” of “competitors to obtain financing.”290
Some former state enforcers and lawyers have argued that dominant
platforms are engaging in exclusionary conduct to acquire and maintain
monopoly power in ways reminiscent of Microsoft—but that enforcers
have yet to rectify these marketplace harms, due to unfavorable case law
in the United States and inadequate remedies by the European
Commission.291
advantages will be motivated to engage in exclusionary conduct and erect artificial barriers
to entry in order to maintain or strengthen their advantage . . . . [T]he unique character-
istics of big-data markets . . . affect the nature, scale, and scope of such competitive effects.”);
see also Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User
Data, 31 Yale J. on Reg. 401, 418–19 (2014) [hereinafter Newman, Control of User Data]
(discussing the barriers to entry, including an up-front investment in data networks, that
Bing faces in competing with Google in the online search market).
287. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
288. Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust, Multi-Dimensional Competition, and Innovation: Do
We Have an Antitrust-Relevant Theory of Competition Now?, in Competition Policy and
Patent Law Under Uncertainty: Regulating Innovation 228, 230 (Geoffrey A. Manne &
Joshua D. Wright eds., 2011) (“The emerging consensus appears to be that . . . antitrust
should incorporate dynamic efficiencies into the current framework by accounting for the
impact of competition to engage in research and development for new or improved
goods, services, or processes.”).
289. See Baker, supra note 210, at 576; Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski,
Mergers and Innovation, 74 Antitrust L.J. 1, 3–5 (2007); Wright, supra note 288, at 230.
For a high-level overview of existing research on whether platform conduct is suppressing
innovation, see Noah Smith, Big Tech Sets Up a ‘Kill Zone’ for Industry Upstarts,
Bloomberg (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-07/
big-tech-sets-up-a-kill-zone-for-industry-upstarts (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
290. Complaint at 12–13, Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (No. 98-1232), 1998 WL 35241886.
291. See, e.g., Martin Giles, Gary Reback: Technology’s Trustbuster, MIT Tech. Rev.
(June 27, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611488/gary-reback-technologys-
trustbuster/ [https://perma.cc/3CLC-QKF3] (“Why is it that we were able to go after
Microsoft in the 1990s, and now we’re facing almost identical conduct by Google and
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Platform discrimination and appropriation also risk going unad-
dressed by contemporary antitrust. This is because of both specific
doctrinal changes that have significantly narrowed the range of instances
in which single-firm conduct rises to an antitrust offense as well as
general blind spots of a consumer welfare approach primarily focused on
price and output effects.292 To appreciate the likely neglect of antitrust to
these competition harms, it’s worth briefly reviewing the doctrinal
obstacles to bringing an antitrust case against a dominant tech platform
for discrimination or appropriation.
1. Denial of Access and the Essential Facilities Doctrine. — Prior to 2004,
a dominant tech platform that blocked independent parties in favor of its
own goods or services might have been liable under the “essential
facilities” doctrine.293 Under essential facilities, dominant firms that deny
other businesses nondiscriminatory access to their unique facilities may
incur antitrust liability.294
This doctrine traces to the early years of the federal antitrust law,
when the Supreme Court interpreted Section 1 of the Sherman Act to
impose obligations of equal and nondiscriminatory access.295 In subse-
quent decades, the Court interpreted the Sherman Act to require that
the only railroad bridge across the Mississippi river grant open and equal
access to all rivals;296 that the Associated Press grant nondiscriminatory
membership to publishers that competed with its existing members;297
we can’t manage to do anything about it in the US?” (quoting attorney Gary Reback));
Sally Hubbard, The Case for Why Big Tech Is Violating Antitrust Laws, CNN (Jan. 2,
2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/02/perspectives/big-tech-facebook-google-amazon-
microsoft-antitrust/index.html [https://perma.cc/G7T8-U935] (“The nearly 20-year-old
case of US v. Microsoft illustrates how today’s tech giants are breaking the law. . . . Google,
Amazon and Facebook are following the same playbook.”).
292. Kevin Caves & Hal Singer, When the Econometrician Shrugged: Identifying and
Plugging Gaps in the Consumer Welfare Standard, 26 Geo. Mason L. Rev. (forthcoming
2019) (manuscript at 3–5) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“The first potential
blind spot identified here concerns innovation harms. These harms, which might not
manifest until future periods, are not readily quantifiable or relatable to a platform’s discrimi-
nation; thus, exclusionary conduct that generated such harms may not be cognizable
under current the rigorous antitrust injury standard.”).
293. Notably, the essential facilities doctrine would be available to independent parties
only in instances when the dominant platform was a competitor. Denial of access to parties
that could not be characterized as competitors would not be cognizable as an essential
facilities claim. See, e.g, Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer Co. v. Depository Trust &
Clearing Corp., 485 F. Supp. 2d 387, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[T]he essential facility doctrine
is intended to prevent a competitor from obtaining an unfair advantage in a market by
denying to its actual or potential competitors access to a facility essential for use of that
market.”).
294. See, e.g., id.
295. While the Supreme Court has applied the principles underlying the essential
facilities doctrine, it has never mentioned it by name. Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber
Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 Antitrust L.J. 1, 6–7 (2008).
296. United States v. Terminal R.R Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 411 (1912).
297. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21 (1945).
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and that the sole power company in a region must transmit power gener-
ated by rival firms to customers that sought to buy cheaper power from
those rivals.298
In 1983, the Seventh Circuit formalized essential facilities into a
doctrinal test, requiring plaintiffs to establish four elements: (1) the
monopolist controls access to an essential facility; (2) the facility cannot
be practically or reasonably duplicated by a competitor; (3) the monop-
olist denies access to a competitor; and (4) it is feasible for the monop-
olist to provide access.299 In this way, essential facilities could be seen as
“a means of protecting or injecting competition into a market susceptible
to monopolization due to structural factors.”300
Insofar as independent producers or developers could prove these
elements, the dominant platform would have been liable.301 The essential
facilities doctrine, however, has died a “death by a thousand cuts,”302
having drawn academic criticism since the 1980s.303 As of 2004, the
essential facilities doctrine lives in “near extinction.”304 That year, in
298. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 378 (1973).
299. MCI Commnc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 1983).
300. Maxwell Meadows, The Essential Facilities Doctrine in Information Economies:
Illustrating Why the Antitrust Duty to Deal Is Still Necessary in the New Economy, 25 Ford.
Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 795, 809 (2015).
301. The first element has two sub-elements that plaintiffs must prove: (1) a defined
market in which the defendant has a monopoly over the facility or resource, and (2) the
defined market in which the facility is essential. Meadows, supra note 300, at 805.
Plaintiffs’ success will vary by market, but—given, for example, that Android captures over
85% of the mobile operating systems market and that Amazon captures over 70% of the
online book market, see supra note 4—at least some producers would likely prove
successful. See, e.g., MCI, 708 F.2d at 1133 (finding that the plaintiff had cleared the
threshold requirement of showing that the telephone infrastructure at issue constituted
“essential facilities” because the plaintiff “could not duplicate [the defendant’s] local
facilities”). For ideas on how to conceptualize dominant tech platforms and their control
over data as “essential facilities,” see Meadows, supra note 300, at 813–20 (“The ability to
restrict access to either information or means of distribution in their entirety would
demonstrate control adequate for the essential facilities doctrine.”); see also Zachary
Abrahmson, Comment, Essential Data, 124 Yale L.J. 867, 870–72 (2014) (arguing that “a
claim to essential data—data essential to competition—should require the same elements
as a claim to an essential facility”).
302. Frischmann & Waller, supra note 295, at 9.
303. 3B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law § 771c, at 205 (4th ed.
2015) (“Lest there be any doubt, we state our belief that the essential facility doctrine is
both harmful and unnecessary and should be abandoned.”). But see James R. Ratner,
Should There Be an Essential Facility Doctrine?, 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 327, 367–68 (1988)
(discussing how the essential facilities doctrine could be “restructured” in response to
criticism and arguing that such a restructuring would “contribute meaningfully to the
competitive functioning of the downstream market”); Glenn O. Robinson, On Refusing to
Deal with Rivals, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 1177, 1183 (2002) (endorsing essential facilities
doctrine in lieu of broader general duty to deal for monopolists).
304. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410–
11 (2004). Professors Brett Frischmann and Spencer Waller note that a narrow view of the
Court’s skepticism could preserve a version of the essential facilities doctrine for joint
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Trinko, the Court ruled on whether a customer of a local phone
monopolist could bring an antitrust class action challenging discrim-
ination by a monopolist against a rival.305 Although the Court’s holding
did not involve essential facilities, in dicta the Court all but rejected the
viability of the doctrine.306 While courts continue to review essential
facilities claims, in the wake of Trinko no plaintiff has successfully
litigated one to judgment.307
2. Discriminatory Refusal to Deal. — A dominant tech platform that
discriminates against those independent parties that provide competing
goods or services could, in theory, be liable for discriminatory refusal to
deal in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.308 The key precedent is
Aspen Skiing, in which the defendant’s refusal to sell lift tickets to a rival
resort was held to constitute unlawful monopolization.309 What distin-
guishes a legitimate refusal to deal from an illegitimate one is whether
the dominant firm’s actions discriminate between rivals and non-rivals.310
For example, if Android demoted from the Google Play Store apps that
competed with Google-owned apps but did not demote non-rivals, the
demoted competitors would likely be able to allege a discriminatory
refusal to deal claim against Android.
Here, too, the Supreme Court has thrown into doubt the practical
viability of unilateral refusal to deal claims. In Trinko, the Court denied
refusals to deal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Frischmann & Waller, supra note 295,
at 9 n.24. Notably, the essential facilities doctrine was criticized by prominent antitrust
scholars for decades before Trinko. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy:
The Law of Competition and Its Practice § 7.7, at 410 (5th ed. 2016) (“The so-called
‘essential facility’ doctrine is one of the most troublesome, incoherent, and unmanageable
bases for Sherman § 2 liability. The antitrust world would almost certainly be a better place
if it were jettisoned, with a little fine tuning of the general doctrine . . . to fill any gaps.”);
Philip J. Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
Antitrust L.J. 841, 852 (1989) (providing “six principles that should limit application of
the essential facilities concept”).
305. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410–11 (holding that the monopolist’s “alleged insuffi-
cient assistance” did not create a cognizable antitrust claim).
306. Frischmann & Waller, supra note 295, at 9.
307. Courts have, however, allowed essential facilities claims to proceed beyond
summary judgment. See, e.g., Am. Home Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. Floyd Memorial Hosp.
& Health Servs., No. 4:17-cv-00089, 2018 WL 1172995, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 5, 2018).
308. Whereas the essential facilities doctrine only covered instances of denying access,
discriminatory refusal to deal covers instances of discriminatory access. See, e.g., Trinko,
540 U.S. at 411 (“[W]here access exists, the doctrine serves no purpose.”); Aerotech Int’l,
Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 836 F.3d 1171, 1185 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Honeywell’s ordering
process may very well be ‘Kafkaeseque,’ . . . and Honeywell may even provide priority access to
certain customers, [but] Honeywell does not deny Aerotech access to APUs or their
component parts.”).
309. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610 (1985).
310. Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253,
308–09 (2003) (“[W]hile the ex ante efficiencies created by property rights do justify
virtually all refusals to deal on terms other than the price set by the property owner, they do
not justify discriminatory refusals to deal with those buyers who are (or deal with) rivals.”).
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the existence of any duty to deal and characterized Aspen Skiing as “at or
near the outer boundary of § 2 liability.”311 Stopping short of foreclosing
refusal to deal claims entirely, the Court distinguished Trinko from Aspen
Skiing on the grounds that (1) Aspen involved a defendant that had
stopped participating in an existing venture, and (2) the existence of a
regulatory structure that already governed the defendant’s duty to deal
couldn’t be reconciled with a separate antitrust duty to deal.312
The blow of Trinko is softened slightly in the context of the
dominant tech platforms, which presently are not governed by a separate
regulatory regime. But the Court also codified a heightened require-
ment, establishing that discriminatory refusals to deal will only be
actionable if the conduct is likely to create a new monopoly or entrench
an existing one.313 In other words, the dominant platform must have a
“dangerous probability of success” in monopolizing the adjacent market.
Discrimination by Android against independent apps, for example,
would constitute a viable claim only if that discrimination were enabling
Google to capture a monopolistic share of the relevant app market.314
Although some commentators have read this requirement as “squeeze[ing]
much of the remaining vitality out of Section 2 claims challenging unilateral
refusals to deal,”315 it is possible that platform conduct in certain adjacent
markets could be shown to meet even this heightened standard.316
3. Information Appropriation. — Antitrust enforcers recognize that
appropriation of sensitive competitor information can undermine
competition. When reviewing vertical mergers, the antitrust agencies
assess whether the deal would enable the merging firm to use rivals’
311. 540 U.S. at 409.
312. See id. at 409–12.
313. Id. at 415 n.4; see also Ellen Meriwether, Putting the “Squeeze” on Refusal to
Deal Cases: Lessons from Trinko and linkLine, Antitrust, Spring 2010, at 65, 67.
314. No firm with a market share of less than 50% is a monopolist. Compare United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (opining that “it is
doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent [market share] would be enough” to
constitute a monopoly), and Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 207 n.2
(5th Cir. 1969) (observing that more than a 50% market share is a “prerequisite for a
finding of monopoly”), with Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc.,
651 F.2d 122, 127–29 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that a 50% market share is not a prerequisite
for being a monopolist).
315. Meriwether, supra note 313, at 70 (internal quotation marks omitted).
316. For example, in addition to being a dominant platform in search and mobile
operating systems, Google is dominant in several adjacent markets, capturing 59% of the
browser market (through Chrome), 81% of the internet maps market (through Google
Maps), and 78% of the internet video market (through YouTube). See supra notes 107–
108 and accompanying text. Courts generally require a showing of 50% or more market
share to establish a “dangerous probability” of success. See, e.g., Actividentity Corp. v.
Intercede Grp. PLC, No. 08–cv–04577 VRW, 2009 WL 8674284, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11,
2009) (finding that defendant adequately stated an attempted monopolization claim by
alleging that plaintiff had more than 50% of the market).
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information in anticompetitive ways.317 Enforcers recognize that posi-
tioning a dominant firm to collect and analyze a rival-customer’s business
information could “reduce the incentives of the rivals even to attempt . . .
procompetitive moves,” resulting in longer-term harm.318
Outside of the merger context, appropriation of sensitive business
information by a rival is more difficult to cognize as an antitrust harm.
Exclusionary conduct cases are generally governed by the rule of
reason.319 The standard follows a burden-shifting approach: In the first
stage, the plaintiff must show a significant anticompetitive effect.320 If the
plaintiff succeeds, then the defendant must demonstrate a legitimate
procompetitive justification.321 If the defendant succeeds in doing so,
then the plaintiff can show that the restraint is not reasonably necessary
or that the objectives could be achieved by less restrictive alternatives.322
An empirical study of rule of reason cases found that courts dispose of
97% of cases at the first stage on the ground that there is no
anticompetitive effect; courts balance the pro- and anticompetitive
effects in only 2% of cases.323
An exclusionary conduct case based on information appropriation is
especially unlikely to succeed under the current antitrust framework
because establishing anticompetitive effects purely on innovation-based
harms is extremely challenging under the consumer welfare standard.324
In part this is because static harms are easier to measure than innovation
harms, a fact that tends to bias antitrust analysis towards a focus on price and
output effects.325 In part this is also because dynamic harms can involve
317. Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, Potential Competitive Effects of Vertical
Mergers: A How-To Guide for Practitioners 22–23 (Dec. 8, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
318. Id. at 22. Empirical studies suggest that appropriation by dominant platforms is
having this effect. See supra section I.E.
319. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58–59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (per curiam) (adopting a burden-shifting balancing test for the exclusionary
conduct claims at issue that the court described as being “similar [to the] balancing




323. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st
Century, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 827, 828 (2009).
324. See Tim Wu, After Consumer Welfare, Now What? The “Protection of
Competition” Standard in Practice, Antitrust Chron., Apr. 2018, at 1, 5 [hereinafter Wu,
Consumer Welfare], https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/
2018/04/CPI-Wu.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5FY-QBDS] (“Despite the often brilliant ability
of economists to make consumer welfare arguments, the emphasis on measurable harms
to consumers still tends to bias the law toward a focus on static harms and, especially, on
prices. . . . [This] inevitably tends to marginalize parts of the antitrust law concerned with
dynamic harms . . . .”).
325. This is more likely to be true in the context of Section 2 enforcement than
merger enforcement. Indeed, the antitrust agencies have focused on innovation harms in
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significantly greater indeterminacy, such that conduct that yields short-term
price reductions might also lead to long-term losses in innovation.
It is true that the Justice Department prevailed in United States v.
Microsoft by focusing on innovation-based harms.326 Since Microsoft,
however, the antitrust agencies have not brought a single case involving a
pure-innovation theory of harm in a monopolization case. In the twenty
years since, courts have raised evidentiary standards for plaintiffs,
demanding “empirical proof of antitrust impact or injury for consumers
that can be directly tied to the conduct.”327 Given both doctrinal hurdles
imposed by courts since Microsoft as well as the general challenges of
concretizing innovation-based harms, a growing set of scholars is conclud-
ing that “antitrust generally, and the antitrust agencies specifically, are
currently ill-equipped to effectively pursue a platform owner that
commands sufficient market power to stifle innovation.”328
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently made it even more difficult for
plaintiffs to successfully allege even price-based anticompetitive effects in
certain cases. In Ohio v. American Express Co. last term, the Court
introduced a special rule for analyzing the conduct of companies
operating in “two-sided transaction platforms,” requiring that plaintiffs
alleging anticompetitive harm on one side of the market must—as part of
establishing a prima facie case—also show that the purported harm was
not offset by benefits on the other side.329 A drastic departure from
traditional forms of antitrust analysis, this “netting” requirement
redefines what constitutes anticompetitive conduct in the context of
merger cases. In United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., for example, the Department of Justice
challenged Bazaarvoice’s consummated acquisition of PowerReviews on the theory that
the transaction “significantly reduced incentives to . . . invest in innovation.” Complaint at
19, United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. C13-0133 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014), 2013 WL 127168.
326. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 75–76; United States v. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 44
(D.D.C. 2000) (“More broadly, Microsoft’s anticompetitive actions trammeled the
competitive process through which the computer software industry generally stimulates
innovation and conduces to the optimum benefit of consumers.”).
327. Caves & Singer, supra note 292, at 13.
328. Id. at 10; see also Newman, Control of User Data, supra note 286, at 411–12
(arguing that “earlier and more systematic regulation in new online markets is
necessary”); Frank Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, 20 Geo. Mason. L. Rev. 1009,
1010 (2013) (“Antitrust law has been slow to recognize privacy as a dimension of product
quality, and the competition that antitrust promotes can do as much to trample privacy as
to protect it.”); Wu, Consumer Welfare, supra note 324, at 4–5 (questioning whether the
consumer welfare standard that is now prevalent in antitrust is “inherently too restrictive
and static” to effectively protect competition in the modern world).
329. See 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287 (2018) (finding that the plaintiffs had failed to meet
their burden of demonstrating anticompetitive effects in the credit card market because
they based their theory of harm solely on anticompetitive effects on the merchant side of
the market without showing any anticompetitive effects in the cardholders’ side of the
market). The Court held that this novel approach to market definition is warranted when
analyzing “transaction platforms,” whose key feature, the Court noted, is that “they cannot
make a sale to one side of the platform without simultaneously making a sale to the other.”
Id. at 2277.
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platforms that facilitate a “simultaneous transaction,” effectively creating
an insurmountable hurdle for plaintiffs.330 While several commentators—
including the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust—have said they
interpret the holding as applying only to a small number of tech
platform markets,331 it is too early to tell whether antitrust defendants will
successfully expand its reach to cover exclusionary conduct by non-
simultaneous transaction platforms.332
4. The Shift Away from Structural Remedies. — A final trend in
antitrust worth identifying is the shift away from structural remedies in
vertical merger cases. The 2004 merger guidelines strongly disfavored
behavioral remedies.333 The 2011 guidelines, by contrast, established a
preference for a combination of structural and conduct remedies.334 In
practice, the Obama Administration proved reluctant to issue strong
structural remedies in vertical cases; it approved two major vertical deals—
both described by critics as raising significant anticompetitive concerns—
by issuing primarily conduct remedies.335
These conduct remedies—in the Ticketmaster–Live Nation and
Comcast–NBC mergers—have proved difficult to oversee and enforce.336
330. See Tim Wu, The American Express Opinion, the Rule of Reason, and Tech
Platforms, 7 J. Antitrust Enforcement 117, 127 (2019) [hereinafter Wu, American Express]
(“American Express suggests that a judge can keep demanding more proof, in concentric
lines, until the government’s lawsuit collapses”); Lina Khan, America Has a Major Market
Power Problem & SCOTUS Just Made It Worse, Take Care Blog (July 5, 2018),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/america-has-a-major-market-power-problem-and-scotus-
just-made-it-worse [https://perma.cc/VGS3-HYBZ].
331. See Wu, American Express, supra note 330, at 118 (“The Supreme Court’s opinion
does have one great merit as compared to the Second Circuit’s: it is narrow, indeed far
narrower than some have suggested.”); Ina Fried & David McCabe, DOJ Antitrust Official:
Supreme Court Ruling Won’t Shield Big Tech, Axios (June 26, 2018),
https://www.axios.com/makan-delrahim-in-aspen-1530038874-a289ad1a-012b-4ccb-9cb7-
69658ee78c33.html [https://perma.cc/6N7K-N5UR] (“[Justice Department Antitrust
Chief Makan Delrahim] said that he doesn’t think the Supreme Court’s American Express
ruling would make it more difficult to take on the biggest online platforms over
competition concerns.”).
332. Already, defendants have cited American Express in cases not involving
simultaneous-transaction platforms. See, e.g., Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Defendant Google LLC’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at 3 n.2, Dreamstime.com, LLC v. Google LLC, No. 3:18-cv-01910 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 28, 2019), 2018 WL 6587482 (“Like the credit card markets discussed in American
Express, search and search advertising are two-sided in that users are essential to advertisers
while ads are essential to finance the system.”).
333. Kwoka & Moss, supra note 27, at 980.
334. Id.
335. See Christine Wilson & Keith Klovers, Competition Policy Int’l, Yes We Can, But
Should We? Merger Remedies During the First Obama Administration 2 (2014),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/WilsonKloverDec-14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DK3M-2RDQ] (“[T]he Agencies revived a number of previously
disfavored remedies during the first Obama Administration, including what the Justice
Department now characterizes as a ‘panoply’ of conduct remedies.”).
336. Kwoka & Moss, supra note 27, at 1004–07.
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Concerns that Live Nation has failed to abide by the remedies in any
meaningful sense have prompted the Justice Department to open a
Section 2 investigation, examining whether Live Nation is indeed using
its control over concert facilities to pressure customers to also use its
ticketing service and retaliating against those who decline its ticket
service but still seek access to the concert facility.337 Comcast, too, has
violated the conduct remedies that enforcers imposed when permitting
the merger.338
These incidents raise broader questions about the relative efficacy
and administrative costs of imposing conduct remedies over structural
ones.339 As Professor Spencer Weber Waller has noted, the retreat from
structural remedies has led the antitrust agencies to adopt highly
complex remedies that typically “exceed the resources and strengths” of
the Justice Department and FTC.340 Another way to understand the trend
is that the agencies have shifted away from structural remedies in favor of
remedies that do more regulatory work341—even as the agencies are
institutionally structured to serve as enforcers rather than regulators.
Stark information asymmetries between enforcers and platforms
suggest that enforcing conduct remedies in digital markets will prove
even more challenging.342 Given that rebalancing away from an exclusive
reliance on conduct remedies in favor of structural remedies could
mitigate these administrability costs and challenges, the case for
structural separations in digital markets is worth assessing.
337. Ben Sisario & Graham Bowley, Live Nation Rules Music Ticketing, Some Say with
Threats, N.Y. Times (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/01/arts/music/
live-nation-ticketmaster.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
338. Cecilia Kang, FCC: Comcast to Pay $800,000 for Violating NBCU Venture
Conditions, Wash. Post (June 27, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
tech/post/fcc-comcast-to-pay-800000-for-violating-nbcu-venture-conditions/2012/06/27/
gJQA8MZU7V_blog.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
339. See generally Kevin J. O’Connor, The Divestiture Remedy in Sherman Act § 2
Cases, 13 Harv. J. Legis. 687, 730–32 (1976) (“Conduct remedies, whether directed primarily at
performance results or indirectly at market structure changes, tend to be ineffective.”).
340. Waller, supra note 20, at 577 (“Many of these remedies would not be needed if
the United States focused on policies of vertical separation or structural remedies in
monopolization cases, but this has not been the emphasis of either competition or
regulatory policy in the United States for decades.”).
341. These include: obligations to provide competitors and customers with critical
inputs and access to networks on fair and nondiscriminatory terms, the disclosure of
necessary intellectual property, the creation of firewalls to discourage the misappro-
priation of sensitive business information, and the use of special masters and technical
committees to oversee dispute resolution. Id. at 576.
342. One facet of this shortcoming is the disadvantage agencies face in policing how
firms share and use data. See, e.g., Peter Maass, How a Lone Grad Student Scooped the
Government and What It Means for Your Online Privacy, ProPublica (June 28, 2012),
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-a-grad-student-scooped-the-ftc-and-what-it-means-
for-your-online-privac [https://perma.cc/XGV8-EDAN].
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5. Adjusting Competition to Regulation? — These trends can be
summarized as follows: In the wake of deregulation of network industries
and dominant intermediaries, lawmakers expected antitrust to police
dominant intermediaries. But in the decades since, courts and enforcers
have drastically contracted the basis for antitrust liability in cases
involving dominant firms.343 The result is a highly enfeebled and impov-
erished set of tools for confronting dominant intermediaries in network
industries.
Meanwhile, even innovation harms seem to go unaddressed under
the consumer welfare framework, although innovation is central to
dynamic efficiency and long-term welfare.344 In instances when vertical
mergers are scrutinized, moreover, growing reliance on conduct
remedies has stretched the antitrust agencies beyond their institutional
capacities, enabling exclusionary conduct.345 Notably, the Court has
suggested in recent antitrust cases that remedies for injuries that result
from dominant firm conduct may be better pursued through a regula-
tory paradigm rather than through antitrust law—further suggesting that
judicial aversion to antitrust will make addressing platform integration
through current law extremely challenging.346
In light of these trends, the question of whether structural
separations should be recovered as a tool of competition policy is salient
because digital platform markets seem to favor monopolistic market
structures. Growing empirical research shows that dominant tech
platforms enjoy uniquely durable market power.347 Network effects and
the self-reinforcing advantages can lead to winner-take-all dynamics,
where markets tip early and potential entrants face significant barriers.348
Expectations that the tech sector would be sufficiently fast-moving and
rapidly innovating so as to justify a relatively hands-off approach to
antitrust were too rosy.349
343. See supra notes 272–274 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 324–325 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 339–341 and accompanying text.
346. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 283–84 (2007)
(“[W]here securities regulators proceed with great care to distinguish the encouraged and
permissible from the forbidden [and] where the threat of antitrust lawsuits . . . could
seriously alter underwriter conduct in undesirable ways, to allow an antitrust lawsuit would
threaten serious harm to the efficient functioning of the securities markets.”); Verizon
Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 411–12 (2004) (“One
factor of particular importance is the existence of a regulatory structure designed to deter
and remedy anticompetitive harm. Where such a structure exists, the additional benefit to
competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small . . . .”).
347. See infra Part V.
348. See, e.g., Data-Driven Innovation, supra note 286, at 7.
349. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 Antitrust L.J. 925, 939
(2001) [hereinafter Posner, New Economy] (“The gale of creative destruction that
Schumpeter described, in which . . . temporary monopolies operates to maximize innovation
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The question of how to adjust expectations of competition to the
reality of its absence has an analogue. As formerly monopolistic sectors
were opened up to competition, a wave of scholarship in the 1990s and
2000s explored how the legal regime governing these markets should
adjust accordingly.350 Specifically, these scholars asked: When should an
increasingly competitive market lead us to abandon regulations whose
justifications depend on monopoly market structure?
What we lack is an understanding of the inverse question: When do
we decide that what was perceived as a competitive market in fact is
monopolistic or oligopolistic, warranting the application of rules tradi-
tionally applied to dominant firms? And which traditional tools should
apply?
These questions animate this Article, with a focus on one of these
tools: structural separations. As Part III will discuss, structural separations
have been a mainstay tool applied to network industries and dominant
intermediaries. While much of the focus—and criticism—of the public
utility regime has centered on rate regulation, vertical separations have
been less closely studied.351 Separations differ from rate regulation and
several other regulatory tools in that separations are ex ante rules whose
application does not require continuous government intervention or
constant monitoring. Insofar as a primary criticism of the public utility
era is that many of the regulations proved too unwieldy for courts and
enforcers to implement, structural separations appear far more appealing.352
Contrasted with other public utility tools, separations reduce regulatory
burden and reflect humility about the capacity of public officials to
manage business conduct.
that confers social benefits far in excess of the social costs of the short-lived monopoly
prices that the process also gives rise to, may be the reality of the new economy.”).
350. See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a
New Model for U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 Yale J. on Reg. 55, 57 (2007)
[hereinafter Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation] (“The question to be addressed is whether,
in the light of changes in telecommunications markets over the past decade, ex ante,
dominant-firm restraints remain an appropriate mode of telecommunications regulation.”);
Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Toward a Unified Theory of Access to Local
Telephone Networks, 61 Fed. Comm. L.J. 43, 45 (2008) (“This approach taken by
Congress and the FCC suffers from several conceptual shortcomings. It overlooks the fact
that the emergence of competition undermines many of the basic rationales for regulation.”);
Kevin Werbach, No Dialtone: The End of the Public Switched Telephone Network, 66 Fed.
Comm. L.J. 203, 205 (2014) (arguing that the Public Switched Telephone Network
(PSTN) had been “undermined [by] . . . the rise of the Internet; customers and providers
abandoning wireline voice telephony; and the collapse of the regulatory theory for data
services,” and providing “a framework for moving beyond the PSTN”).
351. Rahman, New Utilities, supra note 26, at 1638 (discussing how the perceived
failures of the public utility approach have been rooted partly in an “overly narrow focus
on regulatory rate setting”).
352. See Delrahim, supra note 27 (describing non-structural regulatory interventions
as requiring the government to serve as “a roving ombudsman into the affairs of business”
and noting that “we often don’t have the skills or the tools to do so effectively”).
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III. SEPARATIONS REGIMES
This Part provides an overview of five separations regimes, as applied
to railroads, bank holding companies, television networks, and telecom-
munication carriers. Two of these separations were implemented through
statute,353 two through agency regulations,354 and one as an antitrust
remedy.355
To be sure, this list is not exhaustive; lawmakers and enforcers have
implemented structural prohibitions in a variety of other contexts.356
This section seeks to offer a representative sample across a few network
industries to identify the range of concerns that arise when companies
that play an infrastructure role in distribution networks integrate into
lines of business that rely on those networks.
A. Railroads
By 1900, a handful of railroads had captured the market for
anthracite coal. Six firms owned 90% of the total anthracite resources,
resulting in high, uniform prices and yielding massive profits for the
railroads.357 Through controlling both the tracks and the coal, railroads
came to engage in the same kinds of discriminatory conduct that
Congress had outlawed through the Interstate Commerce Act.358
Independent coal companies found, for example, that the railroads
refused to provide them with sufficient cars to transport their coal to
market,359 giving the railroad-owned coal superior access to markets.360
353. See infra sections III.A–.B.
354. See infra sections III.C–.D.
355. See infra section III.E.
356. Separations regimes not examined here include provisions of the Glass–Steagall
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 378 (2012), the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79
(2000) (repealed by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16451–16463 (2012)), the
consent decree in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131(1948), and
section 619 of the Dodd–Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1851, known as the “Volcker Rule.”
357. Comment, The Judicial History of the Anthracite Monopoly, 41 Yale L.J. 439, 439
(1932).
358. As the Court described,
[T]he great purpose of the act to regulate commerce, whilst seeking to
prevent unjust and unreasonable rates, was to secure equality of rates as
to all and to destroy favoritism, these last being accomplished by
requiring the publication of tariffs and by prohibiting secret departures
from such tariffs, and forbidding rebates, preferences and all other
forms of undue discrimination.
N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 200 U.S. 361, 391
(1906).
359. Note, Present Status of the Commodities Clause of the Hepburn Act, 1 St. Louis
L. Rev. 59, 59 (1915) [hereinafter Note on Commodities Clause].
360. See, e.g., Hartford R.R., 200 U.S. at 382.
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Seeking to rectify this runaround, Congress included in the 1906
Hepburn Act a provision separating the function of transportation from
the function of ownership over goods.361 While this specific prohibition
was introduced last-minute in the Senate and therefore did not generate
extensive debate,362 the concept was not new; a congressional committee
in 1892 had undertaken an investigation of the railroad sector and
concluded that “the public interest demanded that the business of a
common carrier should be absolutely separated from any other.”363
Known as the “commodities clause,” this provision forbade a railroad
from carrying “any article or commodity” that it had “manufactured,
mined, or produced,” or in which it “may have any interest[,] direct or
indirect.”364 Under the original version of the bill, this rule would have
applied to all “common carriers,” including pipelines for oil, natural gas,
and other commodities.365 But business interests in the oil and gas sector
managed to narrow the provision so that the final language emerging
from conference covered not common carriers in general but only
railroads.366 Several senators also successfully pushed to exclude timber
and lumber from the general prohibition, arguing that a whole group of
railroads that had invested in tracks for the sole purpose of transporting
lumber would otherwise go bankrupt.367 More extensive debate and
discussion might have yielded a more sweeping ban,368 had Congress not
361. See Hepburn Act, Pub. L. No. 59-337, sec. 1, § 1, 34 Stat. 584, 585 (1906).
362. See 40 Cong. Rec. 6455–61, 6493–500, 6551–70, 7011–17 (1906). Discussions
from May 7th to May 9th were conducted under the fifteen-minute rule with the Senate in
the Committee of the Whole. This was by no means the first time that the separation of
transportation and industry had been proposed. This separation had been advocated by
an 1834 Pennsylvania legislative report. See Francis Walker, The Development of the
Anthracite Combination, 111 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 234, 236 (1924). The
House of Representatives made the same recommendation in 1893. See H.R. Rep. No. 52-
2278, at viii (1893).
363. Eliot Jones, The Commodity Clause Legislation and the Anthracite Railroads, 27
Q.J. Econ. 579, 587 (1913).
364. Sec. 1, § 1, 34 Stat. at 585. The full text of the commodities clause reads:
From and after May first, nineteen hundred and eight, it shall be
unlawful for any railroad company to transport from any State, Territory,
or the District of Columbia to any other State, Territory, or the District
of Columbia, or to any foreign country, any article or commodity, other
than timber and the manufactured products thereof, manufactured,
mined, or produced by it, or under its authority, or which it may own in
whole, or in part, or in which it may have any interest direct or indirect
except such articles or commodities as may be necessary and intended
for its use in the conduct of its business as a common carrier.
Id.
365. Jones, supra note 363, at 582–83.
366. Id. at 583; see also sec. 1, § 1, 34 Stat. at 585.
367. See Jones, supra note 363, at 582–83.
368. At least one critic argued for extending “‘the principle of dissociation’” to “‘any
two industries that are complementary in their nature’” and maintained that the failure of
the United States to “divorce transportation altogether from other enterprises” led to
2019] SEPARATION OF PLATFORMS AND COMMERCE 1039
been “anxious to secure the speedy passage of the bill.”369 The Hepburn
Act passed the Senate by 71-3, with fifteen senators not voting.370
The backlash from the railroads against the law was almost
immediate. States in the anthracite region—including New Jersey, New
York, and Pennsylvania—had been encouraging railroads to purchase
coal lands in order to develop those states’ natural resources.371 In some
cases the states had embedded the right to own coal mines in corporate
charters.372 Following state guidance and incentives, the railroads had
invested heavily to purchase coal mines—only to see the Hepburn Act
penalize them for it.373
Shortly after the bill was enacted, the Attorney General filed suits
against six railroad companies that had not divested their coal
interests.374 One firm responded with a constitutional challenge, alleging
that the act fell outside congressional authority to regulate interstate
commerce and that the commodities clause would constitute an imper-
missible “taking” under the Fifth Amendment.375 The Court rejected this
view and clarified that, contrary to the government’s position, a carrier
may transport goods that it had produced, so long as the carrier had
clearly divested its ownership of those goods prior to commencing
transport.376 The Court also construed the statute to permit railroads to
carry goods produced by a bona fide distinct company in which the
railroad was a stockholder.377
Three subsequent cases at the Supreme Court would further test the
boundaries of the commodities clause. In 1911, the Court held that a
railroad using direct stock ownership in a coal company to wield
“complete power over the affairs of the coal company, just as if the coal
company were a mere department of the railroad,” violated the Hepburn
continued monopolization by railroads of other industries. Thurlow M. Gordon, Book
Review, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 797, 797–98 (1916) (quoting Thomas Latimer Kibler, The
Commodities Clause 147, 162 (1916)).
369. Jones, supra note 363, at 586.
370. Id. at 583.
371. See Note on Commodities Clause, supra note 359. Pennsylvania had even passed
a bill entitled, “An act to authorize railroad and canal companies to aid in the develop-
ment of coal, iron, lumber, and other material interests of the Commonwealth.” United
States v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 396 n.1 (1909).
372. See Edwin C. Goddard, Comment, The Commodity Clause of the Hepburn Act,
14 Mich. L. Rev. 49, 51 (1915) (noting that railroads “owned coal properties of great
value” and that some had been “organized largely to market this coal,” operating under
charters granted by Pennsylvania).
373. Not all states had been so permissive. Even before the Hepburn Act, a West
Virginia statute had made it unlawful for any railroad to engage in the business of buying
and selling coal. Id. at 50.
374. Note on Commodities Clause, supra note 359, at 60.
375. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. at 386.
376. Id. at 413–15.
377. Id.
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Act.378 Critically, the problem was not stock ownership per se but “the
‘commingling of the affairs . . . ,’ so as to make both corporations virtually
one.”379 Four years later the Court confronted a coal operation that had
been spun off as a separate organization yet remained beholden to its
former parent railroad.380 The vice president of the railroad company
also served as the president of the coal company, the two firms shared
directors and an office building, and the railroad corporation dictated
contractual terms to the coal company, effectively prohibiting it from
doing business with other entities.381 The Court held that no single factor
was decisive, but ruled that—taken together—the facts proved that “the
relation between the parties was so friendly that they were not trading at
arm’s length.”382 The key question was whether one company had been
“converted into a mere agent or instrumentality of the other.”383 Lastly,
the Court reviewed a case in which a single holding company owned
both a railroad and a coal company, and the railroad company, in turn,
was a majority shareholder in the mining company.384 Upon examining
the circumstances, the Court found that the owners had sought the
“abdication of all independent corporate action,” surrendering to the
holding company the “entire conduct of their affairs.”385 Explaining that
courts would “look through the forms to the realities of the relation
between the companies,”386 the Court required that the businesses
separate to establish “entire independence.”387 In doing so, the Court
explained that it was “using the antitrust laws to close a gap” in the
Hepburn Act,” which had banned railroads from owning commodities
but not from entering contractual agreements.388 The Court recognized
that railroads could achieve through exclusive contracting what the law
forbade them from achieving through integration.389
By the 1920s, any unity of control—through stock ownership or by
means of a holding company—was recognized as a violation of the
Hepburn Act. Rejecting the view that the statute outright prohibited
railroads from having any ownership interest in the firms whose goods
they transported, the Court adopted an approach that assessed the
378. United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 220 U.S. 257, 273 (1911).
379. John G. Love, Note, Interpretation of the Commodities Clause of the Act of
Congress Regulating Railroads, 69 U. Pa. L. Rev. 66, 67–68 (1920) (quoting Lehigh Valley
R.R., 220 U.S. at 274).
380. See United States v. Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co., 238 U.S. 516, 518–19 (1915).
381. See id.
382. Id. at 529–30.
383. Id. at 529.
384. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 45–47 (1920).
385. Id. at 61–62.
386. Id. at 63.
387. Id. at 64.
388. Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration, supra note 256, at 986.
389. Id.; see also Reading, 253 U.S. at 60–62.
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degree of control between the two firms. Any association of
management between railway companies and commodity companies
was prohibited.390
B. Banking
A core principle at the heart of banking regulation in the United
States is the separation of banking and commerce. This policy of sepa-
ration traces back to the charter for the Bank of England391—an
example that the United States looked to when forming its own banks,
and a principle that many state banking regimes also adopted.392
Between 1870 and 1910, the Supreme Court four times upheld rules
enjoining banks from owning commercial businesses.393
In 1956, the United States codified this separation principle in the
Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA).394 The Act applied to all firms
controlling multibank holding companies (i.e., two or more banks).395
Specifically, § 4(a) prohibited banks from acquiring nonbanking
companies and required banks covered by the Act to divest any
nonbanking subsidiaries within two years of becoming subject to the
law.396 The Act granted banks some latitude: They could own non-
banking subsidiaries whose activities were deemed by the Federal
Reserve to be “so closely related to the business of banking or of
managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto.”397
390. Some questioned whether the Hepburn Act was ultimately successful given that
railroads continued to dominate the coal sector. But this was partly attributed to schemes
by J.P. Morgan and other large banks to control multiple interests. See Jules I. Bogen, The
Anthracite Railroads: A Study in American Railroad Enterprise 240 (1927).
391. See Bernard Shull, The Separation of Banking and Commerce: Origin,
Development, and Implications for Antitrust, 28 Antitrust Bull. 255, 259 (1983)
(“Separation was initiated, for all practical purposes, with the establishment of the Bank of
England in 1694.”).
392. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and
Commerce, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1541, 1554–55 (2007). The New York Free Banking Act of
1838, for example, served as a model when Congress amended the National Bank Act in
1864 to limit the scope of power available to banks and specifically to prohibit national
banks from acquiring ownership interests in commercial enterprises. Id. at 1558.
393. See Merchs. Nat’l Bank of Cincinnati v. Wehrmann, 202 U.S. 295, 301 (1906)
(affirming that national banks do not have the power to take stock in corporations); First
Nat’l Bank of Ottawa v. Converse, 200 U.S. 425, 439 (1906) (same); Cal. Bank v. Kennedy,
167 U.S. 362, 366–67 (1897) (same); First Nat’l Bank of Charlotte v. Nat’l Exch. Bank of
Balt., 92 U.S. 122, 128 (1875) (same).
394. See S. Rep. No. 91-1084, at 2 (1970) (stating that the 1956 Act was adopted to
prevent “a departure from the established policy of separating banking from other
commercial enterprises”).
395. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 2(a), 70 Stat. 133,
133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (2012)).
396. Id. § 4(a), 70 Stat. at 135 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)).
397. Id. § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. at 137 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)).
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But in practice, the Federal Reserve granted this exception extremely
rarely.398
Because the BHCA had applied only to multi-bank firms, it had
created a loophole. By 1970, the six largest banks in the United States
had formed one-bank holding companies in order to engage in
commercial activities.399 Responding to this runaround, Congress amended
the BHCA to extend its prohibitions to one-bank holding companies.400
Lawmakers described the revision as a way to “continue our long-
standing policy of separating banking from commerce.”401
Lawmakers and policymakers have appeared willing to also apply the
separation to commercial entities. Starting in 2005, Walmart, Home
Depot, Target, and several other commercial firms made moves to
acquire FDIC-insured industrial loan companies (ILCs), a type of finan-
cial entity.402 Had the FDIC approved the acquisitions, Walmart’s
financial arm, for example, would have become the primary processor of
payments for Walmart.403 Critics of the deals worried that Walmart would
be able to pressure Walmart Bank to ignore credit problems404 and that
Target and Home Depot would make loans to finance exclusive purchases of
their own goods.405 In the face of opposition from business groups, labor
unions, community activists, public interest groups, and members of
Congress, Walmart withdrew its application.406 Applications by the other
firms were stalled by FDIC’s moratorium.407
While the Federal Reserve moved to erode the legal wall between
banking and commerce in the late 1990s and early 2000s, renewed
publicity around 2013 thrust the issue back into the center of policy
398. See Carl Felsenfeld, The Bank Holding Company Act: Has It Lived Its Life?, 38
Vill. L. Rev. 1, 83–84 (1993) (“The burden of meeting these conditions . . . has weighed
heavily upon the banking community.”).
399. See Note, Regulating the One-Bank Holding Companies—Precluding Zaibatsu?,
46 St. John’s L. Rev. 320, 322 (2012) (describing the trend in the late 1960s for the nation’s
largest banks to form one-bank holding companies).
400. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (“‘[B]ank holding company’ means any company
which has control over any bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding
company by virtue of this chapter.” (emphasis added)).
401. S. Rep. No. 91-1084, at 3 (1970).
402. See Joe Adler, Flashback: When Walmart Wanted a Bank, Am. Banker (Aug.
23, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/when-walmart-wanted-a-bank
[https://perma.cc/AD26-9NNA].
403. See Wilmarth, supra note 392, at 1545 (explaining how the proposed Walmart
bank would have limited functions, primarily processing customers’ payments and con-
verting checks electronically).
404. Id. at 1545–46.
405. Id. at 1595–96.
406. Eric Dash, Wal-Mart Abandons Bank Plans, N.Y. Times (Mar. 17, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/17/business/17bank.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
407. See Wilmarth, supra note 392, at 1552–53 (detailing the FDIC’s decision in
January 2007 to extend its moratorium on commercial firms acquiring ILCs).
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debate,408 prompting congressional hearings and a Senate investi-
gation.409 Scholarship and reporting newly identified the original hazards
of permitting our biggest banks to serve as merchants of essential raw
materials.410 In 2016, the Federal Reserve proposed a rule to rein in
banks’ nonbanking activities and largely return to the earlier regime.411
Although many of the biggest banks significantly divested their commod-
ities holdings in the wake of public attention,412 the Federal Reserve rule
has yet to be finalized.
408. See, e.g., Editorial, Goldman Sachs’s Aluminum Pile, N.Y. Times (July 26, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/27/opinion/goldman-sachss-aluminum-pile.html (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (expressing concern that “American lawmakers and
regulators have removed many of the barriers that historically separated banking and
commerce”).
409. See Christian Berthelsen & Ryan Tracy, Senate Report: Banks Had Unfair
Commodity-Market Advantages, Wall St. J. (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
senate-report-says-banks-gained-unfair-advantages-in-commodity-markets-1416434539 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (“A U.S. Senate report on commodity-market activities at
big Wall Street banks accuses the firms of being so powerful they were able to influence
prices, gain trading advantages and put the broader financial system at risk by entering
volatile businesses such as uranium trading and coal production.”); Examining Financial
Holding Companies: Should Banks Control Power Plants, Warehouses, and Oil
Refineries?, U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs (July 23, 2013),
https://www.banking.senate.gov/hearings/examining-financial-holding-companies-should-
banks-control-power-plants-warehouses-and-oil-refineriesd [https://perma.cc/JWP8-VS67].
410. See Saul T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and
Commodities, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 297 (2013) (discussing the risks associated with banks’
foray into physical commodities markets and noting a “near-absence of reliable, detailed
data on the precise nature and full scope of U.S. banking organizations’ physical
commodity operations”); David Kocieniewski, A Shuffle of Aluminum, but to Banks, Pure
Gold, N.Y. Times (July 20, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/business/a-
shuffle-of-aluminum-but-to-banks-pure-gold.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(“Wall Street is flexing its financial muscle and capitalizing on loosened federal
regulations to sway a variety of commodities markets . . . .”). But at least one scholar has
argued for loosening the separation and allowing commercial firms to own banks, in order
to “reduce systemic risk” and create a “more diverse and secure banking structure.” See
Mehrsa Baradaran, Reconsidering the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 80 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 385, 402 (2012).
411. See Regulations Q and Y; Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory Requirements
for Activities of Financial Holding Companies Related to Physical Commodities and Risk-
Based Capital Requirements for Merchant Banking Investments, 81 Fed. Reg. 67,220,
67,225 (Sept. 30, 2016) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 217, 225); see also The Federal Reserve’s
Commodities Proposal: Safety and Soundness Regulation, or an Indirect Prohibition?,
Gibson Dunn (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.gibsondunn.com/the-federal-reserves-commodities-
proposal-safety-and-soundness-regulation-or-an-indirect-prohibition/ [https://perma.cc/P99B-
H9AL] (providing commentary on the Federal Reserve’s proposed rule).
412. See Dan Fitzpatrick & Christian Berthelsen, J.P. Morgan to Sell Commodities
Business, Wall St. J. (July 26, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323
610704578630170912921006 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“J.P. Morgan joins
rivals Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley, which also are seeking buyers for
[their physical commodities operations]”).
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C. Television Networks
As the television industry grew in the 1950s, the sector
consolidated around three networks: ABC, CBS, and NBC. These
networks owned and operated the majority of television stations and
affiliated stations, controlling the distribution of television programs for
a majority of the country.413 They also produced their own programs.
Through an investigation into the networks’ programming practices, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) determined that the networks
had acquired significant power over the financing, development, and
syndication of television programming.414 The top three networks controlled
all aspects of programming, from creating programs to deciding which pro-
grams got aired and syndicated.
The FCC reached two main conclusions. First, by virtue of being the
only program providers that could reach almost all Americans, the
networks enjoyed monopsony power, which they could wield to acquire
programming at terms highly unfavorable to producers.415 Second, the
networks also possessed monopoly power, which they could use to
withhold programs from independent stations and to grant favorable
syndication rights to their network affiliates.416 The networks were
powerful vertically integrated entities that used their heft against both
independent programmers and independent stations. The problem, as
the FCC saw it, was that the networks’ power would have “the effect of
limiting the number and variety of programs available to the public,
thereby limiting program diversity, contrary to the FCC’s much sought
after goal.”417
The FCC followed its investigation with an order that structurally
disallowed networks from entering the production and syndication
markets.418 Specifically, the rule prohibited networks from both syndi-
cating any of their own programs and obtaining financial interests in
programs created by independent producers that the networks aired.419
By separating production and distribution, these structural rules sought
to curb the conflicts of interest created through integration.
Almost from inception, these “fin-syn” rules faced pushback from
industry, which lobbied the FCC to revise its order. In a follow-up inquiry
413. Christopher J. Pepe, Comment, The Rise and Fall of the FCC’s Financial Interest
and Syndicate Rules, 1 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.F. 67, 71–72 (1994).
414. Id.
415. Tamber Christian, The Financial Interest and Syndication Rules—Take Two, 3
CommLaw Conspectus 107, 107 (1995).
416. Id.
417. Id. at 108.
418. See Competition & Responsibility in Network Television Broad., 23 F.C.C.2d 382,
398, para. 30 (1970) (report and order).
419. Id.; see also Marc L. Herskovitz, Note, The Repeal of the Financial Interest and
Syndication Rules: The Demise of Program Diversity and Television Network Competition?, 15
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 177, 183 n.43 (1997).
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in 1978, the FCC observed that the rise of satellite technology had
opened up the market to new networks, potentially rendering the 1970
prohibitions obsolete.420 News that the FCC was considering modifying its
order prompted a major advocacy effort by the major motion picture
studios, which benefited from limits placed on the networks’ activities.421
Hollywood’s interests found a friend in the Reagan Administration, and
the FCC kept the 1970 rules in place for another decade. In the early
1990s, the FCC once again moved to review the fin-syn regime, this time
issuing revised rules that loosened restrictions on networks’ ability to own
and syndicate programming.422 After the Seventh Circuit struck down the
rules for being arbitrary and capricious,423 the FCC responded by issuing
rules that imposed on the networks minimal structural restrictions that
would phase out in two years.424 In 1995, the FCC released an order
observing that the advent of cable, VCR, and direct broadcasting had
opened up the market and loosened the networks’ gatekeeper power,
resolving concerns about their ability to undermine diversity.425 Its 1995
order effectuated the end of the fin-syn rules.
D. Telecommunications: Maximum Separation
By the 1960s, advances in computing had given rise to a new industry:
data processing. Data-processing services relied on communications lines
run by telephone monopolies.426 As telecom carriers began to enter data
processing, officials worried that the carriers would use their control over
the pipes to squash nascent rivals.427 To examine the issue, the FCC
launched a series of proceedings called the “Computer Inquiries.”
In the first proceeding (Computer I),428 the FCC focused on whether
to regulate the data-processing industry and whether to limit common
420. Herskovitz, supra note 419, at 184.
421. See id. at 192.
422. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.658(k), 73.659–-73.662, 73.3526(a)(11) (1991).
423. Schurz Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1055 (7th Cir. 1992).
424. Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, 8 FCC Rcd. 3282,
3282–84, para. 1 (1993) (second report and order).
425. Network Financial Interest and Syndication Rules, 60 Fed. Reg. 48,907, 48,907–08
(Sept. 21, 1995) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
426. Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communication Commission’s Computer
Inquiries, 55 Fed. Comm. L.J. 167, 168–69 (2003) (“[T]hese computer network services
were dependent upon the underlying communications network. Thus, the unregulated
computer services were simultaneously substitute services for the traditional regulated
communications network and also dependent upon them.”).
427. Id. at 170 (“These enhancements, however, also threatened to be a substitute for
regulated services, and regulated services threatened to be a bottleneck in the way of the
growth of these services.”).
428. Interdependence of Comput. & Commc’ns Servs. & Facilities (Computer I), 28
F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) (final decision and order).
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carriers from expanding into the new market.429 The FCC concluded that
the data-processing market was highly competitive, innovative, and
characterized by low entry barriers, therefore demonstrating no need for
regulation.430 The reliance of data processing on incumbent carriers,
however, posed a risk.
Concerned that carriers would stifle data processing, the FCC
adopted a policy of “maximum separation,” under which regulated
communication carriers could enter the unregulated data-processing
market only through a fully separate subsidiary.431 Carriers could do
business with their data-processing affiliates but were prohibited from
discriminating among affiliates “in the offering of facilities or services, in
the timing of the installation of facilities, in the quality of service offered
or in the charges for like services.”432 The rule also prohibited carriers
from promoting the data-processing services offered by their subsidiaries
or from using any excess network capacity to provide data-processing
services.433 Affiliated subsidiaries, meanwhile, were not allowed to own
transmission services and instead had to acquire them on a service
basis.434 These structural safeguards sought to create “an open communi-
cations platform available to all users on a nondiscriminatory basis.”435
Recognizing that discrimination by the largest firms posed the most
429. Note, The FCC Computer Inquiry: Interfaces of Competitive and Regulated
Markets, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 172, 172 (1972) [hereinafter Note on FCC Computer Inquiry].
430. See id. at 172–73 (describing the FCC’s decision not to regulate the data-
processing industry).
431. In the order outlining the new policy, Commissioner Bartley wrote separately that
he believed the proposal should require a complete separation of the companies and not
permit independent affiliation: “I would go further and require . . . a complete separation
of companies making public offerings of regulated common carrier communication
services and non-regulated data processing services.” Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d at 290 (final
decision and order) (Bartley, Comm’r, concurring). This policy did not apply to Bell
System, which the FCC felt was already prohibited by the 1956 Consent Decree from
entering any unregulated activity (including data processing). Id. at 281–82, paras. 39–40
(majority opinion). Specifically, the FCC mandated that a carrier looking to offer data-
processing services: “[(1)] establish a separate data processing corporation, [(2)] have
separate accounting books, [(3)] have separate officers, [(4)] have separate personnel,
and [(5)] have separate equipment and facilities.” Cannon, supra note 426, at 178.
432. Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d at 274, para. 22 (final decision and order). Notably, the
FCC’s “maximum separation” regime partially mirrors the consent decree imposed on
IBM by the Justice Department in 1956. See United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach., 1956 Trade
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,245 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). That decree required IBM to sell data-processing
services through a subsidiary that could be treated no differently than an independent
data processor. See Peter Passell, I.B.M. and the Limits of a Consent Decree, N.Y. Times
(June 9, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/09/business/ibm-and-the-limits-of-a-
consent-decree.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). As part of its compliance, IBM
created a separate division. Id.
433. Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d at 274–75, paras. 21, 24 (final decision and order).
434. See id. at 271, para. 16; Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 303, para. 42 (1970)
(tentative decision).
435. Cannon, supra note 426, at 180.
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serious risk to competition, the “maximum separation” regime applied
only to carriers with annual operating revenues exceeding one million
dollars.436
Through basing the separation on the distinction between data
processors and carriers, the FCC created a loophole for hybrid services
that provided both the processing and transportation of data.437 Initially
the FCC held that, so long as the data processing was “incidental” to the
communications service, the entire activity would be treated as communi-
cations.438 But the hybrid category continued to pose problems for the
FCC, prompting the agency to revisit its rules.439
In the late 1970s the FCC undertook a second round of inquiries
(Computer II).440 This time the FCC created a new distinction between
“basic service” (which referred to pure transmission) and “enhanced
service” (which rode the pipes of the “basic service” and included email,
voice mail, the internet, newsgroups, interactive voice response, and
protocol processing).441 The FCC maintained its basic conclusion: that
“enhanced services” should remain unregulated and that permitting
“basic services” into the new market for enhanced services would risk
stifling competition in this adjacent market.442 In response to claims that
structural separations on all carriers were “inefficient,” the FCC raised
the size threshold requirement, leaving only AT&T and GTE subject to
the ban.443 All other carriers had to comply with unbundling rules—
separating basic from enhanced services—but were otherwise allowed to
maintain joint operations.444
436. Id. at 179. Notably, the FCC did not adopt a separations regime across the board;
it cared about understanding the industry dynamics and ensuring that the Commission
tailored remedies that actually addressed the problem. In the case of “hybrid services”—
service offerings that integrated data processing and message transmission, Computer I, 28
F.C.C.2d at 287 (final decision and order)—the FCC decided to take a more case-by-case
approach, explaining that “we have insufficient experience with such offerings to enable
us to adopt rules of general applicability sufficiently definitive to accommodate the variety
of further service offerings.” Id. at 276, para. 27.
437. Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d at 287 (final decision and order).
438. Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d at 305, para. 42 (tentative decision).
439. See Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 871, 892–
94 (2009) (describing how, in Computer II, the FCC used a broader definition of “enhanced
services” to avoid the definitional problems that plagued the “hybrid” services regime).
440. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations (Computer
II), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) (final decision).
441. Cannon, supra note 426, at 183–88 (quoting Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d at 420, para. 96).
442. Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d at 387, paras. 5–7; see also id. at 463, para. 208
(discussing costs and benefits to separating regulated basic services from unregulated
enhanced services).
443. See id. at 482, para. 251 (“[W]e have determined that AT&T’s and GTE’s
dominant position in the terminal equipment market requires some special treatment . . . .
[A] separation requirement might be unduly costly, but we do not contemplate applying
the requirement to the small carriers.”).
444. See id. at 388–89, para. 12.
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The Commission undertook a third round of investigations
(Computer III) in 1985.445 The inquiry was prompted by the FCC’s
determination that the second round of inquiries had imposed
“significant costs on the public in decreased efficiency and innovation.”446 In
1986, the Commission issued its new plan: require carriers to ensure that
their network remain open to all users of the basic services, by permitting
users to interconnect to certain network functions and interfaces on an
“unbundled and equal access basis.”447 In other words, the new rule
allowed common carriers to enter computing, so long as they offered
unbundled basic service, adopted interconnection, and adhered to
special accounting practices to prevent subsidization across lines of
business.448 Over the course of the Computer Inquiries, the FCC switched
from structural separation to an unbundling and equal-access regime.449
Twice the Ninth Circuit struck down the FCC’s move, finding that
the Commission “had not adequately explained its apparent ‘retreat’
from requiring ‘fundamental unbundling.’”450 Absent compelling justifi-
cation, the court worried that this halfway unbundling regime would fail
to prevent the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) from engaging in
discrimination.451 Meanwhile, the FCC passed an Interim Order that
allowed BOCs to provide some computing services without a separate
subsidiary.452 The regime remained in place until the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, which undid some of the restrictions on dominant networks
in favor of competition.453
445. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations (Computer
III), 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 962, para. 1 (1986) (report and order).
446. Id. at 964, para. 3.
447. Id. at 1019, para. 113.
448. Id.; see also id. at paras. 113–114 (requiring firms to also submit an “Open
Architecture” plan, allowing its telephone network to be known to other companies); id.
at 1068–69, paras. 223–224 (requiring firms to protect customers’ proprietary network
information).
449. See Cannon, supra note 426, at 201–02.
450. Computer III Further Remand Proceedings, 13 FCC Rcd. 6040, 6051–52, para. 15
(1998) (further notice of proposed rulemaking) (quoting California v. FCC (California
III), 39 F.3d 919, 928 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also California v. FCC (California II), 4 F.3d
1505, 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
451. See California III, 39 F.3d at 928 (“[W]e must consider whether it adequately
explains why fully implemented [open network architecture] is no longer regarded as a
necessary safeguard against access discrimination after removal of structural separation.”).
452. See Computer III Further Remand Proceedings, 13 FCC Rcd. at 6044–45, para. 4.
453. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2012)). In summary, the Act sought to
create competition between telecom companies by requiring that services be unbundled
and that providers be interconnected. BOCs were permitted to offer long-distance
telephone service to their local customers upon FCC approval. The Act also imposed
common carrier requirements on telecom service and empowered the FCC with broad
authority to oversee the industry. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation, supra note 350, at 62–69.
2019] SEPARATION OF PLATFORMS AND COMMERCE 1049
Competition, however, “never arrived.”454 Enforcers permitted waves
of consolidation, leading to highly concentrated cable and telecommu-
nications markets.455 For this reason, policymakers have continued to
examine ways to manage the bottleneck power of dominant actors in
these markets, most recently in the form of net neutrality.
Notably, the net neutrality policy discussion has occurred within a
framework partly established by the Computer Inquiries, which intro-
duced into communications law the conceptual distinction between
information and telecommunications. The question of which category
internet services fall into has been at the center of the net neutrality debate.
E. Telecommunications: The Breakup of AT&T
For much of the twentieth century, the telecommunications industry
was intensely regulated through requirements that carrier services,
prices, and entry be approved by the FCC and state regulators. The
Communications Act of 1934 served as the basic statutory framework
guiding the FCC’s regulation, which held universal service as a central
goal.456
In the 1970s AT&T provided local and long-distance phone service,
owned a major producer of telephone equipment (Western Electric),
and ran a leading research facility (Bell Labs).457 The Justice Department
filed an action against the Bell Systems empire in 1949, alleging that
Western Electric had monopolized the manufacturing, sale, and
distribution of telephones and other equipment material.458 In 1974, the
government filed a separate action, arguing that AT&T had abused its
dominant position in three markets—local exchange, long distance, and
equipment—in order to monopolize the entire telecommunications
industry, a strategy described as the “‘triple-bottleneck’ theory.”459 The
government’s complaint alleged that AT&T had illegally refused to
provide competitors with local interconnection services, furnished rivals
454. Gene Kimmelman et al., The Failure of Competition Under the 1996
Telecommunications Act, 58 Fed. Comm. L.J. 511, 511 (2006).
455. Specifically, the government’s approval of the SBC–AT&T and Verizon–MCI
mergers marked “the abandonment of the competition model envisioned by the 1996
Act.” Id. at 513.
456. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
457. Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Winning by Losing: The AT&T
Settlement and Its Impact on Telecommunications, 1 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 3–4 (1983).
458. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956).
459. MacAvoy & Robinson, supra note 457, at 14 (quoting The Communications Act
of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 13015 Before the Subcomm. on Commc’ns of the H. Comm. on
Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 748 (1978) (statement of John H. Shenefield,
Assistant Att’y Gen. for Antitrust)).
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with inferior maintenance services, and imposed requirements that
thwarted the reach of competing local networks.460
In lieu of going to trial, the parties reached a settlement. The
agreement required AT&T to divest ownership and control of the
BOCs.461 Premised on the idea that regulators would be unable to stop an
integrated monopoly from engaging in predatory anticompetitive conduct
in adjacent markets,462 the settlement was designed to prohibit the compa-
nies from combining monopoly and competitive lines of business after
divestiture. The Justice Department argued that prohibiting the act of
discrimination would be insufficient—the government had to target the
underlying incentive to discriminate outright.463
Notably, the consent decree combined the breakup requirement
with an “equal access” obligation imposed on the independent BOCs.
Under this provision, the divested BOCs had to provide unaffiliated long-
distance carriers access to the local exchanges that was “equal in type,
quality, and price” to that given to AT&T.464 This obligation was even-
tually extended to all local-exchange carriers.465
The consent decree was administered by Judge Harold Greene for
twelve years.466 Over this time, Judge Greene responded to the parties’
requests for modification of the decree, assessing whether the market
had sufficiently changed to justify loosening the line-of-business
460. See United States v. AT&T Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1354–57 (D.D.C. 1981).
461. Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications
Act: Regulation Telecommunications Under Judge Greene, 50 Hastings L.J. 1395, 1412
(1999).
462. This premise came to be known as the “Bell Doctrine” or “Baxter’s Law.” See,
e.g., Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 Va. L.
Rev. 123, 139 n.49 (2006) (noting that although Professor William Baxter referred to the
premise as the “Bell Doctrine,” others refer to it as “Baxter’s Law”). In short, Baxter’s Law
held that:
[R]egulated monopolies have the incentive and opportunity to monop-
olize related markets in which their monopolized service is an input,
and . . . the most effective solution to this problem is to “quarantine” the
regulated monopoly segment of the industry by separating its ownership
and control from the ownership and control of firms that operate in
potentially competitive segments of the industry.
Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in Telecommunications,
Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1249, 1249–50 (1999). Notably,
Baxter’s Law is applicable only in the context of regulated industries.
463. See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 187 (D.D.C. 1982) (“The
restrictions are based upon the assumption that the [BOCs], were they allowed to enter
the forbidden markets, would use their monopoly power in an anticompetitive manner.”).
464. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 142.
465. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 232, at 1351.
466. See Kearney, supra note 461, at 1398–99.
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restrictions.467 The decree remained in place until the passage of the
Telecommunications Act.468
F. Common Threads
Drawing from these separations regimes, a few observations stand
out. First, policymakers have applied separations regimes to three
sectors: transportation, communications, and banking. Broadly all three
have involved particular markets and services where a bottleneck facility
served as infrastructure or a critical intermediary.469 Within these cate-
gories, we can further distinguish between bottleneck services that are or
were essential for the functioning of our economy—such as railroads or
banking—and those that constitute an important distribution channel
but have not been viewed as essential in the same way.
Second, a majority of the separations were coupled with common
carriage rules requiring equal access on equal terms. This was the case
with railroads, data processing, and telecommunications, further captur-
ing how structural separations and nondiscrimination rules can function
as critical complements in the service of nondiscrimination.
Third, defining the separation may not always be straightforward,
especially when dealing with new technologies. With time, the FCC came
to see that the initial distinction it had drawn—between data processors
and common carriers—was unworkable, prompting the agency to re-
design the rule around a distinction between basic and enhanced
services instead. This form of learning and reworking is bound to be a
part of implementing separations regimes.
Fourth, the efficacy of a separations regime rests intimately on the
timing of its implementation. This is true both with regard to its
introduction and its repeal. Insofar as it is the existence of a bottleneck
that invites the separation, identifying when market conditions have
changed such that discrimination or appropriation by the firm is no
longer likely to have market-wide effects can help inform if and when a
separation should be revoked. The separations implemented through the
Computer Inquiries and the AT&T remedy both underwent continuous
467. See id. at 1417.
468. Id. at 1459.
469. See supra sections II.A–.E. Banks may appear to be the exception. But Professor
Morgan Ricks notes that recent academic scholarship on banks has improperly focused on
their intermediary role of facilitating private transactions, instead of on their monetary
role as issuers of funds—a role that gives them “a unique relationship with the state.”
Morgan Ricks, Money as Infrastructure, 2018 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 757, 758–59. When one
focuses on banks’ monetary role, bank regulation “becomes a subfield of public utility and
common carrier regulation.” Id. at 768–69. Ricks, therefore, argues that “bank regulation
might instead embrace infrastructure regulation’s logic and follow through on its impli-
cations.” Id. at 770; see also Rahman, New Utilities, supra note 26, at 1657 (“Finance
represents another kind of infrastructural good, a critical service upon which the entire
economy depends.”).
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scrutiny by regulators and the judiciary, who regularly evaluated whether
the market had become more competitive.470 And with the exception of
banking, the separations regimes discussed above were eliminated once
enforcers or lawmakers determined that market developments had
created more pathways for distribution, softening the bottleneck’s market
power. Applying separations requires periodic reassessment that the
remedy is still addressing an underlying harm.
Lastly, the separations principle has been applied in different forms.
Broadly, two levels of strictness emerge: (1) complete bans (or total
separations), which prohibit a company from any engagement or involve-
ment, interest, or ownership in particular activity; and (2) partial bans
(or functional separations), which permit a company to engage in a
particular business activity but prescribe the organizational form it must
take—requiring, for example, that the separate business activity be
conducted through a separate affiliate. There is no clear pattern as to
when lawmakers or regulators opted for one form over the other.
IV. FUNCTIONAL GOALS
This Part explores the policy motivations and functional goals that
underlay these structural separations. Although policymakers applied
structural limits in a variety of sectors, six justifications recur: (1) elimi-
nating conflicts of interest, (2) preventing cross-financing that would
extend existing dominance, (3) preserving system resiliency, (4) promot-
ing diversity, (5) preventing excessive concentration of power, and (6)
prioritizing administrability.
Notably, these motivations register in a normatively pluralistic
framework: While some are cognizable in terms of welfare economics,
others appeal to a broader set of institutional and democratic values.
Some goals sound in both registers. This Part reviews these various policy
motivations.
A. Eliminating Conflicts of Interest
A key policy objective that runs through the separations explored
above is the elimination of conflicts of interest. The animating idea is
that companies in infrastructure-like sectors that compete with the
businesses using their services have an incentive to favor their own goods
or services over those owned by rivals. Because these intermediaries
comprise a backbone for a broader set of economic or social activity,
whether they actually act on the incentive and ability to discriminate is
secondary—the incentive and ability are deemed a sufficient threat. By
forbidding the very structural arrangement that gives rise to the conflict
of interest, prophylactic bans safeguard against discrimination.
470. See supra notes 466–468 and accompanying text.
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The goal of eliminating conflicts of interest motivated the
implementation and/or enforcement of structural separations in
railroads, banking, and computing. As railroads continued to experiment
with arrangements that facilitated control over coal, a group of critics
argued that the commodities clause should be read as a sweeping
structural ban—to prohibit railroads from transporting any commodity
produced by any company in which it held any stock. This view was first
articulated by Justice John Harlan dissenting in the first commodity
clause case to reach the Court.471 A reading of the act that permitted
railroads to affiliate with producers in any capacity would, he warned,
“enable the transporting railroad company, by one device or another, to
defeat altogether the purpose which Congress had in view, which was to
divorce, in a real, substantial sense, production and transportation, and
thereby to prevent the transporting company from doing injustice to
other owners of coal.”472 While a majority of the Court refused to go
along with this specific interpretation, it rested on the idea that
integration created possibilities for abuse, and therefore bans on cross-
ownership would help “avoid the tendency to discrimination,” which
“necessarily inheres in the carrying on by a railroad company of the
business of manufacturing, mining, producing, or owning, in whole or in
part, . . . commodities which are by it transported in interstate commerce.”473
In other words, Justice Harlan wrote, history showed that discrimination
“inevitably grew up where a railroad company occupied the inconsistent
positions of carrier and shipper.”474 Only a clear separation between
production and transportation would eliminate this risk of discrimination.
Similarly, the structural separation in banking was driven by the
desire to prevent conflicts of interest that could bias how banks make
loans or extend credit. Owning or even affiliating with a commercial
entity could incentivize banks to make lending decisions with an eye to
the effects on their own commercial entities.475 By interfering with the
allocation of credit, this dynamic could threaten to distort not just
competition in any given market but the economy as a whole.476
471. See United States v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 419 (1909) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
472. Id.
473. Id. at 404 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
474. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 61 (1920) (emphasis added).
475. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 100-19, at 8 (1987), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 489,
498 (noting that commercial ownership by banks “raises the risk that the banks’ credit
decisions will be based not on economic merit but on the business strategies of their
corporate parents”).
476. J.P. Morgan running a copper business, for instance, could skew its lending
decisions in a couple of ways. The bank could discriminate against competing copper
companies, choosing to extend credit at unfavorable rates or declining to lend at all. It
could also discriminate among suppliers or buyers of its copper—conditioning credit on
favorable treatment for its commercial affiliate. Aggregated across millions of lending
decisions, this biased approach—penalizing competing copper companies and pressuring
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At root, the concern about biased lending echoes the antitrust fear
about foreclosure. Both focus on how an integrated business may use its
integrated structure to undermine or discriminate against rivals. The
concern is more acute in the context of banking given the critical role
financial institutions play in providing access to credit, the lifeblood of
the economy.
The FCC echoed concerns about conflicts of interest in the
Computer Inquiries. As the telephone companies expanded into the
nascent computing market—thereby competing with the data-processing
firms dependent on them477—the FCC worried about “even the most
subtle preferences a common carrier might give its data processing
subsidiary.”478 In its tentative decision first considering the structural
regime, the Commission observed that the primary dangers of allowing
common carriers to integrate into data processing “relate primarily to
the alleged ability of common carriers to favor their own data processing
activities by discriminatory services, cross-subsidization, improper pricing
of common carrier services, and related anticompetitive practices and
activities.”479
Notably, the FCC acknowledged that permitting carriers to use
excess capacity for data processing might yield efficiencies that could
lower costs.480 But the agency maintained that “the potential abuses
inherent in operations of this nature outweigh whatever benefits might
borrowers into doing business with J.P. Morgan’s own copper dealer—could determine not
only the fate of any single copper company but the trajectory of the copper sector as a
whole.
477. See Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 389–90, para. 15 (1980) (final decision)
(explaining that a major goal of the Computer Inquiries was to address “whether
communications common carriers should be permitted to market data processing
services”).
478. Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the Giant: How the Federal Government Created
Microsoft, Personal Computers, and the Internet, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1999).
479. Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 301–02, para. 33 (1970) (tentative decision).
Reviewing the structural separation, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
echoed the FCC’s concerns, noting that:
[T]he ability for abuse exists as does the incentive, of that there can . . .
be no doubt. . . . Among the more obvious means of anticompetitive action
in this regard are increases in the rates for those switched and private
line services upon which Regional Company competitors depend while
lower rates are maintained for Regional Company network services;
manipulation of the quality of access lines; impairment of the speed,
quality, and efficiency of dedicated private lines used by competitors;
development of new information services to take advantage of planned,
but not yet publicly known, changes in the underlying network; and use
for Regional Company benefit of the knowledge of the design, nature,
geographic coverage, and traffic patterns of competitive information
service providers.
United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 566 (D.D.C. 1987).
480. See Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 271, para. 13 (1971) (final decision and order).
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be achieved.”481 Moreover, the FCC argued that permitting carriers to
integrate would distort the market by enabling a firm to succeed based
on existing dominance rather than business-specific talent.482
B. Preventing Protected Profits from Financing Entry into New Markets
Another concern that recurs as a functional justification is the desire
to prevent companies from using protected profits to finance entry into
new lines of business—a tactic that was deemed anticompetitive. This
concern was especially heightened in the context of banking and
telecommunications, as officials worried that firms would use their
regulated services to finance their unregulated businesses.483
The separation of banking and commerce, for example, was seen as
a way to keep banks from leveraging a government-granted advantage
into other lines of business.484 Some accounts view this as a foundational
reason that England first instituted the separation. As the British
government had granted the Bank of England a corporate charter,
separation was a “protection against whatever advantages the special
corporate charter implied and whatever advantages the Bank might
obtain in the future.”485 Keeping banks from entering commerce would
prevent a government-sponsored entity from constraining opportunities
481. Id.
482. The Commission noted in its tentative decision that “[t]he factors which mark
the difference between service bureau success or failure are imaginative innovation,
quality programming, and useful service features, rather than the size of the staff or the
computing installation.” Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d at 298, para. 21 (tentative decision). In its
final decision and order, the Commission also stated its belief “that [its] restrictions herein
respecting corporate arrangements are neither onerous nor burdensome but reflect,
rather, the market conditions confronted by those 800 or more noncarrier-related firms
with whom carrier data affiliates will be competing.” Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d at 272, para.
16 (final decision and order).
483. Separations policies were applied in the context of regulated monopolies to
prevent three anticompetitive practices: (1) the monopolist’s use of profits earned from
regulated markets to engage in predatory pricing in the unregulated markets; (2) the
monopolist’s control of the supply of competitors (assuming the two markets are related);
and (3) the monopolist’s assignment of all joint costs to the regulated product, charging a
higher price in the regulated market. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Economics of Regulation
and Antitrust 546–49 (4th ed. 2005) (highlighting the anticompetitive practices that
“might result from allowing a regulated monopolist to compete against unregulated firms”
and describing how “[t]he benefits of separation rest in preventing such practices from
taking place”).
484. Professors Bob Hockett and Saule Omarova explain how banking has always
functioned as a form of public franchise, built upon the full faith and credit of the U.S.
government. See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Special,” Vestigial, or Visionary?
What Bank Regulation Tells Us About the Corporation—and Vice Versa, 39 Seattle U. L.
Rev. 453, 461 (2016).
485. Shull, supra note 391, at 274.
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for private entrepreneurs. In other words, separation was a “protection
against a firm affiliated with the government.”486
In computing, the FCC wanted to prevent regulated telephone
monopolies from subsidizing their data-processing entities, which would
have given them an edge over independent data processors.487 Because
data processors depended on the carriers, permitting carriers to enter
computing would mean the carrier’s data-processing division would
receive an “implicit subsidy” from its competitors.488 This would lead to
“unfairly and artificially low prices in the data processing market for the
carrier’s computer services.”489 And because the monopoly had its long-
run rate of return effectively guaranteed, it had latitude to engage in
predatory pricing.490
Again, this cross-financing was viewed as anticompetitive, as it would
permit the monopoly to leverage its government-protected advantage
against firms in a separate market. The FCC wanted to “prevent any
arbitrary manipulation in the allocation of revenues and expenses be-
tween a carrier’s regulated and unregulated service offerings.”491 Specifi-
cally, the FCC worried that a carrier could charge inflated prices to its
customers and use these revenues to finance its data-processing unit,
which could underprice competitors in the data-processing market.492
This concern applied even in the context of smaller carriers, which
would still have “the incentive and opportunity to take advantage of their
monopoly control of the transmission capacity, and to act in anticom-
petitive ways.”493
The FCC’s desire to prevent the affiliate from enjoying any residual
benefits from the monopoly led it to prohibit affiliates from sharing even
486. Id. Some scholars argue that this aversion to “crony capitalism” and “trade
monopolists” led in part to the American Revolution and played a key role in foundational
debates about the federally incorporated Bank of the United States, the scope of the
Contracts Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment. See Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C.
Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism, 36 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol’y 983, 984–88 (2013). A version of this same concern might focus on the
implicit subsidy that large U.S. banks enjoy. In 2014 the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) documented that big banks benefit from “implicit public subsidies created by the
expectation that the government will support them if they are in financial trouble.” The
IMF estimated that “global systemically important banks” enjoyed a $70 billion subsidy in
the United States and up to $300 billion in the euro area. IMF Survey: Big Banks Benefit
from Government Subsidies, IMF (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/
2015/09/28/04/53/sopol033114a [https://perma.cc/W973-6JCZ].
487. See supra notes 431–436 and accompanying text.
488. Note on FCC Computer Inquiry, supra note 429, at 190.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 273, para. 20 (1970) (final decision and order).
492. Id.
493. Cannon, supra note 426, at 194.
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names or symbols with the common carrier.494 Branding the affiliate as an
extension of the common carrier would produce the “same coercive
effect” as if the carrier were soliciting sales on behalf of its data-processing
business.495
Preventing cross-financing was treated as a tool to enhance
competition in the data-processing market. Allowing exclusive trans-
actions between a carrier and its affiliate would “substantially impact the
competitive market in which hundreds of small competing service
bureau firms would be unable to obtain and retain the patronage of so
significant a data processing customer.”496 This is one reason the FCC
required carriers to provide basic services to all other enhanced services
on the same terms and conditions—effectively combining a structural
separation with a nondiscrimination regime.
C. Preserving System Resiliency
Another justification that recurs is promoting the resiliency of
systems. Because several of the entities subject to structural separations
serve an “infrastructural” role—structuring access to markets or to an
essential good or service—the public has a strong interest in maintaining
their stability and shielding them from disruption.497 Crashes that cripple
these infrastructural services can have an outsized effect on economic
activity, and involvement in multiple lines of business can increase the
likelihood of system crashes. For this reason, policymakers treated strict
limits on entry and exit as one way to shield critical services from undue
risk.498 Structural separations in banking and telephony, too, were partly
justified on grounds of promoting system stability.499
Precisely because banking services constitute a critical good,
ensuring the soundness and stability of banking is a central goal of
banking policy. Lawmakers and regulators have argued that preventing
494. Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d at 272, para. 18 (final decision and order).
495. Id.
496. Id. at 273, para. 19.
497. For a definition of “infrastructural,” see Rahman, New Utilities, supra note 26, at
1640–44. It’s also worth noting that the definition is contested. Even investors lack any
single definition of “infrastructure.” Ryan Dezember & Miriam Gottfried, What Do
Laundry Machines and Roads Have in Common? To Investors, They’re Infrastructure,
Wall St. J. (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-do-laundry-machines-and-
roads-have-in-common-to-investors-theyre-infrastructure-1520282663 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (“Blackstone notes that the term infrastructure is open to interpre-
tation: ‘There is no generally accepted definition of infrastructure.’”).
498. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Ernest Gellhorn, Regulated Industries in a Nutshell
251–74 (4th ed. 1999).
499. See, e.g., Randall S. Kroszner & Raghuram G. Rajan, Is the Glass-Steagall Act
Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking Before 1933, 84 Am.
Econ. Rev. 810, 810 (1994) (“The driving force behind the Act was Senator Carter Glass,
who strongly believed that direct commercial-bank involvement with corporate securities
was detrimental to the stability of the financial system.”).
1058 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:973
banks from expanding into commercial activities may help insulate banks
from the vagaries of other sectors.500 This line of argument is premised
on the idea that exposing banks to manufacturing, physical trading, or
other commercial activities “increases the vulnerability of the banking
and payments systems, the federal deposit insurance fund, and thereby
the broader economy.”501 A question frequently raised during the 2013
debates around banks’ expansion into physical commodity trading was:
What would happen if Morgan Stanley repeated the BP oil spill? Would
taxpayers be on the line for the $61.2 billion in damages? In this way, a
structural separation helps eliminate the risk that instability or disruption
in commercial markets could necessitate a financial bailout.502
To be sure, not all commercial activities are inherently more risky
than financial activity—and, some might argue, expanding into these
spheres may help banks diversify risk. That said, it is true that some
commercial activities—like drilling oil or mining—pose particularly
expensive risks to which federally insured depository institutions should
not be exposed.503
Concerns about system stability and resiliency also informed the
FCC’s Computer Inquiries. The carriers argued that, in order to promote
efficiency, they should be permitted to use excess capacity for data
processing.504 The Commission stated, first, that “the potential abuses
inherent” in the system far outweighed any purported efficiencies,505
and, second, the carriers should have a “‘back-up’ system” that “should
be designed to meet foreseeable breakdowns of equipment dedicated to
public service” and “should be available instantly for that purpose without
the conflicting claims of other users.”506 In other words, the FCC privileged
redundancy over efficiency, recognizing that the former would serve the
public by helping to ensure the stability of communications services and
500. See, e.g., David Sheppard & Alexandra Alper, Insight: As Banks Deepen
Commodity Deals, Volcker Test Likely, Reuters (July 3, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-commodities-forwards-banks/insight-as-banks-deepen-commodity-deals-volcker-
test-likely-idUSBRE86206420120703 [https://perma.cc/42R9-J7XJ] (quoting senators
as decrying bank expansion into commodities-related businesses due to the risk
potential); Editorial, The Value of the Volcker Rule, Wash. Post. (Oct. 28, 2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-value-of-the-volcker-rule/2011/10/18/
gIQATZhUQM_story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting arguments by
Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve at the time, in favor of requiring banks to
separate investment banking practices from traditional commercial banking practices).
501. Omarova, supra note 410, at 275–76.
502. See Nathaniel Popper & Peter Eavis, Senate Report Finds Goldman and
JPMorgan Can Influence Commodities, N.Y Times: Dealbook (Nov. 19, 2014),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/senate-report-criticizes-goldman-and-jpmorgan-
over-their-roles-in-commodities-market/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
503. See id. at 317–18 (noting that “[g]lobal energy prices are notoriously volatile”).
504. See Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 271, para. 13 (1970) (final decision and order).
505. Id.
506. Id.
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networks. Although expanding into data processing wouldn’t necessarily
heighten the risk of a crash, keeping that capacity for backup would
enable the system to absorb any shocks, helping promote resiliency.
D. Promoting Diversity
By creating conditions that invite greater competition among
producers, structural bans can promote diversity in the goods and
services produced. The history of the media sector shows that mandating
a separation between production and distribution can help create an
open market for content.507
A key reason the FCC issued the fin-syn rules was to promote media
diversity. One effect of the networks’ vertical control was that they effec-
tively controlled the production process of most programming, “from
idea through exhibition.”508 Their programming decisions, in turn, were
driven by advertising profits. As a result, “programs were produced on
the basis of ‘formulas’ that were pre-approved by the three networks and
their advertisers, such that the subject matter would satisfy tested
commercial patterns.”509 The networks’ grip on production, coupled with
their commercial priorities, dramatically limited the range of program-
ming that they would run. Lacking both the financial support of the
networks as well as national exposure, independent producers lan-
guished.510 The FCC worried that the networks’ dominance was sapping
program diversity, limiting the shows and voices that Americans could
access.511
For this reason, the FCC structured its rules with diversity as a
primary goal.512 Key to achieving greater variety in programming was
restructuring the networks’ incentives and restricting their ability to steer
content. On this metric, the fin-syn rules worked: Between 1970 and 1990,
the number of independent television stations increased from 65 to 340.513
507. See Herskovitz, supra note 419, at 179–81 (arguing that FCC-mandated
separation in media created an environment in which, “for the first time, independent
producers were bargaining from a position of relative strength”).
508. Id. at 186 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Competition & Responsibility
in Network Television Broad., 23 F.C.C.2d 382, 389, para. 11 (1970) (report and order)).
509. Id. at 187.
510. Id. at 188–89.
511. See id. at 179–80 (noting that the impetus behind fin-syn was to “foster a more
competitive and diverse programming climate”). Available data validate the worry: From
1957 to 1968, the percentage of prime-time network programming provided by inde-
pendent producers had fallen from 33% to 4%. Douglas Ginsburg et al., Regulation of the
Electronic Mass Media 266 (2d ed. 1991).
512. Specifically, the agency sought to promote diversity across three different
dimensions: source diversity, outlet diversity, and program diversity. See Herskovitz, supra
note 419, at 200–06 (discussing the various results of fin-syn in the television marketplace).
513. Christian, supra note 415, at 109.
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The Big Three networks’ aggregate share of nationwide primetime audi-
ence over this same period, meanwhile, declined from 90% to nearly 62%.514
Safeguarding diversity of information also motivated Judge Harold
Greene to modify the government’s consent decree with AT&T.515 The
decree proposed by the Justice Department would have permitted the
new AT&T—having divested local carriers—to provide electronic publish-
ing services.516 Reviewing the provision, Judge Greene held that First
Amendment values required that AT&T be blocked from entering this
market.517
Judge Greene’s primary concern was that AT&T would use its power
in the interexchange market to undermine competing electronic
publishers. He identified a set of tactics that the corporation could use to
discriminate against rivals.518 For example, he explained, AT&T could use
its control over the network to prioritize traffic from its own publishing
operations, to develop technology that favored its own operations over
those of the industry at large, or to discriminate against competitors
when providing needed maintenance on their lines.519
Judge Greene acknowledged the Justice Department’s likely
argument—namely, that market dynamics would limit AT&T’s ability to
discriminate.520 But he stated that “the peculiar characteristics of the
electronic publishing market” invited particular caution.521 Noting that
information and news were “especially sensitive” to even small delays,
and that publishers would “have no realistic alternative transmission
system,” he concluded that “AT&T’s entry into the electronic publishing
market poses a substantial danger to First Amendment values.”522 Judge
Greene required that the consent decree be modified to prohibit AT&T
from entering electronic publishing for seven years, with the prospect of
extension if the court determined that threats remained.523
514. Id. The FCC’s repeal of fin-syn was controversial. On the one hand, industry
groups and some public advocates stressed that the advent of new technologies had
injected fresh competition in the media marketplace, dissolving the networks’ grip. Others
held that the networks still possessed the ability to steer and manipulate programming at
the expense of source and outlet diversity. See Herskovitz, supra note 419, at 200
(“Commentators have taken the position that the repeal of the rules was a prudent
judgment . . . point[ing] to the prolification of broadcast outlets such as cable, VCRs, and
direct broadcasting . . . . They point to these as evidence of competition in the industry and
an increasing supply of diverse programming.” (footnote omitted)); Id. at 200–01.
515. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 181 (D.D.C. 1982).
516. Id. at 180.
517. Id. at 181–83.
518. Id. at 181.
519. Id.
520. Id. at 182.
521. Id.
522. Id. at 182–83.
523. Id. at 225. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated Judge Greene’s
prohibition against a BOC’s provision of information services, on the basis that BOCs
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Abandoning the principle of structurally separating production and
distribution has enabled widespread integration across media markets—
potentially at the expense of media diversity. Critics of the Comcast–NBC
merger, for example, warned that the tie-up would incentivize Comcast
to privilege NBC programming524—and evidence suggests that Comcast
has, in fact, discriminated against rival content.525 The recent vertical tie-
up of Time Warner and AT&T526 poses some of the same hazards—
including, public advocates predict, less media diversity.527 Weeks after
the D.C. Circuit approved the deal, AT&T threatened to drop rival program-
ming, prompting allegations that the merged firm was using its “new-
found market dominance” as “leverage to drive consumers to the
content it owns.”528
E. Preventing Excessive Concentration of Power and Control
By preventing certain forms of centralized control, structural
separations can help safeguard against the concentration of power. The
antimonopoly movement and the foundational antitrust laws were partly
animated by a recognition that tyranny in our commercial spheres would
preclude true democracy and liberty in our political sphere.529 Structural
separations were seen as a tool in this antimonopoly toolbox. Perhaps
due to the outsized power that a financial oligarchy can wield—and the
trove of findings by the Pujo Committee showing how a handful of
could not be prevented from entering a market absent specific evidence that they had
engaged in anticompetitive abuses in that market. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 894 F.2d
430, 436–38 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
524. See Kim Hart, Comcast-NBC Merger Conditions Expire, Raising Anti-Competitive
Fears, Axios (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.axios.com/comcast-nbm-1516393866-a394d1c7-
abc5-4f51-879e-3fcab1c0de89.html [https://perma.cc/H2AY-F7AB] (citing concerns of
Senator Richard Blumenthal and then-FCC Commissioner Mignon Clyburn over the
prospect of Comcast owning the distribution of both content and programming).
525. See Jasmin Melvin, U.S. FCC Sides with Bloomberg over Comcast Dispute,
Reuters (May 2, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/fcc-comcast-bloomberg-idUSL
1E8G2N8C20120502 [https://perma.cc/9K3D-9CR7] (describing an FCC decision finding
that Comcast had violated a “neighborhooding” requirement by not placing Bloomberg’s
financial news channel near other news channels in its lineup).
526. The District Court for the District of Columbia approved the merger in June 2018.
See United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 165 (D.D.C. 2018).
527. See, e.g., Shiva Stella, Public Knowledge President to Testify on AT&T/Time
Warner Merger, Pub. Knowledge (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.publicknowledge.org/press-
release/public-knowledge-president-to-testify-on-att-time-warner-merger [https://perma.cc/
FVA6-MHPT].
528. Sara Fischer, In AT&T and Viacom Spat, Cable Customers Lose Out, Axios (Mar.
22, 2019), https://www.axios.com/att-viacom-directv-blackout-cable-tv-dispute-3945f9c1-
9e7f-4711-b5f7-d0d8a3d20d02.html [https://perma.cc/2HVS-F4YJ].
529. See Zephyr Teachout & Lina Khan, Market Structure and Political Law: A
Taxonomy of Power, 9 Duke. J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 37, 61 (2014) (“[E]xploration of the
Sherman Act’s intellectual antecedents shows that for Senator Sherman and the Act’s
congressional supporters, economic and political freedoms were seen as part of a piece.”).
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financiers had seized control over entire sectors of the economy530—
preventing excessive concentration featured as a prominent justification
in debates on banking law through the mid-twentieth century.531
On some accounts, all bank holding company regulation in the
United States has had this antimonopoly goal as its focus—both to
prevent “the unrestrained concentration of banking resources under the
control of a single organization” and “to prevent undue concentration of
economic power that Congress perceived may result when banking and
nonbanking enterprises combine under the same corporate umbrella.”532
The BHCA follows this antimonopoly tradition, and its passage was in
part the product of effective lobbying by small independent and
community banks.533 Embedded in the separation of banking and
commerce is a preference for small, local business enterprise as a unit of
economic activity.534
How would banks’ foray into commercial activities risk concen-
trating excessive power, rather than exhibiting bigness per se? One factor
is control. If the same organizations that control access to money also
control access to commercial products and services, banking experts
worry that the arrangement would hand outsized decision-making power
to a few. This concern is heightened when the products and services are
of an essential nature—such as commodity inputs and raw materials like
copper, grain, and energy—and when the controlling banks hold
dominant positions.535
If one worry about big banks steering both credit and commerce is
outsized economic control, the other is excessive political influence. The
ways that corporate actors can translate economic power into political
influence are legion.536 If history suggests that banks and finance
530. See H.R. Rep. No. 62-1593, at 133 (1913); see also Louis D. Brandeis, Other
People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It 2–6 (1914) (describing the Pujo Committee
report and arguing that the outsized power of the financial oligarchy—driven by invest-
ment bankers in particular—poses a danger to political liberty).
531. See Omarova, supra note 410, at 276–77 (noting the BHCA’s original focus as an
“antitrust, anti-monopoly law”).
532. Melanie L. Fein, Federal Bank Holding Company Law § 7.01[1] (3d ed. 2018).
533. Omarova, supra note 410, at 277.
534. See id.
535. This potential hazard recently came to the surface around 2013, when the public
learned that some of our biggest banks—Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, and Morgan
Stanley—had also morphed into some of the biggest merchants of physical goods, supply-
ing crude oil, storing aluminum, and running electricity plants. See id. at 266–67
(describing these banks’ ventures into commodity industries); Goldman Sachs’s Aluminum
Pile, supra note 408 (arguing that policymakers should investigate financial institutions’
commodities-driven profits).
536. See Simon Johnson & James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the
Next Financial Meltdown 3–13 (2011) (“The Wall Street banks are the new American
oligarchy—a group that gains political power because of its economic power, and then
uses that political power for its own benefit.”); Teachout & Khan, supra note 529, at 37–38
(explaining how “decentralized economic power and democratic self-government are
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interests have enjoyed political influence by virtue of their influence over
the American economy, then prohibiting banks from acquiring signifi-
cant equity in American industry remains one safeguard against their
amassing greater political power.
F. Prioritizing Administrability
A final functional justification for structural separations is that they
are highly administrable. Issuing outright bans obviates the need to
engage in lengthy rule-of-reason type analysis; structural limits prescribe
rules instead of standards. Structural separations are sometimes criticized
for being far-reaching, crude, and overly broad, prohibiting benign as
well as pernicious activity.537 This criticism is fair, given that rules are “by
nature both over- and under-inclusive.”538 They accept some degree of
error in return for clarity and predictability.
In at least two instances, public officials introduced structural
regimes by citing their administrability, noting the limits of the govern-
ment’s capacity to consistently detect discrete acts of wrongdoing. The
FCC, for example, stressed its inability to “monitor carefully” the types of
activities it had prohibited, “since even the injured party may not be
aware of them.”539 The Commission observed that “subtle forms of
favoritism” are “numerous and difficult to detect,” and that it was
unlikely that the agency would “be prompt in cracking down on discov-
ered abuses.”540 Relying on the agency to track individual acts of injury
would risk extensive harm to competition. Structural bans, the agency
explained, could also aid “the deterrence of foreseeable abuse.”541
Members of Congress cited some of these same factors when
constructing the BHCA. Lawmakers acknowledged that not all banks that
expanded into commerce would discriminate or otherwise abuse their
power.542 But short of flagrant abuses, “subtle bias” might creep in, and it
deeply intertwined” and arguing that market structure is “innately political”); see also
Johnson & Kwak, supra, 88–94 (noting that the “dismantling of the regulatory system” that
occurred in the 1990s and 2000s coincided with increasing political donations from the
financial sector and Wall Street bankers taking on “major positions in the government
during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations”); James Kwak, Cultural Capture
and the Financial Crisis, in Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and
How to Limit It 71, 79–81 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014) (describing the
phenomenon of “cultural capture,” a process whereby regulators systematically favor regu-
lated industries whose members share a common identity with the regulators, are in the
regulators’ social networks, or are generally perceived as high-status individuals).
537. See infra Part V.
538. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & David E. Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 Colum. L. Rev.
809, 843 (2015).
539. Note on FCC Computer Inquiry, supra note 429, at 200.
540. Id.
541. Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 273, para. 20 (1971) (final decision and order).
542. See Omarova, supra note 410, at 277–78 (describing exemptions from the
general statutory restrictions separating banking and commerce).
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would be “quite unrealistic to expect [banking regulators] to monitor
and detect” these less overt forms of discriminatory lending.543
G. Shared Features Across Justifications
As explored above, six primary justifications recur across the
structural separations reviewed: (1) eliminating conflicts of interest, (2)
preventing dominant firms from using protected profits to enter new
markets, (3) preserving system resiliency, (4) promoting diversity, (5)
limiting the concentration of power, and (6) prioritizing administrability.
Several justifications share features, even as they draw on different
values. First, these goals generally seek to preserve the integrity of a
process rather than achieve a specific market outcome. Eliminating
conflicts of interest and preventing use of protected profits to finance
entry, for example, target purported distortions of market competition;
both seek to curb a firm’s ability to harness existing market power. While
the rhetoric surrounding these two justifications occasionally draws on
notions of fairness, the substantive justifications also ring soundly in
welfare terms, given that preventing dominant firms from harnessing
existing advantages at the expense of new firms can promote dynamic
efficiency. Preserving system resiliency, too, can be viewed as a welfare-
based goal, insofar as ensuring greater reliability of core infrastructure is
likely to facilitate greater economic activity.
Several of the policy goals, however, can instead be understood as
appealing to a broader set of democratic and institutionalist values.544
Preserving the system resiliency of essential services, for example, also
draws on a tradition concerned with facilitating broad access to critical
resources and restricting the arbitrary power that providers of essential
services can exercise. Promoting diversity in production and preventing
the excessive concentration of private power, meanwhile, are informed
by a foundational recognition of the connection between economic
structure and political outcomes. Drawing on the republican insight that
domination is wrongful “even if the empowered party never affirmatively
interferes with the dependent’s party choices,” structural separations
target the source of the power, rather than its exercise.545
543. Jonathan Brown, The Separation of Banking and Commerce, GIS for
Equitable and Sustainable Communities, http://www.public-gis.org/reports/sbc.html
[https://perma.cc/G5LG-F3X8] (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
544. Leading contemporary republican thinkers describe domination as subjection to
another’s arbitrary power. See, e.g., Philip Pettit, Republican Freedom: Three Axioms,
Four Theorems, in Republicanism and Political Theory 102, 102 (Cécile Laborde & John
Maynor eds., 2008) (reformulating “the republican conception of freedom as non-
domination” and, in doing so, using the “notion of being subject to the alien control of
others . . . to represent the idea of domination”).
545. Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95 Tex.
L. Rev. 993, 1003 (2017) (“The mere fact that the empowered party has the capacity for
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V. TOWARD A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR SEPARATING
PLATFORMS AND COMMERCE
The competition issues posed by dominant digital platforms have
emerged against a doctrinal and institutional backdrop that seems particu-
larly ill-equipped to handle them. The enfeebling of antitrust, coupled
with the shift away from direct regulation of network industries, has
permitted businesses that enjoy dominant positions as key infrastructure
to integrate in ways that threaten to undermine competition. Yet even
prominent proponents of deregulation have championed strong anti-
trust enforcement, including limits on vertical mergers.546
The debate around how to tackle the power of dominant tech
platforms is in its early stages. Recognizing that these entities play critical
gatekeeper roles can help illuminate legal regimes that have been used
to address analogous challenges in the past. While structural separations
were a mainstay in a previous era, their role in structuring open markets
has been largely abandoned.547
This Part examines whether integration by dominant platforms gives
rise to the sort of harm previously addressed through separations, offers
a rough sketch of what a separations framework for digital intermediaries
might look like, and identifies the likely challenges and unresolved
questions. Ultimately, any separations proposal will require a case-by-case
analysis of the relevant market that the platform dominates, the types of
network effects and entry barriers that suggest the platform’s market
power may be durable, and the potential costs of implementing a
separation. Several questions that this Part only briefly engages—such as
how to define what constitutes a platform, how to assess the contours of
the platform, and how to scope structural separations—invite deeper study.
arbitrary interference underscores the dependent party’s vulnerability, impressing upon
the dependent party’s mind the need to remain within the power holder’s good graces.”).
546. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 158 (1982) (“[T]he
antitrust laws rest upon the assumption that a workably competitive marketplace will
achieve a more efficient allocation of resources, greater efficiency in production, and
increased innovation . . . . Where this assumption holds true, antitrust would ordinarily seem
the appropriate form [of] government intervention.”); 2 Alfred E. Kahn, The Economics
of Regulation 115 (1971) (“The only government planning required is of the antitrust
kind—directed at preserving the competitive market mechanism—and related efforts to
make that mechanism work as well as possible.”); Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure,
supra note 249, at 557 (“Where predatory pricing might exist, it can be dealt with through
application of the antitrust laws.”); Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulation: Looking Backward and
Looking Forward, 7 Yale J. on Reg. 325, 348 (1990) (“[T]he government clearly has
neglected responsibilities of which it was never the intention of deregulation to relieve it.
These include . . . vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws . . . .”).
547. See supra section II.B.
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A. Substantive Case
1. Innovation Concerns. — Reports document that dominant digital
platforms are using their integrated structure to discriminate against
rivals and appropriate their competitively significant business infor-
mation.548 If this dynamic depresses the incentive to innovate—as studies
suggest it does549—then this cost of digital platform integration is worth
taking seriously. While standard economic theory states that only under
certain exceptions will dominant platforms have the incentive and ability
to discriminate against complementors, digital markets characterized by
network externalities help create the conditions under which platforms
are likely to discriminate.550 Moreover, because dominant digital platforms
passively capture highly precise and nuanced data on their business
customers—information that is more valuable by virtue of being more
sophisticated551—both the risk and cost of information appropriation is
heightened in digital markets.
Concerns about information exploitation are not new. In 1971,
when the FCC was considering whether its “maximum separation”
regime should prohibit involvement by carriers in data processing
entirely (or should require instead that their data-processing services be
run as an independent affiliate),552 it noted that an integrated carrier
could potentially misappropriate information against processor rivals.553
Data processors worried that integrated carriers would be able to collect
their sensitive business information to exploit against them as rivals in
data processing. The FCC concluded that this risk of misappropriation
was low.554 Its final decision stated that that the majority of independent
data processors would likely use the Bell System for communication
services,555 and since Bell was forbidden from operating in unregulated
markets (including data processing) altogether, there would be no risk of
misappropriation of information by a rival.556 Still, the FCC recognized
the potential threat and noted it would “consider any attempt on the
part of a carrier to secure and use such information for the benefit of its
548. See supra sections I.A–.D.
549. See, e.g., Zhu, supra note 204, at 24–26.
550. See infra Appendix.
551. See supra sections I.A–.D.
552. See Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 269–70, paras. 10–11 (1971) (final decision and
order).
553. See id. at 281–82, para. 39. The Commission’s final decision stated, “[T]he fear is
expressed that provision to the carrier of detailed information regarding a competitive
offering is, in essence, provision of such information to the carrier’s data affiliate.” Id.
554. Id.
555. See id. (“[T]he majority of such non-affiliated firms will doubtless turn to companies
of the Bell System for communication services and facilities since the latter provide the
greater share of such services.”).
556. Id.
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data processing affiliate as a serious breach of the policy established
herein.”557
2. Broader Concerns. — As reviewed in Part IV, separations have been
motivated by a host of functional goals, some of which fit squarely within
a welfarist frame, while others appeal to a set of institutional and demo-
cratic values. Recalling these broader concerns that animated laws and
regulations effecting separations helps bring into focus the range of
factors at stake when dealing with a dominant intermediary. Below I
briefly review how these functional goals do or do not resonate in the
context of digital platforms.
a. Extending Dominance Through Cross-Financing. — As described
above, structural separations imposed on banks and telecommunications
carriers were partly motivated by a desire to prevent cross-financing.
Lawmakers and regulators worried that firms whose dominance stemmed
from government-granted privileges would use that cushion to advantage
new lines of business.558 In particular, they worried that companies would
use their regulated monopoly businesses to finance their unregulated
businesses, thus gaining a competitive edge over rivals.559
One way in which this could occur is if a firm shifted the costs of
supplying the unregulated market to the regulated sector. The regulator—
hypothetically unable to detect that the higher costs should be attributed
to a distinct market—would then raise the revenue requirement that
ratepayers of the regulated product would have to cover.560 Effectively
forcing consumers of the firm’s regulated service to finance its entry into
the unregulated market would, in turn, undermine competition by discour-
aging potential rivals from entering the unregulated market.561
Because digital platforms are unregulated, they cannot use regulated
rates to finance new ventures. To the degree that it is the regulated nature
of the subsidizing rates—namely, the fact that these rates are set by the
government in a market where customers lack real choice—then digital
platforms do not raise analogous concerns. If, instead, the concern is
responding to dominant firms using supracompetitive profits to finance
entry in an array of other markets, then the platform fact pattern
becomes relevant.562
557. Id. at 282, para. 39.
558. See supra section IV.B.
559. See supra notes 484–493 and accompanying text.
560. Timothy J. Brennan, Cross-Subsidization and Cost Misallocation by Regulated
Monopolists, 2 J. Reg. Econ. 37, 37 (1990).
561. See id. (“[T]he ability to set marginal costs low through cross-subsidization can
discourage potential entrants from entering a market, even if the pre-entry price is above
their average cost . . . .”).
562. Antitrust experts previously have cited cross-financing as enabling predatory
conduct. See Remedies Brief of Amici Curiae Robert E. Litan et al. at 54, United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232), https://www.brookings.edu/
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Since dominant platforms report earnings and revenue at a highly
generalized level, without breaking revenues and profits down to specific
lines of business, we can mostly only speculate about the degree to which
these firms are cross-financing. For example, Google’s operating margins
over the last decade have hovered between 22% and 35%,563 margins that
would qualify as supracompetitive and that derive from a market that
Google dominates. Since 2004, Alphabet has purchased close to 200
companies.564 Several of these acquisitions strengthened Google’s position
in digital advertising, its core market.565 But many of its purchases have
established its position in new markets; indeed, Alphabet has built its
strength outside of advertising almost entirely through acquisitions.566
wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20000428.pdf [https://perma.cc/PMY6-XSVW] (“Microsoft’s
deep pockets have financed its predatory actions. In whatever structure the Court finally
decides, therefore, care should be taken to ensure that the vast cash resources of the
company are not lodged in an entity that can use them for anticompetitive
purposes . . . .”).
563. Alphabet Inc (NAS:GOOG) Operating Margin %, Guru Focus,
https://www.gurufocus.com/term/operatingmargin/GOOG/Operating%252BMargin/Al
phabet%2BInc [https://perma.cc/M9TK-JKR8] (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).
564. Vicky Huang, Google Has Acquired 200 Companies Since 2001—Here Are Its
Biggest Failures, Street ( Jan. 14, 2017), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13952508/1/
google-s-moonshots-make-crash-landing.html [https://perma.cc/7TVB-7XGD]; see also Josh
Lipton, Google’s Best and Worst Acquisitions, CNBC (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.cnbc.com/
2014/08/19/googles-best-and-worst-acquisitions.html [https://perma.cc/284M-ZE3M].
565. In the second quarter of 2017, 86% of Alphabet’s total revenue came from
advertising alone. Matthew Reynolds, If You Can’t Build It, Buy It: Google’s Biggest
Acquisitions Mapped, Wired (Nov. 25, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/google-
acquisitions-data-visualisation-infoporn-waze-youtube-android [https://perma.cc/U8ZW-
LVBF]. Acquisitions that boosted its ad business include YouTube ($1.65 billion in 2006)
and DoubleClick ($3.1 billion in 2007). Id.
566. For example, its 2005 purchase of Android (for an undisclosed but reported
price of $50 million) launched the company into the market for wireless device
operating systems. It was described as the “best deal ever” by an Alphabet executive.
Owen Thomas, Google Exec: Android Was “Best Deal Ever,” VentureBeat (Oct. 27, 2010),
https://venturebeat.com/2010/10/27/google-exec-android-was-best-deal-ever/ [https://
perma.cc/K5VM-5M62]. The Android acquisition set up Google to enter the market for
mobile ads, which generated over $49 billion in annual revenue for the company in 2017.
Rani Molla, Google Leads the World in Digital and Mobile Ad Revenue, Recode (July 24,
2017), https://www.recode.net/2017/7/24/16020330/google-digital-mobile-ad-revenue-world-
leader-facebook-growth [https://perma.cc/9MHL-4ATB]. Today, Android captures
around 88% of the global smartphone market. Ananya Bhattacharya, Android Just Hit a
Record 88% Market Share of All Smartphones, Quartz (Nov. 3, 2016), https://qz.com/
826672/android-goog-just-hit-a-record-88-market-share-of-all-smartphones/ [https://perma.cc/
2ML2-4NCQ]. Embedding sensors in Android products, in turn, has let Alphabet collect
enormous amounts of location data, which it feeds back into its advertising business and
into its maps business (both Google Maps and Waze). See Keith Collins, Google Collects
Android Users’ Locations Even When Location Services Are Disabled, Quartz (Nov. 21,
2017), https://qz.com/1131515/google-collects-android-users-locations-even-when-location-
services-are-disabled/ [https://perma.cc/UEW2-78AE] (noting that Google “allow[s]
advertisers to target consumers using location data”); Tim Stenovec, Google Has Gotten
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Google established its home-automation business,567 for example,
primarily through buy-ups.568 Most recently, the race for capturing the AI
market is spurring a new flurry of acquisitions.569 Its pattern of acquisi-
tions suggests that the company “will continue to push into entirely new
areas, from genomics and healthcare to autonomous transport.”570
A dominant digital platform that uses its supracompetitive profits to
buy its way into other markets can raise entry barriers in two ways. First,
the platform can bundle its various services, such that any new firm
seeking to compete in any one line of business may be unable to enter
unless it could enter in multiple lines.571 Second, entering multiple
markets positions a digital platform to combine multiple sources of data,
potentially enabling a “super-platform” to control “key portals of data,
which helps it attain or maintain its power across many products.”572
Amazon’s growing suite of acquisitions—which have picked up since
Amazon Web Services (AWS) started reporting enormous profits573—has
Incredibly Good at Predicting Traffic—Here’s How, Bus. Insider (Dec. 18, 2015),
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-google-maps-knows-about-traffic-2015-11 [https://
perma.cc/2BKF-8N93] (“Hundreds of millions of people around the world give Google
real-time data that it uses to analyze traffic and road conditions.”). In other words,
Alphabet acquired its way into the mobile OS market, which in turn has boosted its ad and
maps businesses.
567. Dan O’Shea, Google Gunning for Amazon’s Smart Speaker Market, Retail Dive
(Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.retaildive.com/news/google-gunning-for-amazons-smart-speaker-
market/515739/ [https://perma.cc/5ANB-QL3G]. Google currently captures around
40% of the market. Id.
568. See Alistair Barr, Google’s Nest Buys Smart Home Startup Revolv, Wall. St. J. (Oct.
24, 2014), https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/10/24/googles-nest-buys-smart-home-startup-
revolv/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that Google’s purchases include
Nest Labs ($3.2 billion), Dropcam ($555 million), and Revolv (undisclosed)).
569. See Jacques Bughin et al., McKinsey Glob. Inst., Artificial Intelligence: The Next
Digital Frontier? 6 (2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/
Advanced%20Electronics/Our%20Insights/How%20artificial%20intelligence%20can%20del
iver%20real%20value%20to%20companies/MGI-Artificial-Intelligence-Discussion-paper.ashx
[https://perma.cc/J98W-KCZC] (“Companies at the digital frontier—online firms and
digital natives such as Google and Baidu—are betting vast amounts of money on AI. We
estimate between $20 billion and $30 billion in 2016, including significant M&A activity.”).
“Artificial intelligence is poised to unleash the next wave of digital disruption” and could
be a $126 billion business by 2025. Id. at 4, 6.
570. Reynolds, supra note 565 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Suranga
Chandratillake, general partner at Balderton Capital, a London-based venture capital
firm); see also Rani Molla, Google Parent Company Alphabet Has Made the Most AI
Acquisitions, Recode (May 19, 2017), https://www.recode.net/2017/5/19/15657758/google-
artificial-intelligence-ai-investments [https://perma.cc/CR88-ABBD].
571. See Robert D. Buzzell, Is Vertical Integration Profitable?, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Jan. 1983),
https://hbr.org/1983/01/is-vertical-integration-profitable [https://perma.cc/L4RU-YYB3]
(“The more vertically integrated a business, the greater the financial and managerial
resources required to enter and compete in [that market]”).
572. Stucke & Grunes, supra note 26, at 137.
573. While the company traditionally operated on losses or razor-thin margins, it
now reports consistent profits—in large part due to AWS. See Stephanie Condon, In
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also led analysts to speculate that Amazon uses AWS profits to finance
entry into new markets.574
The desire to prevent companies from extending their existing
dominance into new lines of business motivated policymakers to impose
structural limits on firms with government-granted advantages.575 Unlike
in the case of telephone carriers, the additional costs of these new
ventures are not raising government-set rates that the public must pay.576
But if durable and persistent dominance is enabling a platform to earn
supracompetitive profits that it can sink into any new market it chooses
to enter, the dynamic may raise analogous concerns, especially given that
dominant platforms’ serial acquisitions—431 over the last decade577—
appear to have helped them maintain and extend their dominance.578
Placing structural limits to address this concern would require sepa-
rating the business earning supracompetitive profits from other busi-
nesses. This would not necessary fall along the line of separating
platforms from commerce. Although in other contexts the functional
goal of preventing protected profits from financing entry into new
markets aligned with the goal of preventing conflicts of interest, in this
context the two goals may yield different forms of breakup.
2018, AWS Delivered Most of Amazon’s Operating Income, ZDNet (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/in-2018-aws-delivered-most-of-amazons-operating-income/
[https://perma.cc/W973-6JCZ]. Called the “cash cow” of Amazon, AWS enjoys 35% of the
cloud computing market, more than its next three competitors combined. Ron Miller,
AWS Continues to Rule the Cloud Infrastructure Market, TechCrunch (Oct. 30, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/10/30/aws-continues-to-rule-the-cloud-infrastructure-market/
[https://perma.cc/MHT2-ZJ5G].
574. Amazon has also made a suite of acquisitions to establish its position in new or
early-stage lines of business. Since 1995, it has made around 130 acquisitions or
investments. Zoe Henry, Amazon Has Acquired or Invested in More Companies Than You
Think—At Least 128 of Them, Inc. (May 2017), https://www.inc.com/magazine/201705/
zoe-henry/will-amazon-buy-you.html [https://perma.cc/9KC6-BL35]. Its largest purchases
include Audible (audiobooks, $300 million), Zappos (shoes, $1.2 billion), Kiva Systems
(robotics, $775 million), Annapurna Labs (semiconductor chip designer, $370 million),
Twitch Interactive (video game livestreaming, $970 million), and Whole Foods (grocery,
$13.7 billion). Jeff Desjardins, Infographic: Amazon’s Biggest Acquisitions, Bus. Insider
(Sept. 12, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-stock-price-biggest-acquisitions-
infographic-2017-9 [https://perma.cc/EP9N-AAD4]; Sally French, All the Companies
in Jeff Bezos’ Empire, in One (Large) Chart, MarketWatch (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/its-not-just-amazon-and-whole-foods-heres-jeff-bezos-
enormous-empire-in-one-chart-2017-06-21 [https://perma.cc/EM5T-U8JT].
575. See supra section IV.B.
576. See Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation, supra note 350, at 59–60 (describing government-
set rates in the telephone industry as a response to concerns about monopolies).
577. David McLaughlin, Did Big Tech Get Too Big? More of the World Is Asking,
Bloomberg (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-22/did-
big-tech-get-too-big-more-of-the-world-is-asking-quicktake (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (“Data compiled by Bloomberg show the big five—Alphabet, Amazon, Apple,
Facebook and Microsoft—have made 431 acquisitions worth $155.7 billion over the last
decade.”).
578. See supra Part I.
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b. Media Diversity. — As in the past, integration by dominant
platforms today could undermine the richness and diversity of outlets
providing media and news. At first blush, this may seem counterintuitive,
given how much easier and cheaper the digital age has made it to
disseminate information. But the proliferation of information in the
digital age—the age of information overload—means that the firms
organizing and delivering desired and valued information gain in
importance. The dominant platforms have emerged as powerful gate-
keepers and network distributors in part because they serve as digital
portals, and “choosing and switching among different portals entails
cognitive costs.”579 This stickiness helps explain why a portal that achieves
early dominance can prove so challenging to dislodge.
Critics have argued that Amazon’s outsized power to cut off
publishers and authors from the online marketplace threatens First
Amendment values.580 Google and Facebook’s role as dominant portals of
news and media, meanwhile, may undermine the health and diversity of
the media ecosystem. For one, the need to be visible in search rankings
and the News Feed incentivizes publishers to invest in content that the
platforms’ algorithms favor. Facebook’s emphasis on video content, for
example, spurred publishers to fire hundreds of journalists in favor of
video producers—only to learn that Facebook had inflated its video
numbers.581 A market structure in which two companies set the metrics
determining whether internet content gets seen is not a system that
promotes diversity. In recent years, questions about news bias by
Facebook and the black-box nature of Google search rankings have
prompted a larger discussion about whether permitting two firms to
579. John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 72 Vand. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2019) [hereinafter Newman, Digital Markets] (manuscript at 10) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
580. See Letter from Authors United to William J. Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice, http://www.authorsunited.net/july/longdocument.html
[https://perma.cc/76GZ-38KW] (last visited Oct. 21, 2018) (“Amazon’s aggressive and
retaliatory behavior has engendered fear and stifled expression throughout the book
industry. As we can attest from our own experience at Authors United, such fear runs deep
among authors, editors, and literary agents.”).
581. Alexis C. Madrigal & Robinson Meyer, How Facebook’s Chaotic Push into Video
Cost Hundreds of Journalists Their Jobs, Atlantic (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2018/10/facebook-driven-video-push-may-have-cost-483-journalists-
their-jobs/573403/ [https://perma.cc/R68G-YT39] (“As media companies desperately
tried to do what Facebook wanted, many made the disastrous decision to ‘pivot to video,’
laying off reporters and editors by the dozen.”); see also Nicholas Thompson & Fred
Vogelstein, Inside the Two Years that Shook Facebook—and the World (Feb. 12,
2018), https://www.wired.com/story/inside-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-2-years-of-hell/
[https://perma.cc/5E45-DTRB] (“Every publisher knows that, at best, they are share-
croppers on Facebook’s massive industrial farm.”).
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capture control over digital information mediation undermines the
integrity of our news ecosystems.582
This algorithm-chasing dynamic is primarily a feature of Google and
Facebook’s horizontal dominance. But Facebook and Google also
vertically compete with the news publishers that depend on their
platforms for greater exposure to readers.583 This dual role they play—as
a competitor in the sale of digital ads and as an intermediary in the
distribution of information—diverts advertising revenue from publishers
to the dominant platforms, helping them maintain their duopoly in the
digital advertising market.584 The news industry, meanwhile, is on life
support: Hundreds of local and regional newspapers have been rolled up
or shuttered, such that two thirds of counties in America now have no
daily newspaper and 1,300 communities have lost all local coverage.585
Even outlets native to the web, like Buzzfeed and the Huffington Post,
are laying off reporters.586
Insofar as this dual role played by Facebook and Google deprives
publishers of digital advertising revenue, structurally separating the
communications networks these firms operate from their ad businesses
could potentially be justified on the basis of protecting the news media.
Rather than separating platforms from commerce, such a separation
would target a particular business model in order to promote media
diversity and protect journalism.587 Careful analysis would be needed to
determine precisely what kinds of limits on behavioral-ad based business
models might be justified.
582. See Foer, supra note 4, at 123–27 (arguing that Google, Facebook, and Amazon
are “indifferent to democracy” and yet “have acquired an outside role in it”); Frank
Pasquale, The Black Box Society 71 (2015) (describing how the vast array of content
provided by Facebook’s “News Feed” may favor the interests of advertisers and Facebook
itself over the news-consuming public).
583. See supra section I.C; see also Elisa Shearer & Jeffrey Gottfried, News Use Across
Social Media Platforms 2017, Pew Research Ctr. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.journalism.org/
2017/09/07/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2017/ [https://perma.cc/3NBG-VXV9]
(finding that 45% of U.S. adults get news through Facebook).
584. See supra sections I.B–.C.
585. Riley Griffin, Local News Is Dying, and It’s Taking Small Town America With It,
Bloomberg (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-05/local-
news-is-dying-and-it-s-taking-small-town-america-with-it (on file with the Columbia Law Review);
Tom Stites, About 1,300 U.S. Communities Have Totally Lost News Coverage, UNC News
Desert Study Finds, Poynter (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.poynter.org/business-work/2018/
about-1300-u-s-communities-have-totally-lost-news-coverage-unc-news-desert-study-finds/
[https://perma.cc/Z87F-E999].
586. Oliver Darcy & Tom Kludt, Media Industry Loses About 1,000 Jobs as Layoffs Hit
News Organizations, CNN (Jan. 24, 2019), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/24/media/
media-layoffs-buzzfeed-huffpost-gannett/index.html [https://perma.cc/D2MU-NVDD].
587. Responding to the rise of the new information monopolies, Professor Tim Wu
has argued in favor of applying a separations regime in information industries, specifically
an approach that would create “a salutary distance between each of the major functions or
layers in the information economy.” Tim Wu, The Master Switch 304 (2010).
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c. System Resiliency. — As a growing share of online commerce and
communications rely on dominant online platforms, the resiliency of
platform infrastructure becomes paramount. Yet concentrating activity
can also concentrate risk, creating the possibility that a single system
crash could have cascading effects.588
For example, AWS leads the cloud computing market, capturing a
greater share than its next three competitors combined.589 This level of
concentration has at least two potential risks. One is general fragility. For
example, a single outage at AWS a few years ago led Netflix, Reddit,
Business Insider, and several other major websites to crash for five
hours.590 The second risk is the security vulnerabilities created by mono-
culture. Homogeneity can render a system more susceptible to malware
or hacks, a risk recognized in the context of computer systems.591 As
more businesses come to use AWS as default computing power (the
company counts among its clients the CIA592), the potential systemic
588. For in-depth analysis of how excessive concentration can heighten system fragility,
see generally Barry C. Lynn, End of the Line: The Rise and Coming Fall of the Global
Corporation 11 (2005) (arguing that an essential network platform “can be viewed as
common property that belongs to all of the companies that rely on it” and therefore, “no
one, quite naturally, is responsible for ensuring that the system is safe”); Barry C. Lynn,
Built To Break, Challenge, Mar.–Apr. 2012, at 87, 94–95 (describing a shutdown in
Japanese automobile manufacturing following a 2007 earthquake, which disrupted
operations at an industrial firm that produced an automobile part used by all Japanese
automakers, and using this example to illustrate the problems that result when an entire
industry utilizes the same infrastructure); Yossi Sheffi & Barry C. Lynn, Systemic Supply
Chain Risk, Bridge, Fall 2014, at 22, 25–26 (noting how, given increasing reliance on “single
‘super’ suppliers” throughout the economy, “[a] strike, sabotage, financial problem, or cyber-
attack can shut down a supplier, . . . creating a systemic disruption”). For an argument for
why antitrust analysis generally and merger enforcement specifically should take fragility
and resiliency concerns into account, see Peter C. Carstensen & Robert H. Lande, The
Merger Incipiency Doctrine and the Importance of “Redundant” Competitors, 2019 Wis.
L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 58–63) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
589. See Peter Cohan, 5 Ways That Amazon Keeps Its Lead in the $180B Cloud, Forbes
(Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2018/08/01/5-ways-that-amazon-
keeps-its-lead-in-the-180b-cloud/ [https://perma.cc/V6EW-DYZD].
590. Romellaine Arsenio, Amazon Web Services Suffers Crash, Takes Down Netflix,




591. The Computer & Communications Industry Association raised the issue of
monoculture during the U.S. antitrust proceedings against Microsoft. A report published
by the group in 2003 concluded, “The presence of this single, dominant operating system
in the hands of nearly all end users is inherently dangerous. . . . These competition related
security problems have been with us, and getting worse, for years.” Dan Geer et al.,
CyberInsecurity: The Cost of Monopoly 3–4 (2003), https://www.flyingpenguin.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/cyberinsecurity.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QBS-K9YW].
592. Kevin McLaughlin, Amazon Wins $600 Million CIA Cloud Deal as IBM Withdraws
Protest, CRN (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.crn.com/news/cloud/240163382/amazon-wins-
600-million-cia-cloud-deal-as-ibm-withdraws-protest.htm [https://perma.cc/NQE8-7HG3].
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ramifications are not trivial. Indeed, the prospect of Amazon winning a
single-source contract for the Pentagon has prompted concerns that
awarding the business to a single provider could increase cybersecurity
risks.593 Analogous concerns raised by Google’s dominance have prompt-
ed policy officials to debate whether the company should be designated
as “critical infrastructure.”594
Notably, these resiliency concerns are primarily responding to
concentration, not integration. A vertical separation would not address
the underlying issue, unless exiting an adjacent market would reduce
exposure to risk.
B. Institutional Shortcomings
Over the last decade, antitrust agencies have primarily responded to
anticompetitive vertical acquisitions through behavioral remedies.595
Behavioral remedies include, for example, transparency provisions,
information firewalls, and nondiscrimination provisions, as well as limits
on certain contracting practices.596 Unlike structural remedies, behav-
ioral remedies seek to change the firm’s conduct, while leaving the
underlying incentives untouched.597 In effect these remedies constitute
“attempts to require” a merged firm to “operate in a manner incon-
sistent with its own profit-maximizing incentives”—an effort that proves
both “paradoxical” and “likely difficult to achieve.”598
Behavioral remedies carry at least four substantial costs.599 First,
there are the direct costs of monitoring the merged firm’s activity to
ensure compliance with the decree. Second, there are costs of evasion
593. Ali Breland, Amazon’s Attempt to Land Major Pentagon Job Stokes Antitrust
Fears, Hill (Mar. 11, 2018), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/377649-amazons-
attempt-to-land-major-pentagon-job-stokes-antitrust-fears [https://perma.cc/LMY8-DQ67]
(“A single-source provider for Pentagon cloud services is obviously reckless. The Pentagon
should clearly have multiple cloud providers so that if something happens to one of them
there is resiliency and redundancy.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Matt
Stoller, fellow at the Open Markets Institute)).
594. See, e.g., Eric Engleman, Google Exception in Obama’s Cyber Order Questioned
as Unwise Gap, Bloomberg (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-
05/google-exception-in-obama-s-cyber-order-questioned-as-unwise-gap (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing how an executive order issued by President Obama may
have exempted Google’s Gmail service from being designated as “critical infrastructure”).
595. Bureaus of Competition and Econ., FTC, The FTC’s Merger Remedies 2006-2012,
at 13 (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/ftcs-merger-remedies-
2006-2012-report-bureaus-competition-economics/p143100_ftc_merger_remedies_2006-
2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA6B-WFHN] (capturing that 100% of vertical mergers in which
the Commission ordered a remedy, the remedy was non-structural).
596. Kwoka & Moss, supra note 27, at 982–83.
597. Id. at 982.
598. Id.
599. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies 8–9
(2004), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2011/06/16/205108.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YC9N-KYRY].
2019] SEPARATION OF PLATFORMS AND COMMERCE 1075
associated with the merged firm sidestepping the spirit of the decree.600
Third, there are costs of restraining potentially procompetitive behavior.601
And fourth, a behavioral remedy may hamper the firm’s ability to adapt
effectively to changing market conditions.602 Stating that “a structural
remedy can in principle avoid” these costs, the Justice Department has
historically “strongly preferred” structural merger remedies to behavioral
ones.603
The challenges of enforcing a behavioral remedy are likely
heightened in digital markets, where the information asymmetry be-
tween the integrated firm and public enforcers is even starker. This is
especially true with regard to information firewalls, which—in theory—
could help prevent information appropriation by dominant integrated
firms.604 In practice, seeking to regulate the dissemination of information
within a firm is difficult in any market—let alone in multibillion dollar
markets built around the intricate collection, combination, and sale of
data.605 The significant business insights, market intelligence, and compet-
itive advantage derived from gathering and analyzing data suggest that
firms will have an even greater incentive to combine different sets of
information—meaning that any regulatory attempts to limit that sharing
or dissemination is more likely to fail. The fact that these regulatory
remedies are imposed by antitrust enforcers, who generally lack regula-
tory tools and resources,606 makes successful oversight and compliance
even more doubtful.
The Justice Department’s remedies in the Google–ITA merger
illustrate one instance of imposing an information firewall in a digital
market. ITA developed and licensed a software product known as “QPX,”
a “mini-search engine” that airlines and online travel agents used to
600. For example, if a remedy required a firm not to raise prices, it could go on to
reduce its costs by cutting quality—“thereby effecting an anticompetitive increase in the
‘quality adjusted’ price.” Id. at 8.
601. Id.
602. Id. at 8–9.
603. Id.
604. See supra sections I.A–.C.
605. See The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, Economist
(May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-
resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“This abundance
of data changes the nature of competition. . . . By collecting more data, a firm has more
scope to improve its products, which attracts more users, generating even more data, and
so on.”); see also Dan Gallagher, Data Really Is the New Oil, Wall St. J. (Mar. 9, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/data-really-is-the-new-oil-11552136401 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (“Moving ones and zeroes around the Internet is getting to be more
expensive than keeping the oil flowing.”).
606. See, e.g., Delrahim, supra note 27 (“[A]ntitrust is law enforcement, it’s not
regulation.”).
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provide users with customized flight search functionality.607 Because the
merger would put Google in the position of supplying QPX to its rival
travel-search websites, the Justice Department required as a condition of
the merger that Google establish internal firewalls to avoid misappropriation
of rivals’ information.608 Although one commentator highlighted the
risks and inherent difficulties associated with designing a comprehensive
behavioral remedy, the court approved the order.609
Whether the information firewall was successful in preventing Google
from accessing rivals’ business information is not publicly known. A year
after the remedy expired, Google shut down its QPX API.610
The challenges of enforcing behavioral remedies—both generally
and in digital markets specifically—highlight the importance of assessing
the relative enforcement costs of alternate remedies. A focus on enforce-
ment costs—which include administrative costs, monitoring costs, and
the misallocation of resources resulting from rent-seeking activity611—can
help identify instances when the purported welfare benefits of a conduct
remedy may not be worth the steep enforcement costs. Another factor to
consider is the prospect that rejecting a structural remedy earlier could
result in more regulation later. This prospect is especially likely in
monopolistic markets, where the failure to build an “effective institu-
tional firewall between the regulated monopoly and the other segments
of a vertical chain” could mean that “as the number of competitive
interfaces between regulated monopoly and competitive segments
expands, the regulation of these competitive interfaces will expand as
well.”612 In other words, cabining the monopoly can cabin regulation.
Lastly, it is worth considering whether increases in information
asymmetries between companies and enforcers should weigh in favor of
greater reliance on structural remedies. If enforcers have less ability to
discern a firm’s business activities—be it due to heightened opacity or
complexity—then targeting the firm’s incentives, rather than attempting
to police its behavior, may make more sense.
607. Competitive Impact Statement at 1–2, United States v. Google Inc., No. 1:11-CV-
00688 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2011).
608. Id. at 13–14. The Justice Department included as a condition of the merger that
Google not restrict, through exclusive dealing, its rivals’ access to the airlines’ seat and
booking-class data. Final Judgment at 27–28, Google Inc., No. 1:11-CV-00688.
609. See Eric K. Clemons & Nehal Madhani, The Real and Inevitable Harm from
Vertical Integration of Search Engine Providers into Sales and Distribution, Huffington
Post: The Blog (Apr. 20, 2011), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-department-of-
justice_b_851079 [https://perma.cc/9KC2-6E5A].
610. Ingrid Lunden, Google Will Pull Its QPX Express API in April 2018, Cutting Off Its
Airfare Feed, TechCrunch (Nov. 1, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/01/google-
will-pull-its-qpx-express-api-in-april-2018-cutting-off-its-flight-data-feed/ [https://perma.cc/
CRA5-PEZ3].
611. Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 18, at 19.
612. Joskow & Noll, supra note 462, at 1253.
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C. Theory
One condition that generally united previous separations is that they
were applied to bottleneck firms. This was true in both the regulated
industries and antitrust contexts.613 The regulated-industries paradigm
identified dominant intermediaries through functional criteria rather
than strict economic ones. Although most regulated industries exhibited
natural monopoly features, separations were often implemented not—as
natural monopoly regulation is sometimes described—to correct market
failure but instead to promote goals that privately regulated markets
could not deliver.614 Antitrust separations, meanwhile, sought to remedy
abuses of monopoly power.615 In either case, separations were responding
to the dominance of a gatekeeper entity.616 In regulated industries,
outsized market power was what rendered a firm’s business decisions
systemically significant, while in antitrust, a lack of competition meant a
lack of market discipline.
Assessing whether integration by dominant platforms might invite
structural separations requires evaluating (1) whether a digital platform
is dominant and serving as a gatekeeper intermediary, and (2) whether
that dominance is likely to be durable and persistent, in light of high
entry barriers. In other words, is it likely that, absent separations,
discrimination or appropriation by these firms will be disciplined by
competition? Critically, it is not discrimination or information appro-
priation per se that is harmful—but rather discrimination or information
appropriation by a network intermediary for which there are no
substitute channels to market.617 Insofar as a platform grants access to
613. See supra Part III.
614. As Professors Kearney and Merrill note, the application of regulated industries
law was guided less by the designation of national monopoly industries and more by a
belief that “government oversight of the market was required to ensure the accepted goals
of reasonableness, non-discrimination, and reliable service.” Kearney & Merrill, supra note
232, at 1334; see also Nachbar, supra note 240, at 102 (“[T]he correlation between market
power and the traditional imposition of nondiscriminatory access is tenuous at best.”).
615. When analyzing the effects of exclusionary conduct by a dominant firm, case law
assesses whether rivals have access to alternative channels to market. Compare, e.g.,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 70–71 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per
curiam) (holding that the dominant firm’s exclusionary conduct violated the antitrust laws
because its rivals lacked alternative distribution channels), and United States v. Dentsply
Int’l Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 196 (3d Cir. 2005) (same), with Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco,
Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the exclusive conduct at issue did
not violate the antitrust laws, in part because rivals had other efficient routes to market).
616. See supra Part III.
617. Given these factors, it is unlikely that a grocer selling private labels would give rise
to similar harms. There is also reason to think that discrimination and appropriation in
digital markets, by virtue of being more tailored and sophisticated, have a greater effect on
competition than discrimination and appropriation in nondigital markets.
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third-party products, “a bottleneck to everything can potentially take a
share of, and exercise some control over, everything.”618
For many years, an underlying assumption regarding digital markets
has been that they are characterized by “uniquely low” entry barriers.619
Unlike industries involved in the production and distribution of physical
goods, digital markets have been understood to involve relatively low
capital investment and rapid rates of innovation.620 Market power enjoyed
by digital firms is assumed to be fleeting, constantly susceptible to the
dizzying pace of technological change.621 This general view of digital
markets—as exceptionally dynamic and self-correcting—has produced a
highly permissive approach to regulation and antitrust enforcement in
these markets.622
618. Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the
Internet, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1663, 1676 (2013); see also Posner, New Economy, supra note
349, at 934 (“We may be in a similar stage in the development of the new economy, where
distribution facilities may be sufficiently limited to create bottlenecks that monopolists can
exploit to perpetuate monopoly.”).
619. Newman, Digital Markets, supra note 579, at 14 & nn.86–88 (emphasis added)
(collecting sources); see also, e.g., Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401,
416 (E.D. Pa. 2002), rev’d, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (“The Internet presents low entry barriers
to anyone who wishes to provide or distribute information.”); Shea ex rel. Am. Reporter v.
Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[T]he Internet presents extremely low entry
barriers to those who wish to convey Internet content or gain access to it.”); ACLU v. Reno,
929 F. Supp. 824, 877 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“[T]he Internet presents very low barriers to
entry.”); Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The
Case Against the Case Against Google, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 171, 195 (2011) (summarizing
Google’s assertion “that competition really is ‘just a click away’ for a significant number of
users” in the online search market); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace and State Sovereignty, 3
J. Int’l Legal Stud. 155, 161 (1997) (“[T]he most important differentiating characteristic
of the Internet is its extremely low barriers to entry.”); Posner, New Economy, supra note
349, at 930 (“Because of the extraordinary pace of innovation, . . . the extraordinary amount
of capital that is available . . . , and the rapidity with which new networks that are primarily
electronic can be put into service, the networks that have emerged in the new economy do
not seem particularly secure against competition.”); D. Daniel Sokol & Roisin Comerford,
Antitrust and Regulating Big Data, 23 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1129, 1136 (2016) (“Data driven
markets are typically characterized by low entry barriers. . . .”); Deborah T. Tate, Net
Neutrality 10 Years Later: A Still Unconvinced Commissioner, 66 Fed. Comm. L.J. 509, 518
(2014) (“The Internet’s low entry costs and lack of barriers to create, upload, start up, and
sell goods and services are especially beneficial to women and minorities with less access to
capital than established firms.”); Yana Welinder, A Face Tells More Than a Thousand Posts:
Developing Face Recognition Privacy in Social Networks, 26 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 165, 189 (2012)
(“[T]he Internet offers a platform for projects that require very little capital investment — thus
lowering the barriers to entry.”); Ilene Knable Gotts & Joseph G. Krauss, Antitrust Review of
New Economy Acquisitions, Antitrust, Fall 2000, at 59, 59 (arguing that few “‘new economy’
transactions” raised antitrust issues because of “the low entry barriers in the Internet space”).
620. Posner, New Economy, supra note 349, at 926.
621. See Newman, Digital Markets, supra note 579, at 19–21 (“[A]nti-enforcement
scholars and stakeholders contend that digital markets should evade antitrust scrutiny
because ‘competition is just a click away.’”).
622. As Professor John Newman writes, the last two decades have been characterized
by a “near-total lack of antitrust enforcement in digital markets.” Id. at 4. Notably, enforcers
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More recently, however, new research and experience has demon-
strated that digital markets can favor long-term dominance. This is due to
several features. One is network effects, whereby the value of the network
increases with greater use of that network.623 Bigger is generally better.
But the same demand-side economies of scale that help a network form
can also come to shield the network from competition, as a potential
competitor must induce a significant number of users to choose its
network over the existing good or service.624 In the absence of inter-
connection, the switching costs for users can be significant, making it
difficult for even a rival with a superior product or service to induce users
to switch.625 Not all network effects are the same, and not all network
effects serve as entry barriers. Indeed, the significance of the entry
barriers created by network effects will vary depending on the strength
and type of the network and on the availability of interconnection,
interoperability, multihoming, and other tools that could soften these
exclusionary effects.626
A second feature that can favor platform dominance is heightened
returns to scale. The cost structure of many digital markets involves steep
up-front costs followed by low marginal costs.627 Firms in the business of
providing information see their marginal cost plummet, as infor-
mation—once produced—can be disseminated online to large groups at
negligible costs.628 Increasing returns to scale can also discourage entry,
as only a firm with either a far superior or far cheaper product would
enter the market.629
and scholars have acknowledged that technology markets can be susceptible to entry
barriers and anticompetitive conduct. See id. at 24–37 (describing various types of “cog-
nizable welfare harm” that are “uniquely facilitated by digital markets”). But the assumption
that false positives are highly costly, while false negatives are rare, has tilted the balance in
favor of underenforcement. See id. at 56; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of
Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 2–4 (1984) (“If the court errs by condemning a beneficial
practice, the benefits may be lost for good. . . . If the court errs by permitting a deleterious
practice, though, the welfare loss decreases over time. Monopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly
prices eventually attract entry.”). It is also worth noting that dominant tech firms have
benefited not only from a laissez faire approach to actions that would limit their power or
autonomy, but also from other favorable government policies, including generous
intellectual property rights and historically low interest rates.
623. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 284, at 483.
624. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 479, 483 (1998) (“In other words, a network effect exists where
purchasers find a good more valuable as additional purchasers buy the same good.”).
625. See Frank Pasquale, When Antitrust Becomes Pro-Trust: The Digital Deformation
of U.S. Competition Policy, Antitrust Chron., May 2017, at 46, 48–49 (arguing that
assuming that the costs of switching between online platforms are low “belies the
complexity of online innovation”).
626. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 624, at 483–84.
627. Crémer et al., supra note 3, at 20.
628. Id.
629. Id.
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A third factor that can benefit dominant incumbents is the critical
and competitive significance of data.630 Services like Google Maps, for
example, have been built through collecting billions of user data inputs,
operating camera-fitted cars that collected more than 21.5 billion
megabytes of street-view images from around the world, and combining
multiple sources of place data across various Android devices.631 Theoret-
ically a new firm could attempt to build a rival service by relying on
public data, but the continued data inputs that Google Maps receives
after achieving initial success are likely to keep any potential competitor
a distant second.632 These self-reinforcing advantages of data can amplify
network effects, lead markets to tip, and close off entry.
Assessing whether a dominant platform should be subject to sepa-
rations would require analyzing these factors and the degree to which
they serve as high entry barriers or render merchants or trading partners
“unavoidable.”633 Limiting digital dominant platforms whose services
constitute a “unique infrastructural asset” from entering adjacent markets
and competing with dependent trading partners could avoid distortions
of the competitive process and generate a host of other payoffs.634
D. Application: Challenges and Unresolved Questions
Implementing a separations regime presents some first-order questions
and challenges. First, how do we define platforms and to which platforms
should a separation apply? Second, how does one identify the parameters
of the platform, especially when integration provides heightened function-
ality? Third, what should be the scope of the prohibited activity and how
should the prohibition be structured? And fourth, what is the proper
institutional mechanism for implementing the separation? This section
offers some initial suggestions for how to approach these questions.
Arriving at a complete analytical framework for structuring separations in
digital markets will require deeper engagement with these issues.
1. Defining Platform. — Offering a clearly bounded definition of
“platform” is challenging. Most definitions look to the role that the entity
plays in intermediating activity by others. One definition, for example, is
“a firm that controls a network, facility, or essential input that those
630. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
631. Newman, Digital Markets, supra note 579, at 15.
632. See, e.g., The Manifest, Apple Maps vs. Google Maps: Which Is Better?, Medium
(Sept. 12, 2018), https://medium.com/@the_manifest/apple-maps-vs-google-maps-which-
is-better-9ceaf28f9bf0 [https://perma.cc/H28R-WHCV] (noting that Google Maps remains
preferred to Apple Maps by a “clear majority of smartphone owners,” even though Apple
has made significant improvements to its Maps application).
633. See Case T 286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2014:547 para. 91
(E.C.J. June 12, 2014) (discussing “unavoidable trading partner”).
634. For one theory of what constitutes “infrastructure,” see Frischmann & Waller, supra
note 295, at 11–12.
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providing a complementary good or service” must “rely on.”635 Another
set of definitions focuses on the infrastructure-like role that these firms
play, by structuring access to markets or facilitating transactions.636 And
some discussions use the terms “network,” “infrastructure,” and “platform”
interchangeably.637
Recent studies by policymakers have also settled on the idea that
dominant platforms play a unique role that regulators should recognize.
In March, the Digital Competition Expert Panel—a panel convened by
the U.K. government to study digital markets—issued a report proposing,
among other ideas, that dominant platforms that enjoy a “powerful
negotiating position” be designated as having a “strategic market status”
and be required to abide by a special code of conduct.638 A report
commissioned by the European Commission, meanwhile, noted that, by
designing marketplace rules that govern millions of users, dominant
platforms “function as regulators” that should face a special respon-
sibility to “ensure a level playing field” on their marketplace and “not use
[their] rule-setting power to determine the outcome of competition.”639
Given the challenge of offering a bounded definition of “dominant
platform,” any definition will likely be under- or over-inclusive. But any
definition should seek to capture the degree of market power that the
platform enjoys over users.640 How essential is the platform’s infra-
structure? To what degree do other businesses depend on the platform to
reach users, and what is the cost to businesses of avoiding this platform
and using alternative channels? Relevant factors could include: (1) the
extent to which the entity serves as a central exchange or marketplace for
the transaction of goods and services, including the level of market
power that it enjoys in its platform market; (2) the extent to which the
entity is essential for downstream productive uses, and whether down-
stream users have access to viable substitutes for the entity’s services;
635. Weiser, supra note 17, at 271.
636. See Khan, Antitrust Paradox, supra note 255, at 795 (“Amazon itself effectively
controls the infrastructure of the internet economy.”); Rahman, New Utilities, supra note
26, at 1641 (“Firms like [too-big-to-fail] finance, Verizon, Google, or Amazon provide
essential public goods, not in the economistic sense of being non-rival and non-excludable,
but in a broader social sense of comprising the basic infrastructure of modern society.”).
637. As Professor Julie Cohen has noted, platforms are slightly different from infra-
structures and networks; they take advantage of network effects and provide infrastructures
but also “represent strategies for bounding networks and privatizing and controlling infra-
structures.” Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. Davis. L. Rev. 133, 144
(2017); see also Frischmann, supra note 226, at 319–23 (describing a five-layer model of
internet infrastructure).
638. Digital Competition Expert Panel, supra note 31, at 59–61.
639. Crémer et al., supra note 3, at 6.
640. It’s worth noting that “platforms” can be further distinguished by type. Nick
Srnicek, for example, identifies five distinct types of platforms: advertising platforms
(Google, Facebook); cloud platforms (AWS, Salesforce); industrial platforms (General
Electric, Siemens); product platforms (Spotify); and lean platforms (Uber, Airbnb). Nick
Srnicek, Platform Capitalism 49 (2016).
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(3) the extent to which the entity derives value from network effects, and
the type of network effects at play; (4) the extent to which the entity
serves as infrastructure for customizable applications by independent
parties; and (5) the size, scope, scale, and interconnection of the company.
There are no neatly bounded ways to capture these dimensions of
platform power. When implementing “maximum separation,” the FCC
initially used operating revenue as the criterion for determining which
carriers must comply.641 In the context of digital platforms, market share
may prove a better proxy than operating revenues, given that it is the
platform’s role as a gatekeeper or bottleneck—for which there are no
real adequate substitutes—that gives rise to the relevant harms.
The prohibition should be centered on the activities that the
platform facilitates as a bottleneck. Since a key goal of the separations
regime is to eliminate the conflict of interest that arises when a dominant
platform directly competes with the firms using the platform,642 only
activity that would place platforms in direct competition in this way
would be subject to the prohibition. This would not prevent platforms
from integrating into lines of business that do not rely on the platform
market. Nor would such a separations regime target conglomeration or
vertical integration categorically; it would instead focus on platform entry
into markets that creates the ability and incentive to discriminate, to
leverage dominance, and to use information collected on firms as
customers against them as competitors.
2. Distinguishing Between Platform and Commerce. — Applying
separations to digital platforms would likely raise the challenge of
identifying what constitute distinct products or services. In Microsoft, for
example, the court had to determine whether the operating system and
the browser—the two products the government claimed Microsoft had
“tied”—should be considered a single integrated system.643 Microsoft
argued that bundling new functionality into old products was a basic
component of technological evolution.644 A similar issue may arise with
digital platforms: Android, for example, could claim that certain apps
641. See Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 302–03, para. 36 (1970) (tentative decision). The
FCC determined that maximum separations applied only to carriers whose combined
annual operating revenue exceeded $1 million. Id. Its policy justification was to avoid
imposing burdens on smaller carriers, which it thought could spur competition in data
processing. See id. at 299, para. 25. It acknowledged arguments that small carriers could
also discriminate or abuse powers if permitted to enter data processing but concluded that
“both the potential and motives for abuse by these smaller carriers is minimal at this time.”
Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 275, para. 23 (1971) (final decision and order).
642. See section IV.A.
643. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84–89 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (per curiam) (“[U]nless products are separate, one cannot be ‘tied’ to the other.”).
644. See id. at 85 (“Microsoft does not dispute that it bound Windows and IE in the
four ways the District Court cited. Instead it argues that Windows (the tying good) and IE
browsers (the tied good) are not ‘separate products’ . . . .”).
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must be integrated with its operating system in order to provide basic
functionality or for technical necessity.
The traditional metric for assessing whether a set of bundled
products constitute separate products is consumer demand. In Microsoft,
the D.C. Circuit relied on Jefferson Parish’s consumer-demand test to
determine whether consumers preferred a choice in browsers.645 Applying a
similar inquiry in the platform context could similarly help identify
whether integration of distinct functionalities should be viewed as an
integrated system or as a platform.
Regulators would also have the capacity to determine, over time,
whether certain apps or features were necessary for basic functionality
and whether the benefits of integration were sufficiently high to offset
any potential harms to innovation. There may also be specific apps or
functionalities where innovation is less likely to be transformative, and
therefore where integration may prove fewer risks. As with earlier
regimes, periodic reassessment and revisions would prove necessary to
ensure the separation continued to accord with and reflect evolving
market realities.
3. Institutional Mechanism and Timing. — A separations regime
separating platforms and commerce could be implemented through
statute or rulemaking or as antitrust remedies (under existing or new
antitrust law). A statute from Congress could also establish the principle
of separating platforms from commerce—as was the case with banking—
with the specific authority to design and implement separations dele-
gated to an agency. This approach would benefit from having an expert
agency design and revisit the separation. Absent new legislation, the FTC
could use its Section 5 authority to implement a separations principle
through rulemaking.646 Designing separations only through rulemaking
645. Id. at 89; see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984)
(“[T]he essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller’s
exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a
tied product that the buyer either did not want . . . or might have preferred to purchase else-
where on different terms.”).
646. In National Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. Federal Trade Commission, the D.C. Circuit
held that the FTC has substantive rulemaking power under Section 5 for both “unfair
methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts and practices.” 482 F.2d 672, 674–
78 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Shortly after the decision, Congress passed the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, raising the procedural hurdles the FTC must jump when engaging in
“unfair or deceptive acts and practices” rulemaking. Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, sec. 202(a), § 18, 88 Stat. 2183,
2193–98 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2012)). While these hurdles
cause significant delay, they do not affect the FTC’s rulemaking under “unfair methods of
competition,” which is what the Commission could use to implement a separations regime.
For more on the FTC’s rulemaking authority, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, It’s Time to Remove
the “Mossified” Procedures for FTC Rulemaking, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev 1979, 1985–87
(2015) (describing past FTC rulemakings under various statutory regimes); Sandeep
Vaheesan, Resurrecting “A Comprehensive Charter of Economic Liberty”: The Latent
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would require the agency to create rules of general applicability and—
absent a specific congressional mandate—could limit the agency’s ability
to structure highly tailored separations. Antitrust remedies would be
costlier and take significantly longer, requiring the government or a
private party to successfully show anticompetitive conduct and effects
stemming from a digital platform’s involvement in multiple markets.
Given the enfeebling of antitrust doctrines that police single-firm anticom-
petitive conduct—and the judicial requirement that remedies be carefully
tailored to competitive harm—this path is likely to be significantly more
challenging.647
Previous instances of structural separations offer a few models for
structuring these prohibitions. An operational or functional separation
requires the firm to create separate divisions within the firm, requiring
that a platform wishing to engage in commerce may do so only through a
separate and independent affiliate, which the platform may not favor in
any manner. A full structural separation, by contrast, requires that the
platform activity and commercial activity be undertaken through separate
corporations with distinct ownership and management. For example, the
functional approach would permit Alphabet to operate Google search
and vertical services that produce content so long as the two comple-
mentary services are structured as separate affiliates. The second option
would prohibit Alphabet from running both the platform service and the
complementary service, requiring that one be spun off and run by an
independent owner.
It’s not clear that anything short of a full structural separation would
be sufficient, especially given the risks of information misappropriation.
While running complementary services as affiliates could be accom-
panied by information firewalls, the efficacy of firewalls requires close
monitoring.648 Evidence shows that the antitrust agencies have neglected
to fully monitor and enforce conduct remedies in the past.649 Moreover,
firewalls may prove especially difficult to monitor in the context of digital
platforms, given the heightened information asymmetries between pri-
vate platform firms and public enforcers. It is possible that the risk of
information misappropriation may vary by platform—but dominant
Power of the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 645, 651–57 (2017) (giving
the statutory and jurisprudential bases for the FTC’s authority to interpret Section 5).
647. Supra section II.B.
648. The Justice Department acknowledges this: “Effective monitoring also is required
to ensure that the firewall provision is adhered to and is effective.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies 14 (2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/atr/legacy/2011/06/17/272350.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XRE-4XFF].
649. Kwoka & Moss, supra note 27, at 989–96. Indeed, Assistant Attorney General for
the Antitrust Division Makan Delrahim recently admitted that the antitrust agencies “have
struggled more and more with the challenges of crafting and enforcing effective behav-
ioral relief” and find it “difficult to monitor and enforce granular commitments like non-
discrimination and information firewalls.” Delrahim, supra note 27.
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platforms should carry the burden of establishing why operating comple-
mentary services as affiliates would not be anticompetitive.
Finally, a basic challenge facing regulators and enforcers when
dealing with high-tech industries is the role of timing. Because these
markets can evolve quickly, market changes can render regulatory inter-
ventions obsolete.650 Similarly, the failure to intervene can leave exclu-
sionary conduct unchecked, resulting in path-dependent reductions in
innovation. Any subsequent attempt to impose separations should include
a built-in review process every two to three years, to ensure that the
remedy still matches the market conditions.651
E. Costs and Tradeoffs
Separations may come at a cost. Vertical relations can generate
certain efficiencies that structural limits forego. This section reviews
some of the potential costs and tradeoffs of a separations regime, and it
considers how separations might be structured to minimize potential harms
and maximize countervailing benefits.
First, insofar as integration can eliminate double markups, it is
possible that limiting a network monopolist’s ability to compete on its
own network would sacrifice certain cost savings, resulting in higher
prices.652 This loss in static efficiency should be weighed against the
innovation benefits that would likely result from creating an ecosystem in
which the platform lacks the incentive and ability to exclude or appro-
priate from third-party complementors.653
Second, separations could come at the expense of platform
innovation. Prohibiting dominant platforms from competing in markets
that the platform operates would reduce platform investment in certain
platform-adjacent markets.654 Insofar as directly competing with comple-
mentors can generate for a dominant platform additional profits,
650. Judge Posner described this tension as “the tension between law time and new-
economy real time.” Posner, New Economy, supra note 349, at 939.
651. As scholars have observed, agencies already engage in this sort of periodic
reassessment. See Wendy Wagner et al., Dynamic Rulemaking, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 183, 184–
90 (2017) (“In contrast to the prevailing view that agencies rarely revise rules, our findings
reveal that, at least in some quarters of the administrative state, revisions are the rule
rather than the exception.”).
652. See supra notes 269–271 and accompanying text (describing the Chicago School
theory of vertical integration and double marginalization).
653. See Caves & Singer, supra note 292, at 2, 6–11 (describing how platforms’
participation in the market can decrease “edge innovation”—“the reduction in invest-
ment, entrepreneurial, and risk-taking activity by independent [app] and content
providers operating at the ‘edge’ of a dominant platform”); Zhu, supra note 204, at 24–26
(summarizing empirical studies showing that “[the platform’s] entry pushes . . . app devel-
opers to innovate in other product spaces, which may reduce wasted efforts in
developing . . . duplicate apps,” but in the long term, “existing or prospective complementors
discouraged by [the platform’s] entry may bring fewer innovative products to the platform”).
654. See Caves & Singer, supra note 292, at 7.
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uniquely valuable business intelligence, and greater leverage over
complementors, closing off this avenue of business could reduce
platform profits, diminishing the platform’s incentive to invest.655 Again,
this potential reduction in platform innovation would need to be
weighed against the likely increase in complementor innovation—as well
as the potential for greater competition in the platform market.656 It is
possible that separations could spur development of competing plat-
forms, allowing smaller intermediaries to continue developing into viable
alternatives to incumbents.
Whether we should privilege platform or complementor innovation
is, in turn, a question of whether decentralized or centralized innovation
should be favored.657 The answer is likely to vary by industry and
market.658 But innovation literature suggests that “external” innovation is
more valuable for two reasons.659 First, “external innovation is more likely
to be of a disruptive nature,”660 that which marks a “radical departure
from the past.”661 And second, even “disruptive” internal innovation can
be contingent on the existence of external competitors.662 For this
reason, it may make sense to structure an ecosystem that encourages
external innovation, even if it comes at the expense of some platform
innovation.
Third, some argue that separations would dampen entrepreneurial
investment by creating a barrier to exit.663 Since venture capitalists invest
in startups in order to reap the rewards of “scaling a venture to exit,” this
argument holds, closing off one exit path would deter investment and
chill business formation.664 It is worth noting that a policy preventing
655. Id. (“[W]ith more enforcement, platform innovation could decrease due to the
reduced incentive for existing or would-be platforms to invest; for example, a regime that
shared the majority of the rents of incumbent platforms with edge providers or rival plat-
forms could upset Schumpeterian competition.”).
656. Id. at 6–11.
657. Van Schewick, Internet Architecture, supra note 217, at 298 (“Does decentralized
innovation by many innovators offer specific advantages that cannot be achieved by a potential
increase in centralized application-level innovation by a few network providers?”).
658. See Lemley, supra note 210, at 651–52 (arguing that the “relationship between
market structure and innovation is industry-specific,” demanding a more industry-specific
innovation policy).
659. Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously, supra note 213, at 318.
660. Id.
661. Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 962.
662. See Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously, supra note 213, at 318 (“That is to say,
established firms tend to innovate when they actually face a challenge from a startup or an
outsider.”).
663. See D. Daniel Sokol, Vertical Mergers and Entrepreneurial Exit, 70 Fla. L. Rev.
1357, 1362 (2018). It’s worth noting that Sokol is counsel at Wilson Sonsini, which counts
Google among its clients.
664. See id. (“Vertical merger policy that would unduly restrict large tech firms from
undertaking acquisitions in industries as diverse as finance, pharmaceuticals, medical
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dominant platforms from competing in the very markets they mediate
would leave the vast majority of exit options totally unaffected. The policy
would not categorically limit vertical acquisitions or acquisitions more
generally by a dominant platform. Limits would apply only if a dominant
platform that controlled a key distribution channel or marketplace
sought to acquire a firm that would compete in that marketplace. It
seems unlikely that such a targeted and limited restriction—that would
affect each dominant platform differently, given the distinct markets in
which each is dominant—would meaningfully undermine investment.
Moreover, in an environment in which startups face a threat of appro-
priation and discrimination by the platforms on which they are reliant,
dramatically reducing the likelihood of that threat should spur some
investment, not categorically diminish it.665 Even if closing off a small
number of exit options altered some investment decisions, the impact on
innovation is likely to be ambiguous at worst. This is especially likely to
be true in light of research showing that incumbent firms may acquire
innovative startups in order to squash their research and thwart future
competition666 and that “some limited antitrust restrictions on startup
acquisitions by highly-dominant incumbents would be socially bene-
ficial.”667 Introducing this limit as a presumption would increase admin-
istrability, leading to significant administrative savings.
Applying a separations regime, however structured, will involve
unavoidable uncertainties. But this uncertainty is not a compelling
argument for inaction. The fact that enforcers did not block a single one
of the over 400 acquisitions made by the five largest dominant platforms
over the last ten years strongly suggests systemic underenforcement.668
Switching the presumption under a limited set of conditions—namely,
when a dominant platform seeks to acquire a firm that would give the
platform the incentive and ability to discriminate and appropriate against
devices, hardware, and internet platforms would hurt incentives for innovation in the
economy by chilling business formation in start-ups.”).
665. See Caves & Singer, supra note 292, at 7–11 (describing the disincentive to invest
in startups that create products platforms might copy).
666. Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer & Song Ma, Killer Acquisitions 1 (Mar. 22,
2019) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3241707 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (leveraging theoretical and empirical evidence to argue that “an
incumbent firm may acquire an innovative target and terminate development of the
target’s innovations to preempt future competition”).
667. Kevin A. Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions, Rev.
Indus. Org. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 20–21), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3350064
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (suggesting that enforcers should intervene when
“(a) the acquirer is highly dominant; and (b) the acquired technology could plausibly
have an appreciable impact on competition if it is used exclusively by the acquirer”).
668. See Digital Competition Expert Panel, supra note 31, at 12 (noting that “[o]ver
the last 10 years the 5 largest firms have made over 400 acquisitions globally” but that
“[n]one has been blocked and very few have had conditions attached to approval, in the UK or
elsewhere,” and recommending “more frequent and firmer action to challenge mergers”).
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third-party platform dependents—is likely to involve some costs and
significant benefits.669
F. Alternative Remedies
It is worth briefly assessing what alternate remedies might address
information appropriation and discrimination by dominant digital
platforms.
The main alternative that has been proposed is a standalone
nondiscrimination regime. One such proposal would create a new tribu-
nal to assess innovation harms under a new nondiscrimination
standard.670 The idea is modeled after a tribunal created by the 1992
Cable Act, a forum that adjudicates discrimination complaints against
vertically integrated cable video operators pursuant to Section 616 of the
Cable Act.671 If applied to dominant digital platforms, edge innovators
alleging discrimination by a dominant platform could file a complaint in
the tribunal.672 Drawing from the cable example, Kevin Caves and Hal
Singer observe that the specialized tribunal has resolved discrimination
claims in half the time it takes on average to adjudicate a Section 2
antitrust claim in federal court.673
In contrast with a separations regime, this proposal institutes a
remedy ex post rather than ex ante and through case-by-case adjudi-
cation rather than a prophylactic rule.674 In particular, the complainant
bears the burden of showing (1) that its network is similarly situated to
the cable operator’s affiliated network(s); (2) that it received unfavorable
treatment owing to its lack of affiliation as opposed to some efficiency
justification; and (3) as a result of (1) and (2) it was materially impaired
in its ability to compete effectively. When considering the likely efficacy
of such a tribunal in resolving discrimination, it is important to consider
its administrability.
For one, the proposal assumes that third-party innovators can
identify when they are the subject of discrimination or appropriation.
While this may be true in the cable context—where getting blocked or
relegated to a less penetrated tier is relatively easy to detect—digital
669. See generally Robert W. Crandall, The Failure of Structural Remedies, 80 Or. L.
Rev. 109 (2001); Richard A. Epstein, Monopolization Follies: The Dangers of Structural
Remedies Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 76 Antitrust L.J. 205 (2009).
670. See Caves & Singer, supra note 292, at 20–27 (outlining this proposal).
671. Id. at 21.
672. Id.
673. Id. at 26 (comparing the average duration of each process and concluding that
“to the extent that these measures capture the difference between adjudicating a
discrimination complaint at the proposed tribunal and in an antitrust court, the duration
of adjudication prior to appeal could be reduced by nearly 50 percent”).
674. This assumes that separations would be implemented through a statute or
rulemaking, rather than as an antitrust remedy.
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platforms can discriminate in highly subtle ways.675 While well-resourced
incumbents may have the resources to hire experts to identify and
investigate discrimination and satisfy the evidentiary burden at a hearing,
most small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs will be less able to detect
and verify discrimination.
Second, the tribunal approach adopts a quasi-contractual frame,
assuming that platforms and edge companies are equal parties to a
transaction. This assumption is at odds with the significant asymmetry of
power between dominant platforms and the producers that depend on
them to get to market. In other words, the fact that bringing discrim-
ination claims would require independent developers or producers to
challenge their biggest business partner676 makes it even less likely that
third parties would freely use the tribunal, given potential risks of
retaliation.677 More generally, the tribunal assumes some base level of
resources: Independent edge companies without resources would have to
depend on the deterrent effect from private enforcement by those with
means to avail themselves of the protections. The universe of merchants,
developers, and content producers that rely on a dominant platform to
reach market is far more numerous and diverse than the universe of
cable video programmers that could rely on the tribunal to adjudicate
discrimination claims, suggesting that the remedy that works in the cable
context may be inapt for the digital platform context.678
Moreover, even disputes between well-heeled corporations can take
years to resolve. For example, in 2011 Bloomberg filed a complaint with
the FCC, alleging that Comcast was improperly grouping Bloomberg’s
channel in an unfavorable cluster of channels.679 Since the FCC had
conditioned Comcast’s acquisition of NBC on the basis of fair “neighbor-
hooding” of independent news networks, Bloomberg claimed that
Comcast was in violation of its commitments.680 Granted that this dispute
675. See, e.g., Benjamin Edelman, Mastering the Intermediaries, Harv. Bus. Rev. (June
2014), https://hbr.org/2014/06/mastering-the-intermediaries [https://perma.cc/3AZ2-
XNV9] (noting that “[p]latform providers usually get away with relatively subtle discrim-
ination as long as consumers don’t notice or care” and describing how Google deprioritized
Yelp search results after its proposed acquisition of Yelp fell through).
676. See Dzieza, supra note 41 (describing how reliant many merchants are on
Amazon’s infrastructure).
677. Cf. Jack Nicas, Google Pulls YouTube from Amazon Devices in Retaliation,
MarketWatch (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/google-pulls-youtube-
from-amazon-devices-in-retaliation-2017-12-06 [https://perma.cc/UW32-G9VN] (describing
how Google blocked access to YouTube on Amazon devices in retaliation for Amazon’s
refusal to stock products that compete with its own, “like the Google Home smart speaker
or Google’s Chromecast streaming device”).
678. See, e.g., Dzieza, supra note 41 (describing the diverse merchants on Amazon).
Amazon’s Marketplace alone has over six million merchants. Id.
679. See Bloomberg L.P. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, 28 FCC Rcd. 14,346, 14,347,
para. 3 (2013) (noting that Bloomberg filed its complaint on June 13, 2011).
680. Id. at 14,347–49, paras. 3–6 (explaining the background merger between
Comcast and NBC, as well as the dispute between Bloomberg and Comcast).
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was adjudicated outside the auspices of section 616 and the agency’s ALJ,
the FCC took over two years to reach a final decision.681 Given the
importance of timeliness in high-tech markets—where a slight delay can
render a remedy obsolete—even a two-year process in digital markets will
likely come at the expense of innovation.
In short, while a nondiscrimination regime coupled with a separa-
tions remedy would target the platform’s incentive and ability to
discriminate—be it through integration or through contract—a stand-
alone nondiscrimination remedy would risk being ineffective. For example,
the European Commission’s remedy in the Google Shopping case—
which required Google to implement a nondiscrimination approach—
has not changed the underlying market dynamic, prompting content
producers to describe it as “neither compliant nor effective.”682
A remedy that was more attuned to the significant asymmetry in
leverage would not rely entirely on third parties to contest the very inter-
mediary on which their business often depends. Imposing a structural
separation—that targets the underlying incentive to discriminate—would
mitigate these shortcomings.
CONCLUSION
A handful of digital platforms enjoy increasing control over key
arteries of online commerce and communications. How lawmakers and
regulators should respond to this concentration of market power is now
the subject of a global debate. Public authorities around the world are
studying digital platforms to understand how antitrust and competition
tools can be applied to markets mediated by digital technologies.683
These studies vary slightly in their methods and conclusions, but they
generally demonstrate that digital platform markets today are governed
neither by real competition nor regulation—giving dominant platforms
astounding power to shape market outcomes.
In the United States, the process of exploring how to respond to
dominant platforms has been stunted by the fact that we are living
681. See id. at 14,346.
682. Letter from Fourteen European Comparison Shopping Services to Margrethe
Vestager, Comm’r for Competition, European Comm’n (Nov. 22, 2018),
http://www.foundem.co.uk/Comparison_Shopping_Open_Letter_Commissioner_Vestager_
Nov_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC9F-EBJM].
683. See, e.g., Australian Competition & Consumer Comm’n, supra note 31, at 7–8
(discussing the anticompetitive risk online platforms pose to Australian consumers, given
consumers’ “lack of informed and genuine choice” in relying on these platforms); Crémer
et al., supra note 3, at 5–7 (summarizing the European Commission’s conclusions on the
anticompetitive nature of major online platforms); Data Processing in Online Advertising,
supra note 31, at 2–10 (providing findings from the French Competition Authority on the
dominance that Facebook and Google possess in the market for online advertising);
Digital Competition Expert Panel, supra note 31, at 8–16 (providing various recommen-
dations for how the U.K. government can promote competition in digital markets).
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through a major regulatory gap. The abandonment of traditional regu-
latory tools in favor of antitrust—followed by the partial collapse of
antitrust—has left us with a diminished sense of the policy levers
available to address dominant network intermediaries. This Article joins
an emerging field of scholarship that is responding to this sense of
impoverishment by exploring how traditional principles of economic
regulation may apply in the digital age.
The process of identifying how to confront the challenges posed by
dominant platforms requires, first, an understanding of the relevant
problems and, second, an understanding of the relevant set of legal tools
and principles available to confront them. Recovering our understanding
of structural separations—traditionally a mainstay regulatory principle
for confronting dominant intermediaries—is one part of this process.
Reviewing the tradition of separations, moreover, underscores the
broader set of values and concerns that traditionally informed how we
assessed and arrived at the proper form of intervention when confronted
with dominant intermediaries.
Recent events, meanwhile, seem to be driving the public discussion
toward separations. Earlier this year, India began enforcing a structural
separation on foreign online retailers—requiring Amazon to separate its
private-label business from its marketplace.684 In March, Senator Elizabeth
Warren rolled out, through her presidential campaign, a proposed sepa-
rations regime for dominant tech platforms, even drawing support from
some tech workers.685
Getting the policy right will require careful case-by-case analysis and
further study to assess the relevant tradeoffs. Closer study, moreover, may
reveal that the set of contexts that warrant separations is relatively lim-
ited. Arriving at the proper set of interventions, however, requires first
knowing the full set of available tools.
684. See Sankalp Phartiyal, Walmart, Amazon Scrambling to Comply with India’s New
E-Commerce Rules, Reuters (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-
ecommerce/walmart-amazon-scrambling-to-comply-with-indias-new-e-commerce-rules-idUS
KCN1PP1PN [https://perma.cc/3HZR-ES45] (“Another rule blocks entities in which an
e-commerce firm, or any of its group companies, owns a stake from selling its products on
that firm’s marketplace.”).
685. See Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, Medium (Mar. 8,
2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c
[https://perma.cc/MRX5-5WZY] (proposing “passing legislation that requires large tech
platforms to be designated as ‘Platform Utilities’ and broken apart from any participant
on that platform”); see also Casey Tolan, Google, Facebook, Amazon and Apple
Employees Donating to Elizabeth Warren, Even Though She Wants to Break Up Big Tech,
Mercury News (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/04/19/elizabeth-
warren-president-tech-campaign-donations-berine-sanders-kamala-harris/ (“I see a lot of
people start companies and their whole plan for the company is to get acquired. . . . It
creates this narrow environment where you’re only trying to please Facebook or Apple or
Google, and I think that is ultimately bad for our country.” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Justin Kruger, a freelance software developer)).
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APPENDIX. WHY WOULD PLATFORMS UNDERMINE THEIR ECOSYSTEM?
At first glance, the idea that dominant digital platforms may be using
their integrated structure to undermine dynamic efficiency appears in
tension with standard economic theory. This Appendix examines how to
square digital platforms’ conduct with an economic understanding of
integration in adjacent markets.
Vertical relationships, including full integration, can deliver certain
benefits.686 Integration can help resolve contractual holdup problems
that can arise in economically interdependent relationships.687 It can also
reduce costs: Since each company in a vertical transaction usually charges
consumers a markup above marginal cost, vertical integration can elimi-
nate this “double marginalization.”688 Moreover, by granting a single firm
greater control over quality and interoperability, integration can also
better guarantee a stable ecosystem in which platforms and comple-
mentary products work together smoothly.689
Vertical restraints can also be anticompetitive. Economic literature
extensively documents how vertical relationships can raise rivals’ costs or
deny rivals scale, enable exclusion, or facilitate tacit collusion.690 When
686. While the focus of this Article is full vertical ownership, other vertical arrange-
ments include joint ventures, tie-ins, long-term contracts, and affiliates.
687. See Bork, Antitrust Paradox, supra note 267, at 226–33; Christopher S. Yoo,
Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 Yale J. on Reg. 171,
262–64 (2002). The holdup problems can be especially significant in platform markets,
which are commonly characterized as facing a “chicken-and-egg” problem. See David S.
Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 20 Yale J. on Reg. 325, 350 (2003)
(“Critical mass . . . is a key start-up issue [for platforms]. Known in the literature as the chicken-
and-egg problem, the name does not do the problem justice. In some situations coupled
products cannot come into existence without a sufficient number of customers on both
sides from the start.”).
688. Bork, Antitrust Paradox supra note 267, at 219; see also Joseph J. Spengler,
Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. Pol. Econ. 347, 350 (1950). Notably,
evidence today shows that the elimination of double marginalization does not categorically
benefit consumers. See, e.g., Fernando Luco & Guillermo Marshall, Vertical Integration
with Multiproduct Firms: When Eliminating Double Marginalization May Hurt Consumers
2 (Dec. 7, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3110038 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (observing that in multiproduct industries, the elimination
of double marginalization caused by vertical integration may cause price changes that hurt
consumers).
689. Courts have acknowledged this justification. See United States v. Jerrold Elecs.
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556–57 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (acknowledging that bundling the sale of
equipment with engineering services helped “foster the orderly growth of the industry”).
690. See, e.g., Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure,
1990 Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity 205, 205–07; Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven
C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96
Yale L.J. 209, 224 (1986); Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure, in 3
Handbook of Industrial Organization 2145, 2148–50 (Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter
eds., 2007); Michael H. Riordan, Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm,
88 Am. Econ. Rev. 1232, 1232 (1998); Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market
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assessing the competitive implications of vertical acquisitions, enforcers
largely assess tradeoffs between foreclosure incentives and claimed
reductions in price.
Two theories maintain that integrated firms are unlikely to use their
dominant network to discriminate against independent products and
services (which are sometimes described in platform literature as “comple-
mentors”). Both focus on the incentives faced by an integrated
monopolist. Although a monopolist may have the ability to discriminate
against complementors, these theories hold, the monopolist will gener-
ally lack the incentive to do so. It is worth reviewing these economic
theories and identifying the exceptions that may explain why dominant
platforms appear to engage in this conduct, even in instances in which
the platform is not strictly a monopolist.
First, the “single monopoly profit” theory suggests that a monopolist
does not have an incentive to discriminate against complementors
because it cannot increase its profit by monopolizing a market for comple-
mentary products.691 Say, for example, a monopolist in the bolts market
sought also to monopolize the market for nuts. Economic theory holds
that there is a single profit-maximizing price for any combination of nuts
and bolts, such that raising the price of nuts while maintaining the
monopoly-level price of bolts would lead to a decline in demand
sufficient to lower total profits. 692 In other words, the bolts monopolist is
no better off by also monopolizing nuts. Therefore, the theory goes, the
bolts monopolist has nothing to gain by excluding—and thereby driving
out—rivals in the nuts market.693
The second major explanation for why monopolists lack an incentive
to discriminate against complementors is that these independent services
may actually raise the monopolist’s profits. This “internalizing comple-
mentary efficiencies” (ICE) argument holds that if complementors intro-
duce valuable goods or services that generate surplus, the monopolist
that hosts these services on its network can capture that surplus.694 If an
Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. Econ., 345, 345–46 (1988); Michael D. Whinston, Exclusivity and
Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don’t Know, 15 J. Econ. Persp. 63, 64 (2001).
691. Bork, Antitrust Paradox, supra note 267, at 229 (“[A] monopolist has no
incentive to gain a second monopoly that is vertically related to the first, because there is
no additional monopoly profit to be taken.”); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 197–99 (2d
ed. 2001); Bowman, supra note 268, at 20–23; Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Antitrust
Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. Rev. 281, 290–92 (1956).
692. 1 Herbert Hovenkamp et al., IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles
Applied to Intellectual Property Law § 21.03[B] (3d ed. 2018).
693. For explanations relying on a detailed example, see Barbara van Schewick, Internet
Architecture, supra note 217, at 222–23 (2010); Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts,
and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 397, 403 (2009)
[hereinafter Elhauge, Single Monopoly Profit Theory].
694. Van Schewick, Internet Architecture, supra note 217, at 223; Joseph Farrell &
Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a
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operating system with a broader range of applications (or a marketplace
with a broader range of products) is more valuable to users than one
with a narrower range, then the monopolist has an incentive to cultivate
a broader set of complementors. On this view, the monopolist’s incen-
tives are aligned with the user’s.695 Not only does the monopolist lack an
incentive to exclude valuable complementors696 but doing so may even
lower its profits.697 ICE explains why it is assumed that a platform
monopolist will be a “good steward” of the applications and products
that seek access to its platform.698
Subsequent learning and research has led scholars to refine both of
these theories. While the single monopoly profit idea was initially
introduced as a general rule, scholars have since understood that it
provides definitive answers under a relatively narrow set of condition.699
Today the theory is understood to be decisive only when: (1) the
monopolist is both unregulated and protected by prohibitive entry
barriers, (2) the monopolist’s product is used in fixed proportion with
the product sold in the adjacent market, and (3) the adjacent market is
perfectly competitive.700 When any of these conditions does not hold, the
welfare effects of integration are far more ambiguous. Single monopoly
profits, it turns out, are “the exception, not the rule.”701
Similarly, the assumption that a monopoly platform will always make
its platform available whenever it is efficient to do so does not always
Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 85,
89 (2003).
695. See Joseph Farrell, Open Access Arguments: Why Confidence Is Misplaced, in
Net Neutrality or Net Neutering: Should Broadband Internet Services Be Regulated? 195,
198 (Thomas M. Lenard & Randolph J. May eds., 2003) (“ICE asserts that if a platform
sponsor does, or allows to be done, anything that reduces customer value from applica-
tions, say by $1, then the demand curve for platform subscription falls by that $1, lowering
platform profits by $1 per customer.”).
696. See van Schewick, Internet Architecture, supra note 217, at 223 (“Whether the
presence of independent producers generates additional surplus depends on consumers’
preferences, as well as on such things as the intensity of competition and the degree of
differentiation in the complementary market . . . .”).
697. See id. at 225 (“Whereas the ‘one monopoly rent’ theory argues that exclusionary
conduct in the complementary market will not increase the monopolist’s profits, the
‘internalizing complementary efficiencies’ theory suggests that such conduct may even reduce
its profits.”).
698. Farrell & Weiser, supra note 694, at 104.
699. See, e.g., Elhauge, Single Monopoly Profit Theory, supra note 693, at 404
(“However, the model indicating a single monopoly profit depended on several key
assumptions . . . . As the economic literature shows, different results are reached if one relaxes
these narrow assumptions. Indeed, relaxation of any one of these assumptions produces a
distinctive profit-increasing effect.”); see also Salop, supra note 272, at 1968–69 (2018)
(“This theory is simple but invalid in all but the following extreme conditions . . . .”).
700. Salop, supra note 272, at 1968–69; see also Elhauge, Single Monopoly Profit
Theory, supra note 693, at 404.
701. Elhauge, Single Monopoly Profit Theory, supra note 693, at 400.
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hold.702 There are several circumstances under which a platform can be
expected to engage in exclusionary conduct that is inefficient.703 Broadly,
a dominant platform can be expected to engage in exclusionary conduct
when (1) it is able to more fully exploit its existing market power or (2) it
is able to achieve additional market power.
It is worth briefly identifying the contexts under which these condi-
tions are likely to arise in digital markets.704
A. More Fully Exploiting Existing Market Power: Exclusionary Conduct
Enables Price Discrimination
First, a dominant platform may have an incentive to exclude comple-
mentors from its network when doing so would enable it to price discrim-
inate.705 Price discrimination—or charging customers different prices
based on their willingness to pay—enables a monopolist to more fully
exploit its existing market power by extracting more consumer surplus.706
In order to engage in price discrimination, a seller must enjoy some market
power—namely, the ability to profitably set price above marginal costs.707
Foreclosing or discriminating against certain applications or services
can enable the platform to separate consumers into different groups,
based on their willingness to pay.708 For example, the platform can offer
different tiers of service: a basic version that provides access to the network
but excludes certain applications and a premium version that provides
access to the network as well as all applications.709
702. The number of exceptions to both the single monopoly profit theorem and ICE
has prompted some to question whether these ideas should still be considered general
principles. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 695, at 197 (“However, post-Chicago economics
finds that [the one monopoly rent theorem]/ICE has many holes, perhaps too many to be
a ‘theorem.’”).
703. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 694, at 105–119 (identifying and discussing eight
exceptions to ICE); van Schewick, Internet Architecture, supra note 217, at 225–81 (discussing
exceptions to the one monopoly rent theorem and ICE).
704. Notably, the exceptions reviewed do not assume that only a monopoly platform can
undermine competition in an adjacent market. Although most of the literature analyzing
the exclusionary potential of vertical conduct takes monopoly power to be an “indispen-
sable precondition” for anticompetitive effects, even platforms facing limited competition
may have the ability and incentive to exclude competing content, services, or applications.
See, e.g., van Schewick, Internet Architecture, supra note 217, at 255 (“A monopoly in the
primary market is therefore considered an indispensable precondition for successful monopo-
lization of the secondary market.”); id. at 256 (“A network provider may have the ability
and incentive to exclude rival content, applications, or portals from its network, even if it
faces limited competition in the market for Internet services.” (footnote omitted)).
705. See id. at 275–77; Farrell & Weiser, supra note 694, at 107–09.
706. Van Schewick, Internet Architecture, supra note 217, at 275–76.
707. Id. at 276.
708. See id. at 275–76.
709. Id. at 276.
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This form of price discrimination may or may not undermine the
static welfare of consumers.710 Analyzing the welfare effects of any price
discrimination scheme requires empirical analysis based on consumer
preferences and the market’s cost structure.711 But insofar as price discrim-
ination lowers the profits available to complementors, it can depress their
incentive to invest and innovate—thereby undermining dynamic effi-
ciency.712 More generally, discriminatory pricing can “introduce distortion
into the overall market” by “disadvantaging certain classes” of comple-
mentors and decreasing the profits available to them by diverting more
consumer surplus to the dominant platform.713
B. Expanding Market Power: Complementary Market Is a Source of Outside
Revenue
In the standard economic model, a monopolist in the primary
market is assumed to capture its entire monopoly profit from that
market, limiting its ability to earn a second monopoly profit.714 But if
firms in the complementary market derive revenue from other sources—
such as advertising—then the monopolist in the primary market will
likely have an incentive to monopolize the secondary market as well.715
Since excluding rivals in the complementary market can diminish for
consumers the value of the primary network, the overall gains in outside
revenue postexclusion will need to be greater than the profit reduction
in the primary-good market in order for exclusion to be a profitable
strategy.716
Digital platforms that operate in distinct but interrelated markets are
likely to fit this exception. Google, for example, provides its search
engine at zero monetary price and earns the vast majority of its net
income through selling digital ad placement.717 When considering whether
to grant third-party content providers equal access to its search platform,
Google must weigh the revenue it could lose through discriminating against
710. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 694, at 108 (“Price discrimination need not in
itself be inefficient or anti-consumer . . . .”).
711. See generally Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in 1 Handbook of Industrial
Organization 597 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (providing a
theoretical background for analyzing the welfare effects of price discrimination).
712. See van Schewick, Internet Architecture, supra note 217, at 277–78; Wu, Network
Neutrality, supra note 16, at 153; see also Farrell & Katz, supra note 199, at 414 (“[F]irm
M’s desire and ability to extract rents from independent suppliers after they have con-
ducted their R&D may inefficiently reduce these suppliers’ innovation incentives . . . .”).
713. Van Schewick, Internet Architecture, supra note 217, at 277.
714. See id. at 222–23.
715. See id. at 233.
716. Id.
717. See 2018 Alphabet 10-K, supra note 106, at 4–5, 27.
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third-party content718 against the revenue it could gain through
monopolizing the secondary market. Privileging its own content sites
would help keep users within the Google ecosystem, which would in turn
allow Google both to capture greater user data and to sell more (and
potentially higher-priced) ads.719 Given that behavioral ad markets place
a premium on comprehensive user data,720 prioritizing Google verticals
in Google search results is likely to be lucrative. Whether this exclu-
sionary conduct would offset potential revenue losses to Google’s
primary network is an empirical question.
More generally, it is worth examining whether certain features
exhibited by digital platform markets may change the default calculus in
favor of exclusion. If a standard choice faced by a dominant platform is
whether to grant rival complementors access to its network and charge a
fee to extract some of their revenue or to exclude all rival comple-
mentors and sell the service itself, then digital markets seem to tip the
balance in favor of the latter. This is because digital platforms are making
an ecosystem play: By bundling different services and portals, a platform
can heighten switching costs and collect more user data by tracking
individuals across services, both of which amount to a lucrative strategy.721
The enormous value assigned to user datasets suggests that platforms will
have an even greater incentive to keep users within their walled gardens,
meaning that they will be more likely to choose direct access and exclu-
sion over shared access and complementor revenue.
Lastly, online markets may lower the cost of exclusion. While
foreclosure strategies traditionally involve denying a third-party access
outright, digital markets enable subtler forms of discrimination.722 Discrim-
inating against a complementor risks increasing user dissatisfaction with
the product, but users will have limited insight into the source of the
718. Since Google does not charge a monetary price for using its search engine,
calculating the revenue loss that results from one user abandoning Google Search is not
straightforward. Since Google monetizes the user through selling ads, see id. at 4–5, 27,
the revenue loss would be on the ad side.
719. Notably, this does not assume or require that Google capture the secondary
market. See van Schewick, Internet Architecture, supra note 217, at 237 (“Even without
monopolizing a specific market in which advertisers buy access to the network provider’s
Internet customers, selling access to a large block of customers may be more profitable
than selling access to subgroups of that block.”).
720. See Newman, Control of User Data, supra note 286, at 407 (noting that Google’s
“integrated profile[s]” of its users are valuable to advertisers).
721. See id. (noting that Google’s many products and services “allow[] it to develop an
integrated profile of more individuals,” which it then uses “to allow advertisers to more
effectively target particular ads”).
722. See van Schewick, Internet Architecture, supra note 217, at 260 (“[T]he network
provider may be able to engage in exclusionary conduct without losing too many of its
Internet-service customers by using discrimination instead of direct exclusion.”). For
example, instead of blocking access to a complementary product, a network provider
could merely slow that complementary product—a subtler form of discrimination that the
network provider’s internet-service customers would be less likely to notice. See id.
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quality degradation, reducing the chance that they will respond by
abandoning the platform. In other words, if Apple denies Spotify
upgrades on iOS, users may blame Spotify rather than Apple, limiting
Apple’s exposure to users abandoning Apple. Switching costs, moreover,
can be significant in digital platform markets, especially in the absence of
interoperability or data portability regimes—a fact that also reduces the
cost of exclusion.723
C. Expanding Market Power: Primary Good Is Inessential for Uses of
Complementary Good
Another set of conditions under which a dominant platform will
have an incentive to foreclose rivals in a complementary market occurs
when: (1) the dominant platform’s complementary good can be used inde-
pendently of the primary platform, (2) the platform can stop its compet-
itors from selling their version of the complementary good to the
platform’s users, and (3) the complementary market exhibits economies
of scale or network effects.724
Because a platform monopoly facing these conditions would not be
able to extract all monopoly profits through its pricing of the primary
service, it would have an incentive to extend its monopoly into the comple-
mentary market.725 The existence of network effects, meanwhile, enables
the monopolist to thwart potential rivals from the complementary
market by excluding them from the primary market.726
Even if the platform is not a monopolist, exclusionary conduct that
drove more sales of the complementary good or service would likely be
profitable. Because the cost structure of applications and content usually
involves high fixed costs and low marginal costs, any subsequent sales—
presumably at prices above marginal cost—would likely generate profits.727
723. See Adam Candeub, Behavioral Economics, Internet Search, and Antitrust, 9 I/S:
J.L. & Pol’y for Info. Soc’y 407, 409 (2014) (“If we establish habits and routines to allocate
our scarce cognitive resources, these routines—like many other habits—can be quite
difficult, i.e., costly, to break, creating high switching costs with possible anti-competitive
implications.”); Newman, Digital Markets, supra note 579, at 8–12, 20 (discussing various
factors that lead to high switching costs in digital markets).
724. See van Schewick, Internet Architecture, supra note 217, at 226–27.
725. See id. at 227.
726. See id.
727. See id. at 252.
